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Abstract 
 
Private companies provide security and military services to states, international organizations, 
international non-governmental organizations, and individuals. This thesis addresses the 
United Nation’s use of private security and military companies. The study looks into the 
characteristics of this practice and subsequently provides some explanations for the pattern 
and rationale thereof. The systematization of compiled data on 32 contracts between the UN 
and private security and military companies (PSCs and PMCs) reveals that three main 
categories of services are supplied; Security services, logistic and support services, and what 
is here collectively termed expert services. 
 
The analytical framework deployed focuses both on enhanced need on part of the UN, and on 
enhanced offer from the private sector. The role of the private security and military industry 
has evolved substantially since the beginning of the 1990s when the phenomenon was first 
paid attention to in academic writing. In order to explain the UN’s use of these companies, 
both the UN organization and the industry as such is subject to examination. A twofold 
analytical framework is thus presented. Interviews and official documents are used to examine 
the validity of five propositions derived from the analytical framework. The propositions 
regarding UN demand suggest both radicalized external operating environments and internal 
organizational capacities have contributed to the UN deploying PSCs and PMCs. On the 
supply side, the last set of propositions indicate that comprehensive image refinement efforts 
on part of the industry have added to the UN deploying these companies, while quantitative 
expansion of the industry does not appear to influence UN PSC/PMC contracting in a direct 
manner.  
 
This thesis thus argues that the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs can be explained by the UN 
simultaneously facing more difficult premises for its operations, enhanced expectations for 
action, and proportionally deteriorated internal capacity. The private security and military 
industry on its part has detected the UN potential market and strive to accommodate to the 
demands of this potentially very profitable market.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In June 2004 Congolese students released a wave of violence in central and eastern parts of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo in protest of the UN mission’s failure to stop the atrocities 
in the Ituri province. The frustration of the Congolese civil war, which has claimed close to 
four million lives since the war began in 1994, was thus directed towards UN associated 
personnel and facilities. Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), a US company, was an 
integrated part of the UN operation by running six airfields for the mission, their employees 
were driving UN vehicles and considered UN workers by the people and hence also subject to 
the attacks.  The violence in Kisangani, in the northeastern Congo, caused the UN 
headquarters in the city to burn to the ground, UN staff housing was attacked and burned, 
while over 70 UN vehicles were stoned and set ablaze. As the UN’s military contingent was 
led to simply withdraw without making any effort to stop the anarchy, 300 terrified UN staff 
was thus set into full flight to the local airport, where they demanded emergency evacuation 
from the city fearing they would be killed by the rioting mobs. While PAE workers prepared 
for, and carried out the evacuation of the UN staff, the PAE teams were themselves declared 
‘mission essential’ by the UN Director of Administration, and were not permitted to leave 
unless the entire mission were decided abandoned (Joly 2004: 1-2)1.  
 
The scenario from Congo is not a single case. The UN partners with what is termed private 
security companies and private military companies on a regular basis to support its peace and 
humanitarian operations around the globe.2 The concept of private security companies (PSCs) 
and private military companies (PMCs) has caught the public’s eye in the wake of the US 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the killing and mutilation of four Blackwater employees in 
Fallujah drew additional attention to the practice of using private security providers. While 
such companies are not a new phenomenon, it is a lesser known fact that some of these 
companies have been present in most major conflicts since the 1990s, and that a few of them 
have a history working for the United Nations which at least dates two decades back.  
 
                                                 
1
 Joly was the PAE project manager in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The document was obtained 
from PAE officials and is yet to be published, but is available from the author.  
2
 The title of the thesis refers to peace operations; however this thesis considers the humanitarian operations 
inherent in the broader peace concept and thereby also concerns humanitarian operations.  
Introduction 
 2 
There is no consensus as to what constitutes a private security or private military company, 
nor to the appropriate term to be used for the rather wide variety of companies usually 
referred to as PSCs or PMCs. In this thesis a PSC or a PMC is understood as a commercial 
company employing mainly former military personnel to perform security services, either in 
the shape of guards or bodyguards, armed or unarmed, or consultant security services; 
logistics or other support services; or specialized operational services such as demining, 
policing, operation of advanced weapons systems etc.3 
 
The activities of PSCs and PMCs have spurred contentious debate among experts and 
commentators whether these companies constitute a menace or a blessing to peace. In the 
context of the UN’s long history of failures to “save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war” (Doyle 1999: 451), how then does the UN actually make use of these companies, and 
how can this practice be explained? This thesis attempts to answer these two questions by 
looking at both the changes in the UN’s preconditions for peace and humanitarian operations, 
as well as the evolution in the private security and military industry, and finally how these 
changes interact to prepare for the UN’s use of these companies.  
 
The future role of the United Nations is currently subject to debate. There are obviously 
strong opinions in the world community as to what roles and responsibilities the organization 
is to be bestowed and how they are to be carried out. The United States has a particularly 
heavy bearing upon the organization’s effectiveness and striking power and preferences 
emanating from this member state thus necessarily carry a lot of weight. In the case of PSC/ 
PMC reliance the UN is strongly encouraged to follow the US example and expand its 
outsourcing practice. In a US Senate appropriations bill regarding contributions for 
international peacekeeping activities in 2005 the private sector solution to cutting UN 
peacekeeping costs appears only semi-eligible: 
  
“The Committee is aware that, in some cases, private companies can carry out 
effective peacekeeping missions for a fraction of the funding the United Nations 
requires to carry out the same missions. At a minimum such companies should be 
utilized to supplement the number of blue berets and blue helmets which, in these 
                                                 
3
 See ”Definitional problems” section under 1.3 for a more detailed discussion of the denotations of the 
companies. 
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turbulent times, the United Nations is having a difficult time recruiting. The 
United Nations can no longer afford to ignore the potential cost-savings that 
private companies with proven records of good service and good behaviour can 
offer”   (US Senate Report 108-344, Appropriations Bill 2005). 
   
One can thus infer that the topic of UN dependence upon PSCs and PMCs will only gain 
relevance in the time ahead. Additionally, the new US ambassador to the UN as of March 
2005, John Bolton (Rice 2005), will most likely not contribute to slow down these 
developments.     
 
The great paradox surrounding the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs involves the UN’s attitude 
towards this practice. The only coherence in the handling of the matter appears to be the 
consistent avoidance of the issue altogether. The strategy of evasion can most likely be traced 
back to the sensitivity of the issue. The different UN agencies are very sensitive to the issue of 
PSCs as, in the press and in the general public perception, their use is frequently equated with 
the use of private armies or mercenaries. The rather contentious moral debate pending is 
apparently not on the UN’s agenda for the time being. This has accordingly led individual 
staff members within UN organizations to flatly deny, contrary to the facts, that their 
organization has ever sought advice from PSCs or contracted any such company (Van Brabant 
2002: 9). Illustrative of the apparent ignorance of the topic, officials of the Best Practices 
Section at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) claim not to have the 
qualifications for answering questions concerning UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs (personal 
communication with Ikegaya 17 August 2005). In the meantime the practice continues 
without any systematic framework or set of official regulatory measures.  
 
It is not only in UN circles that the issue of privatized means of security is contentious. In 
academic circles, as well as in media, the debate on the use of privatized means of security 
has been characterized by entrenched and polarized views. The tendency of the media to 
sensationalize has not contributed to a more serious and constructive debate. Until the 
American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the focus of debate had for the most part resided 
around some companies’ history in African conflicts, especially in situations where the 
presence of these companies coincided with large deposits of minerals. Much has thus been 
written about the infamous South African enterprise, Executive Outcomes (EO), and its 
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interference in conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone, and about Sandline in Papua New 
Guinea and in Sierra Leone (Musah and Fayemi, 2000, Howe 2001, Pech 1999 etc.). While 
there are still companies around which operate in the spirit of EO and Sandline, a somewhat 
different niche appeared in the mid 1990s, which led to the formation of companies with a 
somewhat altered impact area. Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and 
Defence Systems Limited (DSL) already represented companies doing business with the 
developed states, and hence debate was spurred about the degree to which such companies 
were acting as government proxies substituting state force in sensitive areas or contexts. This 
particular debate has again gained currency in relation to the Iraq invasion. The American 
authorities have used PSCs and PMCs extensively to take load of the tested state armed 
forces. The debate is of current interest and a stronger emphasis should be put on the links 
between government and global private means of security.  
 
As the practice becomes established and apparently hard to reverse, the current debate is 
mainly focused on the terms on which the companies work. Alternatives for regulation of 
PSCs/ PMCs and their activities have thus emerged as one of the most debated issues 
concerning the private security and military industry. The scope of PSC/PMC dependence is 
also a matter of discussion, particularly in the Iraqi context. While not a formal part of the 
coalition force in Iraq, the private security teams are taking part of the hostilities in a direct 
manner. A South African/ British company, Erinys, admits having killed approximately 70 
insurgents while in Iraq (PBS, Melville 2005). The scope of PSC/ PMC use, their globalized 
nature, along with the fact that PSC personnel fall into a loophole in terms of international 
law render it an important issue to be discussed, preferably internationally. In terms of the 
UN, there has been sporadic debate whether to substitute UN peacekeeping operations with 
private initiatives in certain situations, however, in most cases this still seems too far flung for 
it becoming a serious matter of discussion.4 Little has, however, been said about the partial 
outsourcing of UN functions although the issue obviously involves multiple concerns. The 
practice of outsourcing parts of UN peacekeeping does compromise one of the major ideas 
behind multinational peacekeeping: a multifaceted international presence reflecting 
interference from the international community into conflicts as opposed to the interference of 
single states or biased groups of states. Calls for diverse personnel, in terms of geography, 
                                                 
4
 Reportedly, during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 deploying Executive Outcomes to end the anarchic situation 
in some UN refugee camps was one of the alternatives considered. In the end, it was considered too contentious 
and Congolese forces were brought to remedy the precarious situation (Annan 1998: 8).    
Introduction 
 5 
culture, religion, etc to perform security related duties in order not to deter or to provoke local 
parties is perhaps not adhered to by a private company relying on whatever is most cost-
efficient. In addition, concern is due as to how the UN manages the outsourcing. The 
organization should have to deal with the issue in an overt manner to ensure that the very 
valuable contracts are administered in a responsible and transparent manner. Current practices 
of evasion and ignorance only serves to add uncertainty and unpredictability to a practice 
already considered contentious.     
  
While the 1990s interventions in mineral rich developing countries are often explained by the 
weak state structures leading governments to hire PMCs to contribute to solving their internal 
problems (Howe, Mandel 2001, Musah and Fayemi 2000 etc.), developed state deployment of 
private means of security is explained largely as part of a general shift from 'government' to 
'governance' in which policy sectors that had been centralized during the last century currently 
are privatized or partly so (Krahmann 2002).   The use of PMCs by the United Nations can, as 
will be done in this thesis, be linked to both factors but not exclusively so. As the organization 
normally operates in developing countries on the conditions there present, the organization’s 
use of private military services can only be explained with the use of a multilayered set of 
variables reflecting external operational limitations, internal organizational deficiencies, as 
well as changes in the industry itself. Two sets of variables are thus used to explain the 
changes in the operating preconditions of the organization on the one hand, and industry 
developments on the other. Altogether these developments have prepared for the United 
Nations using privatized security and military services to assist in carrying out its operations.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter it will first be attempted to give an overview of the various 
strands of private military and security providers, pertaining both a historical and a 
contemporary outlook, whereas the methodology of the thesis will be dealt with in the latter 
part. The chapter closes with a full oversight of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Private security providers, an overview 
Throughout most of history security has been a commodity, a privilege to those who could 
afford to offer something in return and as such, the Weberian state monopoly of violence 
where the state is the lone supplier of security provision is historically an exception rather 
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than the rule.5 During the post-Cold War era there has been a new upsurge and evolution in 
private security provision, this time in the shape of corporate entities that seek distance form 
the mercenary label. The dominance of market liberal economic ideologies has lead 
privatization to become a preferred means as to reforming organizations across the public 
sector. The security sector is thus only the latest arena to have been marked by the 
privatization incentive. According to Robert Mandel (2001: 130) three trends seem to be of 
particular notice concerning the privatization of security functions: The spread of arms to the 
civilian population at large, the growth of formally organized private security outfits, and the 
increasing involvement of these private security providers in global turmoil (Mandel 2002: 7). 
Although these three trends can not be considered being independent of each other, but rather 
as highly interrelated developments, this thesis will in essence deal with the two last trends; 
the increase in supply of multinational private security providers and their increasing 
performance on the international arena, in this case in relation to the United Nations. 
 
The private security business can be divided in three rather broad categories: classic 
mercenaries (acting individually, but also in groups or even firms), private military 
companies, and private security companies. The distinctions between the last two categories 
are vague; service offer is inconsistent and often depending on profit margins, commercial 
opportunity, as well as the preponderant legal and moral environment. The private 
security/military industry is at present in considerable flux, it is highly heterogeneous both 
with regard to each categorization and the type of services offered. Some companies aspire to 
operate in a legal environment characterized by legitimacy, while others are far less fussy 
about their assignments. Meanwhile, the more unscrupulous classic mercenarism is 
regrettably, not a closed chapter.   
 
                                                 
5
 See the “Traditional mercenarism” section below.  
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1.1.1 Traditional mercenarism  
Mercenarism6 - the use of paid foreign professional soldiers freelancing their skills to a party 
of a conflict- is as old as conflict itself and has historically attracted little attention as it was 
accepted as normal practice. The ancient Greeks employed Macedonians; Rome hired one 
Germanic tribe to defend its imperial borders against another, and even earlier, in 334 BC, 
Greek mercenaries were used by Persia in the war against Alexander the Great (Musah and 
Fayemi 2000: 5). However, it was in the warring mini-states of Renaissance Italy that 
mercenaries probably enjoyed the highest prominence. During the 14th and 15th century the 
competing city-states used highly organized mercenary armies to conquer rich and strategic 
neighbouring states, and the condottieri served whoever was willing to pay.7After the French 
Revolution, with the identification of the state as the locus of loyalty, it was considered 
correct that every man should serve his country only. This attitude was institutionalized 
through the universal conscription, and it became an ideal that was spread throughout Europe 
and the West (Adams 1999: 2). Hiring of mercenaries was in the period after 1799 generally 
considered immoral and treacherous.  As the European powers extended their world influence 
and created their empires throughout the nineteenth century, hiring of mercenaries was, 
however, a common tool in the attempt to maintain control of the colonies. The 
decolonization period, especially in Africa, therefore coincided with the modern upsurge of 
mercenary activity. During the 1960s and 1970s the people’s struggles to assert their right to 
self- determination were on several occasions met by small groups, or even individual 
mercenaries, hired by the colonial powers and other external interests to undermine the 
liberation struggles.8 Hired for their perceived combat supremacy, a relatively small force or 
group of individuals could pose a threat to an emerging newly independent African state 
(Lilly 2000b: 8). Individuals such as ‘Mad’ Mike Hoare, Jack ‘Black Jack’ Schramme, and 
Bob Denard have thus become notorious elements in African liberation history (Musah and 
                                                 
6
 Article 47 of the Geneva Convention Protocol I defines a mercenary by six cumulative criterions which all 
must be fulfilled in order to be defined legally as a mercenary. A mercenary is then any one who a) Is especially 
recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict; b) Does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities; c) Is 
motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on 
behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; d) Is neither a national of a Party to 
the conflict, nor a resident of a territory controlled by a Party to the conflict e) Is not a member of the armed 
forces of a Party to the armed conflict, and f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces (Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions 1949, Article 47).    
7
 The captains of these forces were called condottieri because they signed a written contract - a condotta – to 
fight for a feudal lord or a rich city.  
8
 Mercenaries were involved in halting the liberating process in i.e. Algeria (1956), the Congo (1960), the 
Comoros Islands (1970s-1990s), Benin (1970s), as well as in Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, the Seychelles etc. 
(Musah and Fayemi 2000: 6). 
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Fayemi 2000: 6). The image they had established was one of an agent of the colonial powers 
and therefore a reactionary symbol of racism and opposition to self-determination (Shearer 
1998: 15). 
  
A slightly distinct version of the hired soldier, which is more prevalent today, is the volunteer. 
Although a volunteer might not exclusively be motivated by financial gains, but also by 
ideology, religion, ethnicity or other factors, he would for the most part also merit the label 
‘mercenary’ as the outlook for financial gains in most cases should not be excluded as part of 
the impetus. The dispatch of this kind of mercenaries is apparently quite widespread and 
volunteers have been reported fighting in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and most recently in 
Iraq. The Muhajeddin forces are presently perhaps the best-known example of this kind of 
mercenaries. 
 
Although the de-colonization period is considered the ‘golden age’ of mercenarism, classic 
mercenary activity has recently also been reported from other war-zones, notably in different 
parts of Africa. The “White Legion”, a unit of approximately 300 mercenaries from Serbia, 
Morocco, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Belgium, France, and Britain was fighting for 
President Mobutu Sese Seko during the 1996-97 Zairean conflict.  Following his defeat the 
Legion was reported to have moved on to Congo-Brazzaville where they fought for the 
besieged Lissouba government (SCFA 2002a: appendix 2). During the hostilities in Sierra 
Leone in early 1999, mercenaries from Ukraine, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Italy, Liberia, 
Britain, and South Africa were reported fighting for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
(Lilly 2000b: 15). Other conflicts where mercenaries have been reported fighting include 
Angola, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Colombia. The UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism 
concluded in a 1997 report that there had been a “detected expansion in mercenary activities, 
observing that mercenaries are involved in serious crimes such as terrorist attacks and drug 
and arms trafficking, in which they are usually the perpetrators of serious violations of human 
rights” (UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries 1997: §115). More recently, a group of 
mainly South African mercenaries, apparently organized in lieu of a logistics company, Logo 
Logistics, were arrested in Zimbabwe in 2004 as they were to start an operation to topple the 
regime of Teodoro Obiang Nguema in oil rich Guinea-Bissau (Leigh, Pallister and Wilson 
2004). A rather new type of mercenary is Keith Jonathan ‘John’ Idema, a US citizen operating 
in conjunction with a few other US citizens in Afghanistan. Idema was financed by revenues 
from media coverage of his ‘adventures’, not by any party to the conflict and was convicted in 
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Afghanistan on charges of torture and other crimes after it was revealed he had been running 
his own personal interrogation facility (Maitra 2004).9   
1.1.2 Executive Outcomes and the early PMC industry  
Private Military Companies is a late 20th century phenomenon and the company most often 
recognized as the first-ever private military company dates back to 1967 when Colonel Sir 
David Stirling founded WatchGuard International, a company employing former British 
Special Air Service (SAS) personnel to train militaries overseas (Lilly 2000b: 10). According 
to industry analyst Kevin O’Brien, the number of PMCs engaged in Africa began to boom in 
1992. By mid-1997, it was estimated that there were about 90 such companies operating 
throughout Africa, the majority in Angola. Companies offered a range of different services 
with combat services at one extreme. The number of companies offering combat type services 
thus appeared to be limited. The better-known company known to have engaged in direct 
combat is Executive Outcomes (EO). The South African company, now officially disbanded, 
was founded in 1989 and sprung out of the Apartheid era South African Defence Force 
(SADF). As SADF members started to leave the Special Forces in anticipation of the 
transition about to come, many joined the private venture (O’Brien 2000: 49). EO has later 
frequently been renown as “the world’s first corporate army” and for good reasons. The 
company had a range of (more or less secretly) affiliated companies that would supply 
virtually all the services and goods a private army would need, among them was a private 
airline (Ibis Air)10, a telecommunications company (Advanced Systems Communications 
Ltd), a logistics company (Trans Africa Logistics Ltd), a company providing military 
equipment (Steelpact & Falconer Systems), a demining company (Shibata Ltd.), along with 
mining and extraction companies such as Branch Mining Ltd., Diamond Works and Heritage 
Oil (Pech 1999: 86-88). EO provided services in armoured warfare, battle strategies, 
confidential ‘advisory’ training, clandestine warfare, combat air patrol, equipment 
capabilities, medical aid, sniper and special-forces training (Isenberg 1997: 6). Executive 
Outcomes was reportedly involved in combat through several successful operations in Angola 
and Sierra Leone in the years from 1993 to 1997, operations that were conducted on behalf of 
the respective governments (Pech 1999: 85-88). In Sierra Leone the company was considered 
                                                 
9
 Idema himself claimed to be working in accordance with the Pentagon, an assertion which was disproved by 
the US authorities (ibid). 
10
 Ibis Air was partly owned by Raymond Moi, son of former Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi (Musah 2002: 
928). 
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decisive in defeating the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion, establishing internal 
order, and help bringing about democratic elections (Isenberg 1997: 6).  
 
Although Executive Outcomes appears the ancestor company of parts of the industry, today’s 
PSCs/PMCs are mainly low-profiled companies that aim to distance themselves of the EO 
legacy. They form a heterogeneous group of companies with different specializations and 
services and hence with different markets around the world.   
1.1.3 The contemporary private security and military business; PMCs                                 
and PSCs 
PMCs and PSCs tend to be organized as corporate hierarchies in scale and trans-nationally 
networked in operational scope. A 2002 Report by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) identified at least 90 PMCs, which were active in 110 
countries worldwide.11 Some analysts estimate the total annual revenue at more than US$100 
billion (Singer 2003c), a number which is not devoid of controversy. The prime clients of the 
industry now include Western government departments such as the US Department of 
Defence. The areas that are being outsourced include a variety of areas such as security, 
military advice, training, logistics, policing, technological expertise, and intelligence, all 
critical to the US armed forces’ core missions.  Private firms also provide the logistics of 
every major US military deployment and maintain such strategic weapons systems as the B-2 
stealth bomber and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (Von Boemcken 2003).  
 
PMC/PSC staffing typically number former military personnel from the industrialized 
countries, notably the US Army, the British armed forces and Special Forces (SAS) as well as 
French and Israeli military personnel. Lately there has also been a tendency towards 
employing former military personnel from places like Fiji, Chile, and the Balkans. Retired 
senior officers and non-commissioned officers of major armed forces are very often involved 
in the management of these companies. The personnel is employed within a defined structure, 
with established terms and conditions, and work with a degree of organization and 
                                                 
11
 The ICIJ does not appear to distinguish between PMCs and PSCs. The database appears not to have been 
updated since August 2002 and the developments in the industry in the wake of the Iraq invasion have not been 
recorded in the database. For instance, companies that currently hold very large contracts in Iraq, such as Aegis 
and Erinys Iraq, was not recorded in the database by August 2005.   
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accountability to the company. The company in return normally offer high salaries and 
sometimes life insurance packages to its employees. 
 
As there is no consensus as to how to categorize private security companies (PSCs) and 
private military companies (PMCs), a variety of denotations coexist. Some observers refrain 
from differentiating between the two and in stead choose to denote them all as private security 
companies (See for example Herbert Howe 2001, or David Shearer 1998, Holmqvist 2005, 
Avant 2005) or private military companies (see SCFA 2002, David Isenberg 2004). Others 
have chosen the more value laden term “mercenary firms” to both PMCs and PSCs (See 
David Isenberg 1997). Some analysts choose to categorize the companies by the perceived 
proximity to actual combat functions. Peter Singer’s Tip-of-the-Spear typology hence 
distinguishes between ‘Military Provider Firms’, ‘Military Consultant Firms’ and ‘Military 
Support Firms’ (Singer 2003a: 91). In addition to the multitude of denotations, categorizations 
and typologies of these companies, as observed by Holmqvist, the inflation and partial 
confusion in terminology is worsened by the frequent reference in mainstream media simply 
to ‘contractors’ (Holmqvist 2005: 5). The fact that PSCs and PMCs are not the lone suppliers 
of many of its services also serves to confuse the distinctions to what constitute a PSC or a 
PMC. Many companies offer logistics and support functions to armed forces without 
qualifying as a PSC or a PMC, Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root is often 
mentioned as a PSC/PMC, but even though it has a logistics section, it is essentially an 
engineering and construction company (Halliburton home page). Weapon manufacturers such 
as Northrop Grumman also offers services related to their weapons systems without offering 
security services in general etc. In this thesis only the companies which specialize in security 
and military support functions will qualify as PSCs/ PMCs, these companies will offer a range 
of the services discussed below, and not just a couple of services related to their products. 
Acknowledging that in practice there are no fixed categories explicitly separating PSCs and 
PMCs from all other companies, nor between PMCs/ and PSCs, in general one can say that 
private military companies are associated more with activities designed to have a military 
impact, or in the words of industry analyst David Shearer “to enhance the capability of a 
client’s military forces to function better in war and to deter conflict more effectively” 
(Shearer 1998: 23), while private security companies specialize in the tactical and strategic 
provision of security. Traditionally PSCs have had less of a military profile than PMCs. They 
provide highly specialized services with a military application, but are not in themselves 
notably military or paramilitary in organization or methods. Although its employees may or 
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may not have a military background, they have skills and abilities with military as well as 
civilian use (Adams 1999: 105). PSC are often smaller organizations than PMCs and many of 
them have been known to only provide guards (and not always armed ones), while others are 
increasingly used by cash strapped governments for selected tasks. Industry representative 
Doug Brooks has attempted to display the differences between PMCs and PSC by 
categorizing the most common service distribution among the two company types: 
 
Fig. 1.1: PSC versus PSC activities 
 
 
Apparent from the table above, most companies are engaged in business on both sides of the 
PSC/ PMC divide. In this thesis the terms will thus be used in tandem and accordingly no 
attempt of categorizing individual companies will be attempted. In stead, a general 
introduction to the services commonly offered by the PMC/PSC industry will be provided 
below. 
 
Services commonly offered by PSCs and PMCs 
Although there obviously are subcategories to these companies with corresponding deviations 
in services offered, the services discussed below constitute the services most commonly on 
offer. 
 
Military advice 
This includes high quality tactical, operational, and strategic advice for the restructuring, 
equipping, and employment of forces. The aim of such services would be military 
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restructuring or dramatic increase in capabilities. Such services would also include advice on 
the procurement of weapons. Companies known to provide these services include the Virginia 
based Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), Vinnell, and Levdan (Singer 
2003a: 95).  
 
Military and security training 
Military training includes training of military personnel for combat situations or on general 
terms regarding ground forces, naval or airborne special-forces etc., however it would also 
include training in the use of advanced weapons systems on behalf of national forces, 
intelligence training, surveillance, counter-surveillance, interrogation, and counter-
interrogation skills. Training of bodyguards and other security personnel is also common, as 
well as training of police forces. A leading company in the training field is Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated, best known for its training of the Croatian army in 
1995. Shortly after the official training program was completed the Croatian forces won a 
decisive and unexpected victory in the Serb-held Krajina region, a victory that had serious 
humanitarian consequences (Shearer 1998: 58). Currently another US based company, 
DynCorp, has a contract worth tens of millions of dollars to recruit and train a new Iraqi 
police force (Traynor 2003). Other companies offering advice and training services as 
described above would include a  range of other US based companies, such as Blackwater 
USA, a company which claim to have the most comprehensive private tactical training facility 
in the United States (Blackwater homepage 2005), British based-companies like Aegis 
Defence Services (Aegis home page 2005), as well as French companies like SECRETS and 
ABAC, and Israeli Companies such as Levdan and Silver Shadow (Pech 1999: 100), among 
others. 
 
Security services 
Most PMCs/PSCs provides a broad range of security services, and the majority of companies 
have both an analytical arm and a ‘hands-on’ physical security arm – usually operating in 
close concert. The types of service offered can thus be subdivided into a) ‘consulting 
services’, where the security company acts as an expert adviser, and b) ‘specialist security 
services’ where the security company actually provides a physical service (Black 2004: 173).   
 
a) Consulting services tend to include threat assessment and security risk analysis. In 
light of the current globalized terrorist threat, comprehensive security risk analysis, 
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including projections of future risks, is increasingly undertaken by private companies 
(Black 2004: 174); security surveys and audits, this process involves a detailed 
inspection of premises and staff activity in order to identify physical or electronic 
vulnerabilities (ibid); penetration testing, that is testing in order to detect weaknesses 
in procedures and training of staff (ibid). 
b) Hands-on tactical security provision can entail high-risk operations; the provision of a 
full range of protective and training security services to allow a client to carry out its 
business or task in hostile environments; close protection, a service which has been 
increasingly in demand for the protection of key individuals or those carrying out 
necessary duties in particularly threatening environments, such as that in Iraq or as 
perceived in the flood stricken and lawless areas in and around New Orleans12, in 
addition to ‘close’ body guarding skills, this service usually involves the gathering of 
protective intelligence (Black 2004: 174-75); personal security details (PSD), 
essentially the same as the above, but on a less personalized scale, such as for convoy 
protection. 
 
Intelligence  
Private firms have a requirement to gather and then analyse intelligence to support either 
particular projects for clients or their own general operations (Black 2004: 174), increasingly 
companies are also hired to provide independent intelligence to organizations, companies, 
governments etc. Counter-surveillance in particular is becoming an increasingly important 
part of the private security business. Most serious crimes and nearly all terrorist attacks 
require some form of detailed reconnaissance in advance. British companies are particularly 
strong in this area because of the British military’s extensive experience of counter-terrorism 
in Northern Ireland (ibid: 175). 
 
Logistical support 
Logistical services include equipment delivery, all forms of transport and heavy lift, 
communications and sometimes even the delivery of aid. Transporting and supplying troops 
on the battlefield as well as maintaining and running airports are services often offered by 
PSCs and PMCs. Companies specializing in logistic support services often aim at building 
capabilities and efficiencies that the client cannot sustain. Pacific Architects and Engineers 
                                                 
12
 Blackwater USA is reported to have sent about 150 of its workers to the affected area in support of the US 
Coast Guard (Higgins 2005). 
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(PAE) and International Charter Incorporated of Oregon (ICI of Oregon) are companies 
specializing in logistic support.   
 
Mine clearance 
Demining services is both a popular and lucrative sector of the private military industry. 
Saracen International (an EO spin-off) is frequently hired by a variety of oil companies, as 
well as several UN departments to clear off explosives and land mines (Pech 1999: 101). 
ArmorGroup and Saladin are other companies specializing in humanitarian demining.  
 
Technological expertise 
The management and development of high capacity technological services is a niche often 
attempted entered by the private security industry. This could entail management of 
sophisticated weaponry, sophisticated information technology services etc. Titan Corporations 
and DynCorp are among the companies specializing in technology demanding services to 
state militaries and other potential clients.   
 
Other and more specialized services are also found. DynCorp e.g. has since 1997 been 
operating on behalf of the US State Department to help eliminate drug production in 
Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia (Bigwood 2001). 
  
While some companies tend to specialize on some security related services, many have been 
known to expand service offers in order to better be able to cover the full range of security 
related services which customers could demand in high-risk environments. The variety of the 
services on offer is nevertheless testimony of a diverse and potent private security and 
military industry offering a wide range of services tailored to fill the needs of private 
companies, national governments, and international organizations like the UN.   
 
1.2 Methodology 
Choice of method is often held to be conditional on research question and data availability, 
both considerations that have accounted for the qualitative approach of this thesis. The 
research question of this thesis is twofold in that it aims to provide an insight to the 
characteristics of the UN’s use of private security and military companies as well as to 
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explain such use. Efforts to unveil UN reliance on private means of security, both in terms of 
scope and essence could naturally have benefited from greater data availability. In the 
eventuality of readily available data, the study could have benefited by further quantitative 
measures. The explanatory parts taking into account why this particular use is taking place, 
depends on a qualitative approach. In order to provide answers to the two research questions a 
case study approach has been chosen. In-depth analysis will be carried out of relevant aspects 
of both the UN organization, as well as of relevant strata of the private security/military 
industry in order to explain aspects of the two sets of units, which again generate the UN to 
deploy the industry’s services. 
1.2.1 The case study 
According to Yin, case studies are the preferred strategy when three conditions are present: 1) 
when “how” and “why” questions are posed; 2) when the investigator has little control over 
events; and 3) when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context 
(Yin 2003: 1). In relation to the aims of this thesis all three conditions are present: 1) The first 
part of the research question deals with detecting and classifying the UN’s use of private 
security and military services (“how”), while the second part addresses the rationale and the 
reasons for such use (“why”); 2) the phenomenon is of macro-political character in that the 
UN is the only global intergovernmental organization, and the PSC/PMC industry is an 
industry of distinct international character; and 3) both the patterns of UN use, as well as the 
industry size and characteristics, are in flux.  
 
The two ‘sets of units of analysis’ are the United Nations as well as the PSC/PMC industry.13 
The United Nations, albeit most often referred to as a singular unit, comprises an extensive 
and frequently intricate unit to study. In a reflection of the multifaceted structure of the 
organization, the term “the UN family” has gradually emerged as a collective term 
encompassing the principal organs and its web of programmes, agencies, funds and bodies.14 
The vastness of the UN organizational apparatus is added to by the fact that while formally 
part of the UN apparatus the specialized agencies are major intergovernmental organizations 
operating on large scale within their separate specific fields such as trade, health, education 
                                                 
13
 The units are termed ‘sets of units’ in order to point out the multifaceted nature of both the UN and the private 
security and military industry. 
14
 Defining the UN as a singular or multiple unit raises several questions about the degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by the various component organizations, the policy making procedures etc. Although relevant to this thesis, such 
a discussion is not embarked upon in this context due to the limited scope of the thesis.  
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and agriculture. These agencies subsequently enjoy a large degree of independence from the 
rest of the organization. Needless to say, all aspects of the Organization have not been subject 
to this study. In accordance with the multifaceted structure of the units, the study could be 
termed an embedded case study in that it studies not only the main organization as a whole, 
but also but also subcategories such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian operations 
separately.  The most relevant units of the UN organization to this study hence constitutes the 
Secretariat and especially the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and Office of the United Nations Security 
Officer (UNSECOORD), all three which can be found on the right hand side of the UN 
organizational chart presented in figure 1.2. Less specific attention will be paid to some of the 
Programmes and Funds such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United 
Nations High-Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and World Food Program (WFP), on 
upper the left side of the chart. The organizational chart presented below thus serves to give 
an overview of some of the principal compositional organs of the UN family. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 18 
 
Figure 1.2 UN organizational chart 
 
 
                                  Source: UN homepage at http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html 
 
Within the component parts of the Secretariat, specific sub-offices and agencies have been 
studied, these include e.g. the Safety and Security Services (S&SS) integral to the DPKO, and 
various security instances integral to the UNSECOORD.  
 
The second unit of analysis is the rather broad category of the PSC/PMC industry. The 
industry consists of a wide variety of companies. However, as this thesis aims at explaining 
the interactions of the industry with the UN, it consequently deals primarily with the more 
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legitimate segments of the industry. The industry, like the UN, thus constitutes a compound 
set of units of analysis.  
1.2.2 Theory  
The theoretical framework used to explain the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs is composed of 
two sets of explanatory variables, that is, one set for each unit of analysis. The variables are 
gathered and arranged by the author in an attempt to best explain the UN’s increased demand 
for PSC/PMC related services, as well as to explain the changes that correspondingly have 
taken place on the supply side. The explanatory factors are combined in a chart and will be 
referred to as the analytical framework. This framework also serves as a dispositional 
overview of the theory chapters, and later of the corresponding analysis chapters. A set of 
propositions are derived from each of the two parts of the analytical framework and will be 
attempted confirmed or rejected in the analyzing chapters.  
 1.2.3 Data availability 
There is a considerable lack of coherent and available data on the use of PMCs by NGOs and 
aid agencies in general, and even less concerning the UN’s use of these companies. Hence, 
completely mapping UN use of PSC/PMC services has not been feasible. Instead, empirical 
illustrations of the practice are provided. The data on security privatization is by nature both 
proprietary and confidential and the particularly high sensitivity in relation to the UN has 
clearly limited the collection of data obtained. Information of 32 contracts between the UN 
and various PSCs and PMCs has, however been collected. Having information on “contracts” 
implies that information is provided on incidents of the UN using a particular company in a 
particular setting for particular tasks. It does not imply that the author is in possession of the 
actual contract document in question or the details therein. Companies practice client 
confidentiality and do not share any such detailed information. The gathering of this 
information has been a long cumulative process, which has not been easy to plan for or to 
control. The various types of sources described in the following section have all been used to 
try to provide a picture of which companies are used, for what, when, and where. As far as 
possible each recorded contract has been attempted proven through multiple references (see 
section on reliability below). The compilation of contracts could, as mentioned, preferably be 
more exhaustive, however, none such compilation of cases of UN use has to date been seen 
by the author, and it is the author’s belief that the current list (see table AI.1) does serve to 
provide an impression of the practice.   
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Within the UN there appears, as mentioned above, to be little coherence regarding the topic 
other than that it is best avoided. This fact has no doubt impeded heavily on the access to 
sources and data. Potential interview subjects early made it clear that issues of loyalty 
prevented them from answering in-depth inquiries concerning both the UN’s use of 
PSCs/PMCs, as well as the potential causes thereof. The same hindrances and lack of 
information are confirmed met by academics and researchers in general (e.g. Krahmann 2005, 
personal communication). 
  
Companies are usually also quite averse in terms of providing contract information. Client 
confidentiality very often precludes information. The industry is in general not too easily 
accessible, partly due to the sensibility of the operations in which they have taken part, partly 
because there has been quite a lot of negative publicity and sensationalist journalism covering 
these companies. Attendance at a Brussels conference named “Peacekeeping and Stability 
Operations” in June 2005 very much had a door-opening effect in terms of the industry. 
President of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), Doug Brooks, was very 
open for inquiries and provided a very good source of information. As electronic inquiries had 
already been attempted with little success, personal contact and introduction of the topic of 
the thesis proved to be crucial in order to obtain interviews and opinions, most of which was 
permitted used, although some was not permitted quoted. Audio recording from conference 
presentations and discussions also represent a source of information.15   
 
1.2.4 Primary sources 
The UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs is hence not a much-publicized phenomenon. In order to 
verify and analyze the actual phenomenon, qualitative first hand sources have been gathered 
and utilized to the degree possible in the pursuit of multiple sources of evidence. Document 
analysis, interviews and personal communication have thus been applied as sources. 
 
Document analysis 
Administrative UN reports have been used extensively in order to gather data on internal 
organizational procedures as well as positions on the subject. Thorough examinations have 
                                                 
15
 These sources are available from the author. 
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been performed on Reports of the Secretary-General and of the General Assembly as well as 
reports and internal guidelines of other UN entities such as the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), The UN Social an Economic Council, The United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS),  The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, the former Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs, The UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries etc. In addition, several 
specialized UN inquiries reports have been studied in close detail. 
 
Documentary confirmation has also been sought through government reports and records such 
as reports of the US Department of State, The US Department of Defence, the US Senate, the 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, as well as 
documents of the now defunct Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority. 
 
Other documents have been retrieved from the private security industry such as various 
reports of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and Concept Papers for 
proposed IPOA contributions to peace operations.16  
     
Interviews and personal communication 
Interviews and personal communication play a significant part in the data basis of the thesis. 
I conducted one longer face-to-face interview with IPOA president Doug Brooks in Brussels. 
The interview lasted about two hours and took the shape of an audio-recorded conversation 
guided by an interview guide prepared in advance.17 Questions ranged from personal opinions 
to questions relating directly to IPOA’s work etc. The interview can be described as a semi-
structured interview (Johannessen, Tufte and Kristoffersen 2004: 133) as questions were 
prepared in advance, but the succession was flexible and spontaneous and questions were 
added along the way. This type of interview was deliberately chosen over a very structured 
version as it was assumed that a relaxed approach, a conversation-like interview, would be 
beneficial to the amount of information obtained.  
 
Knowing that Brooks is often the outward face of the industry in media and in academic fora 
it came as no surprise that indeed some of the questions received almost ‘by heart’ answers, 
meaning that argumentation in some cases appeared mere routine. Other questions received 
                                                 
16
 All documents referred to in this section are listed in the bibliography under ‘Official documents’. 
17
 The recording was carried out with permission from the subject.  
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more ‘interesting’ answers, particularly those relating to deliberate image refinement efforts, 
which is less of a topic in the different public discussions related to the industry.18  The 
sensitivity of some aspects of the topic was illustrated by the fact that parts of the 
conversation was asked to be done ‘off the record’, meaning that the recorder was switched 
off and the information was not permitted used in any way.  A transcript of the interview is 
available from the author.  
 
One interview was also conducted by e-mail. The interview was agreed to in advance after 
meeting in the Brussels conference where lack of time prevented a face-to-face interview. 
John Millar, Director of Business Development of ArmorGroup was sent a range of questions, 
which he responded to in the shape of a continuous text rather than as separate questions. As 
in the case of Brooks, Millar also seems accustomed to answering inquiries. Although 
providing some degree of answers to most questions, Millar appeared more limited in his 
response, which might be attributed to him representing one particular company, and not the 
more unspecific ‘industry’, which is the case with Brooks. 
 
One telephone interview was carried out with Mike Pearson, Director of Security Support 
Solutions (3S). This interview also followed face-to-face conversation at the Brussels 
conference. Parts of this conversation were asked to be held “off the record”, and are hence 
not included in the data material.  
 
Other correspondence has been maintained per e-mail. Senior consultant Ernest E. Beno of 
Pacific Architects & Engineers has in particular been open to questions and has confirmed the 
company’s contracts with the UN as compiled by the author. Richard T. Lee, Business 
Development Manager of PAE, answered questions in person at the Brussels conference. No 
thorough interviews were conducted with any of these sources; however statements have been 
used with their permission. Millar, Brooks as well as some academics and some UN officials 
have answered e-mail inquiries on a case-by-case basis. Documentation of all communication 
is available from the author.19 
 
                                                 
18
 This topic is discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
19
 All personal communication, e- mails and interviews are listed in the bibliography under ’interviews and 
personal communication’. 
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1.2.5 Secondary sources  
Various sources of secondary literature have been used, mainly for the background and 
analytical framework sections. 
  
Internet sources and newspaper articles 
Many of the events described in the thesis are of very recent character, which makes internet 
and news agency sources indispensable. Internet sources are also frequently used to gather 
information on companies, their services and activities. Company home pages, NGO web 
pages etc. are thus repeatedly used as sources of information. The International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) database of PMCs has also been consulted for information 
dating prior to 2002. Internet sources are listed separately in the bibliography. 
 
Television 
In Chapter 6, quotations are made from interviews conducted for a PBS television 
documentary. Industry representatives are quoted directly from the documentary and in some 
cases from the interview transcript. The documentary is available on the internet along with 
transcripts of interviews (see bibliography). 
 
Expert evaluation 
In relation to an evaluation of proposed military operation support, Lt. Col. Bjørn Robert Dahl 
of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, agreed to provide an evaluation on 
professional grounds. Dahl provided views based on professional and personal peacekeeping 
experience.    
 
Consequently, in tracing evidence of the UN’s use of PMCs/PSCs it has been necessary to 
search through rather large amounts of potential sources, both the more conventional ones 
such as books, articles and papers on relevant matters, but it has also been necessary to look 
into each company’s website and search trough countless web pages and newspaper articles. 
This process has without doubt been time-consuming, but has also been very interesting, as it 
has led me in closer contact with the private military industry and its personnel. The 
participation in a PMC discussion group administered by Brooks of IPOA, has in particular 
contributed with an inside view of the industry as it hosts both PMC/PSC employees, 
company managers, industry analysts and others. 
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1.2.6 Validity and reliability 
According to Yin four logical tests are relevant for testing the quality of case studies: 1) 
Construct validity; 2) Internal validity; 3) External validity; and 4) Reliability (Yin 2003: 33-
34).  
 
Construct validity 
Establishing correct operational measures for the concept studied in this thesis is a matter of 
selecting the more specific changes that can be derived from the analytical framework to 
explain both external and internal UN need enhancing factors, as well as external and internal 
offer increasing factors. This selection is in part done in the light of findings of the first 
research question which aims at answering the “how” question. That is e.g., the characteristics 
of the way and for what the UN makes use of PSC/PMC services indicate the corresponding 
UN organs to study. As inferred by the research question then, the most relevant parts of the 
Organization have been the DPKO, various humanitarian agencies and the organizational 
arrangements affecting these agencies. In terms of the PSC/PMC industry, the “how” question 
also gives clues to which companies to study.  
 
Internal validity 
As the main purpose of this study is to identify the main causal factors of the development 
pointed out by the preliminary research question (the “how” question) there is always the 
necessity of considering other inferences than those presented in the analytical framework. 
The easiest identifiable problem with maximizing internal validity in this thesis resides with 
the fact that the issue being studied is in relatively rapid development. Throughout the 
research period it has therefore been important to remain observant to developments in order 
to detect potential operationalizations of the analytical framework, which have the potential of 
not being sufficiently idiomatic. In order to assure internal validity one extra part-variable was 
added at a later stage of the process, the terrorism variable was thus added to the analytical 
framework in order to better explain ‘radicalization of operating environment’. It is important 
to point out that the aim cannot be to disclose every attributing factor to the UN hiring a PSC 
or a PMC, as they will vary depending on context. However, the goal is to provide an 
explanatory framework that can be generalized within the UN context and which can be 
supplemented by situation specific details in each case of contracting with PSCs and PMCs.  
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External validity  
Inherent in the nature of case analysis one normally find restricted prospects for 
generalization (Yin 2003: 38). Generalization purposes in most case studies are directed 
towards broader theory as opposed to generalization among other cases. Apart from the 
prospects for generalization within the UN context, exportation of findings will not be 
attempted in this thesis, although it could be subject for discussion whether certain findings 
from this study could be valid for other intergovernmental organizations involved in 
peacekeeping, such as the African Union or the European Union, or in relation to 
humanitarian operations, humanitarian NGOs or other humanitarian agencies. The second part 
of the analysis that deals with the changes taking place in the industry will hold relevance for 
other potential users of PSC/PMC services. As more and more state militaries embark on 
rather extensive outsourcing programs to cut costs and to adjust to different threats in the 
international community, the relevance of studying the private security and military industry 
is increasing. The objective considered most interesting in this context is looking at policy 
implications of the findings, both for the UN and the principles and ideas upon which the 
organization was founded, other intergovernmental organizations, as well as member states, a 
topic which will be touched upon in the concluding chapter. 
 
Reliability 
According to Patton (2002) the aim of using qualitative methods is to describe and explain 
phenomena as accurately as possible so that descriptions and explanations correspond as 
closely as possible to the way the world is and actually operates (Patton 2002: 545-46). 
Assuring reliability has been a particularly important priority and concern in the gathering of 
data for this thesis as the phenomenon studied is not well known, nor well researched. There 
are certain concerns regarding information availability and accuracy as the UN’s strategy for 
dealing with the subject has been one of avoidance, and it has therefore been difficult to verify 
information found elsewhere through the organization. Because of the lack of transparency in 
UN practice regarding its PSCs/ PMCs reliance it has been crucial to establish the central 
facts upon which the rest of the thesis is based. The fact that dealing with the subject seems 
intentionally avoided by the UN also raises concerns of potential manipulation of information. 
The same also goes for the PSC/PMC industry, which seems to release information on 
particular contracts as they see fit their aims. It is no coincidence that information on logistic 
support contracts is seemingly more often listed on individual companies’ web pages than 
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security contracts. Similarly, contracts involving services that are considered, of a ‘humanist’ 
character, such as demining services, and hence more advantageous for the company profile, 
are apparently more often made public than other contracts. This selective dispatch of 
information does constitute a concern for the reliability of information, especially so when 
trying to get an overview of the services most often sold.   
 
Strong sensationalist tendencies in media coverage also contribute to cloud the relevant 
information on the subject. To avoid exposure to such potentially biased information, 
newspaper sources have been chosen with care.  
 
The limited availability of data has thus been a challenge throughout the process (as 
mentioned under 1.2.3) and in order to compensate for having to use second hand sources to 
detect UN contracts, the principle of data triangulation has been applied. The second hand 
references have thus been attempted confirmed either through using multiple sources, or 
through first hand sources, such as company representatives confirming contracts. The 
collection of recorded contracts included in Table AI.1 and Appendix I all meet the above 
requirements for sources, while the records of contracts that could not be confirmed or 
verified to the same degree were consequently left out.  
 
Although the reliability of UN and other official documents will not be questioned in this 
context, it is clear that some UN documents are strikingly evasive in their approach to the 
organization’s use of PSC/PMC services. UN documents not providing the required 
information on the subject has been more of a problem than the actual quality of the sparse 
information available. A greater amount of documents have thus been consulted than perhaps 
anticipated.  
 
The data obtained from interviews are normally less secure since they rely on personal 
conceptions of realities. There are no guarantees that other industry representatives could not 
have given different opinions. However, by interviewing both the president of the main 
interest organization of PSCs/PMCs (IPOA), as well as company representatives from 
companies that already have long established business relations with the UN, it was felt that 
some of the most relevant actors within the industry were represented with their views. 
However, failing to obtain interviews with the concerned UN representatives represents a 
potential worrying aspect in terms of reliability. Several UN offices and representatives have 
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been repeatedly contacted without getting any response. Consequently, the UN’s version had 
to be puzzled together through statements made in reports and other official documents, press 
statements and the like. These documents have had to compensate for the lack of willingness 
of UN officials to make personal statements.        
 
Definitional considerations 
One of the problems concerning discussing private security and military companies relates to 
their definitions. A variety of terms is used by analysts and commentators, and while ‘private 
military company’ (PMC) seemed to be the most common term until recently, ‘private 
security company’ (PSC) now seems to have taken precedence among many observers. There 
is as mentioned in section 1.1.3, however, no consensus to what constitutes either one of the 
terms, and consequently the choice of term often has reflected ideological stands. In the midst 
of definitional chaos, I find that it is useful not to simplify the terminology to an extent where 
the military aspect of the service provision is lost. In fact, a great deal of the contracts 
received by these companies is for tasks formerly carried out by state militaries. Similarly, 
some of the support-tasks carried out by these companies are only indirectly linked to 
enhancing security. In the end, with the present lack of consensus of how to define the 
industry, and consequently at the expense of simplicity, I have chosen to maintain the two 
terms PSCs and PMCs collaterally. The terminology used in this thesis hence reflects a) the 
diversity of the companies concerned, and b) reference to the actual functions that these 
companies carry out, and less their potential bottom line potential or motivation.   
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 consists of an examination of the theoretical framework used to explain the UN’s 
use of PMCs and PSCs. The chapter is divided in two as the first part deals with explaining 
external and internal preconditions for the UN developing a need for external service 
provision by PSCs and PMCs, while the second part introduces the set of variables used to 
analyse the changes in the PSC/ PMC industry leading to a changed offer of security and other 
related services.  
 
Chapter three to seven constitute the two analysing parts of the thesis. Whereas the first 
section (chapter 3-5) deals with analyzing the preconditions for a UN need for PSC/PMC 
services, the second half (chapter 6 and 7) discusses the industry potentials for providing an 
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offer of such services. At the offset of chapter three an outline of the empirical findings of the 
actual UN use will be provided. This brief introduction to the analysis hence attempts to 
capture the essence and nature of the services actually contracted for by the organization and 
to present the findings in a clear fashion. The findings of this section provides the logic for the 
structure of the following three analysis chapters which hence deal with security, logistic and 
support functions, and expert functions in turn. Chapter 6 and 7 are then devoted to analyzing 
changes in the presentation of industry, as well as to the service offer of the industry in light 
of the second part of the analytical framework. 
 
The final chapter of the thesis sums up the findings from the previous analysis, before 
commenting on some of the political implications for the UN and its member states of the 
UN’s engagement with private security and military companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Analytical framework                                                     
 
 
The analytical framework aimed at explaining the UN’s increased use of private military and 
security companies consists of two main explanatory variables: increased demand for 
alternative personnel and increased supply of PMC and PSC personnel. On the one hand, the 
United Nations have faced enhanced expectations concerning the comprehensiveness of its 
activities and have met increased challenges concerning personnel contributions. These 
developments have again corresponded with the organization facing tougher operating 
conditions. On the other hand, there has emerged an alternative source of personnel, suitable 
to fill certain gaps in the UN’s operational machinery.  
 
2.1 Increased need for external service provision 
This set of variables is two-dimensional as it attempts to explain the UN’s need for extra 
ordinary personnel by looking into the external circumstances conditional on the UN’s 
opportunity set, as well as internal features of the World Organization that have limited the 
organization’s access to qualified personnel. 
   
The variables can be outlined and displayed as beneath:  
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Fig. 2.1: Enhanced need for external provision 
 
 
Three propositions are derived from set of variables: P1 and P2 relates to the external need 
enhancing factors, while P3 relates to the internal need enhancing factors.  
   
P1:  Enhanced expectations to the comprehensiveness of UN action have contributed to the 
organization’s deployment of private security and private military companies. 
 
P2:  Radicalization of operating environments has contributed to the UN deploying private 
security and private military companies.  
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P3:  Inadequate internal capacity has contributed to the UN deploying private security and 
private military companies. 
 
2.1.1 Enhanced expectations concerning the comprehensiveness of UN activities 
and responsibility (P1) 
The post-Cold War era has been marked by significant changes concerning the expectations to 
what responsibility should be assumed by the international community, and in particular by 
the United Nations. With the spread of technology and widespread acceptance of human 
rights, both the content and the application of these expectations have changed and 
consequently led to increased demands for UN to take action in situations involving war or 
human rights violations (Karns and Mingst 2001: 222). 
 
The Globalization of human rights 
A transition from a culture stressing national sovereignty to a culture where international law 
and norms opt for a higher national and international accountability has gradually emerged 
after World War II. The core of this effort was a more ethical understanding and arrangement 
of relations between individuals and the institutions governing them (Coicaud 2003: 178). 
Although the concept of the rights of the individual was not a new one, the founding of the 
United Nations represented the beginning of a newfound appetite for humanitarian principles. 
The United Nations Charters states as one of the main purposes of the organization 
“promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Charter of the United Nations 1945: 
Article 1). Further milestones in this progression have been the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols on 
international humanitarian law in armed conflict; the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the two 1966 Covenants relating to civil, political, 
social, economic and cultural rights; and the establishment of the Rome Statute (1998) and its 
enter into force, realizing the International Criminal Court  (ICC) in 2002 (ICISS 2001: 6). 
The number, scope and implementation strategies of international human rights treaties and 
conventions have increased over the past half-century, creating a vast body of human rights 
law, which although far from always implemented, has changed international law and the 
principles for the rights of the individual in a significant manner. 
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The further evolution in international human rights has produced a change of emphasis from 
promotion of rights (articulation in declarations and conventions) to active protection of 
human rights (mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement) (Doyle and Gardner 2003: 3). In 
this respect the UN has often been protracted, and has certainly protracted itself, as a locus for 
action. In his 1992 report An Agenda for Peace then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
called for a new role for the organization in managing global security and identified the 
Security Council as the catalyst for such action (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §16). In his 2001 report 
to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan followed up by launching the term “a culture of protection”, which would entail the 
UN to act on issues of war crimes, fact-finding missions, separation of civilians and armed 
elements, media monitoring mechanisms, protection of journalists etc. (UN SG 2001: §9-45).  
The organization’s Millennium Declaration, and its corresponding eight Millennium 
Development Goals, also reflects this enhanced responsibility that the General Assembly 
asserts for the organization in achieving a greater accordance with the human rights 
aspirations. Yet another example of the high ambitions on the matter is displayed in the 2001 
Report of the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which reflects the evolution 
of peacekeeping from inter-positioning to peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction in 
light of the diffusion of human rights regime. The report proceeds to establish that the 
international community has a “responsibility to protect” in cases where the state is unwilling 
or unable to fulfil its designated tasks. The responsibility encompasses three specific tasks: 
the responsibility to prevent armed conflict, the responsibility to react to “situations of 
compelling human need”, as well as the responsibility to rebuild, after intervention (ICISS 
2001: XI).  
 
‘The CNN effect’   
While considering the changed expectations and conduct concerning the protection of human 
rights, nationally and internationally, it is impossible to ignore the impact of globalization and 
technology. The revolution in information technology has made global communications 
instantaneous and provided unprecedented access to information worldwide. The popular 
concern and political pressure on governments to act in cases where mass sufferings are 
broadcasted to the public is often referred to as ‘the CNN effect’.  As humanitarian action 
rarely is taken unilaterally, ‘the CNN effect’ has a direct effect on the agenda of both member 
state governments and public opinion as well as of the UN bodies. Former Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali has referred to CNN as “the sixteenth member of the Security 
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Council”: “The member states never take action on a problem unless the media takes up the 
case”. When the media gets involved, public opinion is aroused; "Public emotion is so intense 
that United Nations work is undermined and constructive statesmanship is almost impossible” 
(quotation from Cate 2002: 5). 
 
Although some commentators (Cate 2002 and others) recently have argued that the CNN-
effect is exaggerated, and that the countless disaster reports instead are making the public 
immune to disturbing television images, the point remains, that it has become more difficult 
for political actors and institutions that subscribe to the humanitarian regime to ignore well-
publicized crisis.  
2.1.2 Radicalization of operating environment (P2) 
From the typical inter-positioning and observation role that the UN characteristically played 
during the Cold War, the concept of "peacekeeping" evolved in the post-Cold War era to 
involve interference in ongoing conflict environments. The organization now entered 
environments from which the Super Powers had withdrawn their support and overall 
engagement, areas that were awash with local rivalries and antagonisms. The UN agencies 
during the 1990s thus increasingly found themselves facing extremely complex conflict 
environments in the areas where the organization launched its missions. In this thesis it will 
be claimed that the radicalization of the operational environment is due mainly to three 
interacting factors; the increased amount of weak states, often resulting in failed states, and in 
some cases even in the total collapse of state structures; the changed nature of war in such 
environments; and the prevalence of terrorism. Terrorism is a phenomenon that may or may 
not be attributed to new wars and disrupted states, but which in this thesis is chosen dealt with 
as a related, yet separable variable. All three factors contribute to decreased security and 
bigger challenges posed to peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel. 
 
Dysfunctional/disrupted states 
Since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly evident that the Westphalian ideal-
state is facing serious challenges in the modern era and that ‘weak’, ‘failed’, ‘disrupted’, 
‘collapsed states’, or as they collectively will be termed in this context; ‘fragile states’, are 
likely to be a permanent feature of the international order. Fragile states need not be suffering 
from complete state ‘failure’ or ‘collapse’; rather, they are marked by varying degrees of 
incapacity. Fragile states are in this thesis defined according to the UK Department for 
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International Development (DFID) which asserts fragile states to be those “where the 
government cannot or will not deliver core functions of the state for poverty reduction, 
territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic 
services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people can 
support themselves” (DFID 2005: 7). It follows that there are certain historical, political and 
economic features that help explain the context in which states fail to function (see for 
instance The African Studies Centre 2003), and that the phenomenon manifests itself in 
different ways (see Saikal 2003). Full-blown cases of state collapse, which involve the 
extreme disintegration of public authority and the metamorphosis of societies into a 
Hobbesian anarchy, remain relatively rare; in recent years, only states such as Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Congo (DRC) and perhaps Albania seem to fit this definition (Milliken and 
Krause 2002: 754). However, there is a range of other states that fail to provide security and 
public order, legitimate representation, and wealth and welfare to their citizens. Places such as 
the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Haiti, Colombia and Afghanistan have witnessed the near-
total collapse of central authority over part, or all of their territory, with the resulting disorder 
often causing great human suffering (ibid: 754-55).  
 
Disrupted states tend to be vulnerable to physical rupture, open civil conflict and foreign 
intervention (Saikal 2003: 19), and thus represent highly complex conflict environments. 
They need an appropriate, integrated response that not only handles immediate suffering, but 
also assists in political resolution addressing the causal roots of the suffering, as well as post-
conflict reconstruction measures. In these quasi-states there is a flawed monopoly of violence 
and armed actors tend to be fragmented, dispersed, or even privatized. Warlords, paramilitary 
groups, guerrillas, mercenaries, or private military companies may in part substitute a state’s 
armed forces (The African Studies Centre 2003:6).  
 
New wars  
The character of new wars is interlinked to the phenomenon of disrupted states. It is generally 
regarded that new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state and in 
some extreme cases, the disintegration of the state, in particular, they occur in the context of 
the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate organized violence (Kaldor 2002: 4). Disrupted 
states are characteristically engaged in virtually continuous internal wars; and war makes a 
strong state less likely (Clapham 2002:786).  
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Mary Kaldor has defined ‘new wars’ as disputes that involve “a blurring of the distinctions 
between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for 
political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for 
private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence 
undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals)” (Kaldor 2002:2).  
The new wars can thus be contrasted with old wars in terms of their goals, their main actors, 
their methods of warfare, and how they are financed (ibid: 6). 
 
The goals behind new wars would typically be to contest the legitimacy of the state on the 
grounds of identity politics, in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of the past 
wars. In such wars, the state’s armed forces are hence not organically linked to their 
populations, but are instead to be associated with one particular section of the population, or 
with the attempt to impose the control of an autocratic regime (Clapham 2002:786). The 
SIPRI yearbook testifies to this tendency by stating that of the 58 different major armed 
conflicts between 1990 and 2002, 55 were internal. The majority of these wars were also 
waged over governmental power as opposed to territory, a tendency which has been enforced 
after 1997 (Eriksson, Sollenberg and Wallersteen 2003: 109-111). 
 
The main actors of new wars are often non-state actors. In contrast to the vertically organized 
hierarchical units that were typical of ‘old wars’, the units that fight these wars include a 
disparate range of different types of groups such as paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal 
gangs, police forces, mercenaries and also regular armies including breakaway units of 
regular armies (Kaldor 2002:8). Several, and often unpredictable numbers of fighting factions 
complicate the general conflict overview. The war in contemporary Democratic Republic of 
Congo serves as an explicit illustration. A further complication involves the blurring of the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, as well as the use of child soldiers. 
 
The methods new wars are influenced by informal warfare techniques such as guerrilla 
warfare and insurgency warfare. The aim is normally to control the population by getting rid 
of everyone of a different identity (and/or of a different opinion). Hence the strategic goal of 
these wars is population expulsion through various means such as mass killing, forcible 
resettlement, as well as a range of political, psychological and economic techniques of 
intimidation (ibid:8).  
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The funding for new wars often includes plunder and black market trading, or external 
assistance. The latter can be remittance from diasporas, ‘taxation’ of humanitarian assistance, 
support from neighbouring governments or illegal trade in arms, drugs or valuable 
commodities such as gems or oil (Kaldor 2002: 9). New wars are therefore often dependent 
on regional networks for sympathizers and business partners and thus often assume more of a 
regional than a strictly internal character, whereas the ‘old wars’ were dependent on 
superpower patrons for their intrastate interstate warfare.   
 
Terrorism and new patterns of tension  
Among the new security threats identified by contemporary governments, terrorism is the 
most limited in terms of intensity. Empirical data on the degree of threat posed by terrorism 
shows that terrorism causes relatively few deaths in comparison to other security threats, such 
as interstate war, civil conflict, or infectious diseases, although  recent data do show an 
increase in the lethality of individual terrorist incidents (Krahmann 2005: 5).  
 
As there is no international consensus as to the exact entailment of the term, a UN treaty on 
counterterrorism measures has been stalled for years over the failure of its member states to 
agree upon a definition of the phenomenon. Recently Secretary-General Kofi Annan has 
urged world leaders to agree on a universal definition of terrorism. The new UN proposal 
declare that “any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population or to compel a government or an international organization to carry out or to 
abstain from any act constitutes an act of terrorism” (UN Draft Outcome Document 2005: 
§85).20 
  
While terrorism takes on many forms and stems from many motivations, the post-September 
11 environment has seen new lines of tensions on the world scene caused by a growing fear of 
particularly religiously motivated terrorism.21 Such a concept has proven to entail a broad 
definition of the enemy stretching beyond functional and power elites to take in whole 
civilizations (Münkler 2005: 113). Reinforcing the tension, the American-led approach to 
                                                 
20
 The definition was in the end not endorsed by the World Summit 14-16, September, 2005 (UN General 
Assembly 2005: §81-91). 
21
 Other motivations for groups to pursue terrorist strategies would include e.g. national, ethnic, linguistic, 
regional, and ideological motivations, or a mixture of such objectives. Acts of terrorism could in turn also be 
carried out by governments.  
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counterterrorism post September 11, the frequently termed “Global War on Terrorism” 
(GWOT) has had implications for actors associated with the cultural and religious basis of 
North America and Western Europe in general.  
2.1.3 Inadequate availability of qualified personnel (P3) 
As the workload of the United Nations has expanded substantially in the post-Cold War 
environment it has placed formidable challenges to the organization's adjustment abilities. 
The UN has frequently been accused of having a contemporary conceptual design for the 
organized maintenance of peace that only partly corresponds with actuality.  
 
Lack of Political will 
 
“By not averting these colossal human tragedies, African leaders have failed the 
peoples of Africa; the international community has failed them; the UN has failed 
them.”   
- Kofi Annan22 
 
The failures of the UN lead missions in Somalia in 1993, in Rwanda in 1994, and in the 
Balkans in 1995 are all well publicized; in addition to these are the failures in Angola and 
Liberia, which attracted less media interest. The Somalia failure eventually had dramatic 
effects for UN multilateral peacekeeping in general. The killing of 18 American soldiers in 
Mogadishu led the Clinton Administration to issue a presidential decision directive named 
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD25) that in instead of altering, in effect 
withdrew, US support not only from this particular mission, but also largely disassociated the 
US from UN peace operations in general. The Directive orders a reduction in the 
peacekeeping assessment percentage from 31,7% to 25 % by January 1996 (US Department 
of State 1996: §2), and goes on to ensure the American public that the losses of the 18 
soldiers were accidental and that no further cooperation with the UN in enforcement 
operations is impending.  
 
"The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree 
to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large 
                                                 
22
 Quoted in Donald Rothschild “The Us Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa” SAIS review, vol. 21, no. I 
(Winter, Spring 2001 pp 201). S. 6   
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scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to 
involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control 
or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc organizations." 
(PDD25: §3).  
 
Statistics of personnel contributions to UN multilateral peace operations testify to the PDD25 
implementation, as well as to the military priorities that have dominated US foreign policies 
after September 2001. As of 31 July 2004, The United States' contribution to United Nations 
Peacekeeping counted 427 American personnel, six of which served as troops. The American 
contribution amounts to 0.73 per cent of the grand total of peacekeepers deployed in July 
2004. Other major Western democracies are also virtually absent. The top-ten list of 
contributors shows Pakistan contributing the most, with more than 8500 peacekeepers, 
followed by Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana, India, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uruguay, Jordan and 
Kenya.23 Although the present war in Iraq and the NATO engagement in Afghanistan mission 
tie up large parts of Western, and especially US resources, this list serves to confirm a pattern 
that has been emergent for some time: Western democracies are highly risk averse regarding 
committing troops to UN missions, and as a result limit their contributions to financial or 
material means as opposed to personnel.24 Michael Doyle labels the present condition among 
core contributing countries, whether new or old, “Peace-enforcing fatigue” (Doyle 1999: 
450), meaning that rich states are rarely willing to invest their resources or the lives of their 
soldiers in war other than for important national interests.  
 
Other measures are also taken to avoid the commitment of troops to UN peacekeeping 
operations; the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), recently renamed the African 
Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) is one such measure. The 
program was initiated in 1997 by the Clinton Administration and was aimed at training 
African militaries to improve their capacities and potentials for peacekeeping on the African 
continent. By the end of 2001 US special forces and American PMCs had trained nearly 9,000 
troops (O'Hanlon 2003:72). Other Western countries, like France and Britain, have also 
                                                 
23
 Numbers obtained from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/, July 2004. 
24
 The top-ten list for September 2000 (no numbers for July 2000 were available) shows few deviations from the 
2004 list, with Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, India and Jordan ranking top-five. The only deviations are 
Australia and Portugal ranking as number eight and ten due to the extensive mission in East Timor that year, 
where both countries had strategic interests. 
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arranged similar programs.25 However, many of the forces that have attained a training 
program have received only limited assistance in programs lasting only ten to forty days (ibid: 
73). 
 
As a result, the United Nations is finding it increasingly difficult to acquire qualified troops 
for the dangerous operations it is commissioned to take on and militaries of a woeful quality 
are consequently pushed forward. For many poorer states the prospect of earning around $1 
million a month for each battalion contributed to a UN mission is the chief incentive (Shearer 
2001: 2). In some extreme cases, the only way that some states can pay their soldiers is by 
having them serve with UN peacekeeping operations (Bratt 1997: 5). Such contingencies, 
however bold, often suffer from limited defence budgets, the very fact of maintaining 
substantial numbers of proficient infantry soldiers makes it difficult also to provide them the 
necessary lift and logistics for operations abroad (O'Hanlon 2003: 74-75). Lack of adequate 
training and basic equipment are other well-known problems concerning contingencies from 
developing countries.26 The second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations as of 
July 2004, the Nigerian military, was described in an external audit (interestingly also 
performed by the American PMC, MPRI) as performing little to no active training, lacking 
basic equipment such as helmets, canteens and eyeglasses, as well as that 75 percent of the 
force's equipment was described as faulty or out of commission (Singer 2003a: 57).  
 
Health issues also inflict on the capabilities of many developing countries' contingencies.  
According to a report prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, African 
military personnel, peacekeepers, and peace observers rank consistently among the groups 
most affected by HIV/AIDS, often with infection rates 2 to 3 times that of the local 
population. Preliminary testing by South Africa's National Defence Force, according to the 
same report, suggests that 66 to 70 per cent of troops are HIV positive, with the rate among 
some units rising as high as 90 per cent (Schneider and Moodie 2002: 6). Subsequently, high 
rates of HIV/AIDS are likely to affect military readiness, as well as encourage risk-taking and 
inappropriate behaviour among soldiers who believe they have already received a death 
sentence (ibid: 6-7).  
                                                 
25
 According to Peter W. Singer, ACRI was administered by the American PMC, Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated (MPRI) from 1998 on (Singer 2003:60). 
26
 For an analysis of the causes of the poor conditions of especially African militaries see Herbert Howe, 
Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001) 
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Under the portrayed circumstances the quality of UN peacekeeping forces is in some contexts 
subject to mere casualty, adding a substantial element of uncertainty to accomplishment of the 
mandate, putting both the local population as well as personnel at elevated risk.  
 
Organizational incapacities 
The multilateral nature of UN peacekeeping implies a range of inherent weaknesses such as 
language difficulties, incoherent training, differences in equipment etc. These weaknesses are 
to a certain degree natural consequences of the principles under which the UN works, e.g. the 
principle of ‘geographic distribution’, meaning preferably a UN peacekeeping force should 
contain personnel from a variety of regions of the world to avoid missions from representing 
only a small and hence biased sphere of countries. However, other weaknesses appear less 
generic.  
 
On the political level, divisions within the Security Council and especially among the five 
permanent members (P5), in several cases have created an atmosphere of confusion and 
indecision. The operations in Bosnia and Rwanda e.g. resulted as resolutions with a Chapter 
VII component, but lacking P5 commitment to the use of force (Coicaud 2001: 273). 
Coherence in policymaking is thus frequently hampered by the seemingly obsolete 
distribution of veto powers. Lack of flexibility also tend to be a problem when the United 
Nations agree on a mediating a proposal or a framework, it cannot easily be modified in 
response to changing circumstances. Modification requires renegotiation among UN 
members, an often lengthy process that delays mediation (Bratt 1997: 3). 
 
The United Nations Family of agencies, boards, committees, offices, networks, programs and 
funds makes out a complex web in the organizational structure of the organization. Above-
mentioned lack of flexibility in decision-making, combined with slow processing time has 
given the organization a reputation of a cumbersome bureaucracy. In addition, the 
organization is often condescendingly termed a "headquarter organization", an expression 
which relates to the divisions often apparent between field personnel and the secretariat in 
New York. Military personnel have commented, "Mandates are often written in an operational 
vacuum by civilians who may not fully appreciate the military implications of undertakings 
made with immediate diplomatic and political considerations in mind" (Bratt 1997: 3). A 
similar distrust of UN headquarters was reflected in a comment made by former United 
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Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander Lewis Mackenzie:  "if you are a 
commander of a UN mission, don't get in trouble after five p.m. or on the weekend. There is 
no one in the UN to answer phone!" (Mackenzie, quoted in Bratt 1997: 3).  
 
2.2 Increased offer of alternative personnel 
Increased offer of alternative personnel is attempted explained through a two-dimensional set 
of variables. The analytical framework meant to explain enhanced offer covers both external 
conditions affecting the potential expansion of the industry, as well as internal features of the 
industry with implications for its perceived appeal. The variables of the analytical framework 
can be outlined and displayed as beneath:  
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Fig. 2.2: Increased offer of alternative personnel 
 
 
Two propositions can be derived from this set of variables, the first relates to the external 
offer increasing factors, while the second relates to the internal offer increasing factors.   
 
P4:   Pools of available trained personnel have contributed to the organization’s deployment of 
private security and private military companies. 
 
P5:  A credible private security and military industry has contributed to the organization’s 
deployment of private security and military companies. 
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2.2.1 Pools of qualified personnel 
 
Global post-Cold War demobilization  
 
The disintegration of the former Soviet bloc and the de facto end of the Cold War was met 
with a global downsizing and a corresponding restructuring of military forces that affected 
almost the entire world. Although military downsizing is a phenomenon that has been 
associated with the end of war in general, such as the Napoleonic wars or the two World Wars 
(Lock 1999: 11), the hyper-militarization of the Cold War years enforced a comprehensive 
downsizing. According to the US Department of State, by 1999 26 per cent fewer people 
served in the world's armed forces than in 1989 (US Dept of State 2002: 5), of which  
developed nations' armed forces accounted for most of the reduction. By 1999, developed 
nations' armed forces were 44 per cent smaller than in 1989 (ibid: 5). Correspondingly, 
developing nations' forces declined by 14 per cent during the same decade. The global 
numerical military downsizing is clearly illustrated in figure 2.3. 
 
Fig. 2.3: World armed forces 1989-1999 
                               
Source: US Dept of State 2002: 5. 
 
As a result of the differing rates of decline, the two groups' size disparity widened steadily 
over the decade, and of the world's twenty largest armed forces in 1999, only six were in the 
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developed nations group (ibid: 5). The ratio of soldiers per 1000 people on a global basis also 
serves to illustrate the developments as it steadily decreased from 5,5 in 1989 to 3,6 in 1999 
(US Dept of State 2002: 8).  
 
Although new antagonisms have recently emerged on the international political scene, the 
general trend of restructuring and streamlining of the world's armed forces persists, of which 
the common NATO strategy is testimony. One of the key decisions of the Prague Summit 
2003 concerns a "streamlining of NATO's military command arrangements" (NATO 2003: 
11). Moreover, enhanced emphasis is put on numerically smaller multinational forces that are 
flexible, equipped with high technology and that have a high operational radius capability, 
such as the new NATO Response Force (NRF), intended to be "a catalyst for the 
transformation of NATOs capabilities" (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004).  
 
Another important aspect of the cutbacks in state military organizations is the functional areas 
in which they have taken place. A great part of the cuts have been in back-end support areas, 
e.g. the US Army Material Command alone was reduced by 60 per cent during the first post-
Cold War decade (Zamparelli 1999, in Singer 2003a: 53). This part of the downsizing strategy 
is confirmed by the Norwegian Chief of Defence in his 2003 report on the status of the 
Norwegian Defence Forces by stating that the advised measures for strength production, 
logistics and support operations include a considerable streamlining of remaining support 
functions and staff, as well as material cooperation.  The cutbacks should preferably amount 
to about NOK 1,250 million annually (Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003: 30). 
The Norwegian Ministry of Defence confirms that between 2005 and 2008 NOK 2 billion will 
be transferred from logistics and other support activities to material investments and 
operational activity through increasing efficiency of leadership, logistics, support, and 
education (The Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004: 7).  
 
Demobilization and restructuring consequently have, and will continue to release large 
numbers of former soldiers and other trained military personnel on to the job market. The 
contraction of a state's armed forces has also narrowed opportunities for promotion and 
advancement and encouraged others to leave.  
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The privatization trend 
 
"The best minds are not in government. If any were, business would steal them away" 
                                                                            - Ronald Reagan (Quoted in Singer 2003a: 49)  
 
The penetrability of national economic borders, pressures on public resources in the wake of a 
welfare state crisis, disenchantment of the public with the quality of public services, and the 
rise of neo-liberalism have led western governments to increasingly permit or encourage 
private actors to assume responsibilities once monopolized by the state (Gupta 2000: xiv). 
Privatization defined broadly as "the shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the 
public sector to the private sector" (Feigenbaum, Henig, Hamnett 1998: 1), has been pursued 
in liberal democracies, post-communist societies and developing countries - comprising 
military or authoritarian regimes alike (Gupta 2000: xii-xiii). However, as privatization 
covered a wide range of ideas and policies both in economic theory and political practice 
(Gupta 2000: viii), different countries pursued privatization with different strategies and to 
different extents.  
 
There are differing views upon the background for privatization being a nearly universal 
restructuring instrument. While some seem to think of privatization as a predominantly 
economic instrument generic to globalization, others see it much more as a political tool. 
Similarly, some commentators regard the privatization of security and military functions as an 
aspect of ongoing state sovereignty erosion (Van Creveld 1999) fuelled by globalization, 
while others understand it rather as a deliberate expansion of the coercive and violent 
capacities of states (Whyte 2003). Whatever the driving forces, the fact remains that 
privatization plays a considerable role in the dominant political economy paradigm to the 
point that it has reached the domain of state security.  
 
Privatization of national defence is apparently used as a means to accomplish a two-fold goal: 
Reduce public defence spending, often through restructuring of personnel structures; and 
increase operational efficiency. These goals are clearly articulated by the Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence in its plans for defence modernization and NATO accommodations of the 
Norwegian Defence (Ministry of Defence 2004: 6-7), as well as by then Norwegian Chief of 
Defence, Sigurd Frisvold, as he describes a future Norwegian defence that is "more 
technology intensive with fewer soldiers, in line with all the NATO member states' ongoing 
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restructuring which imply an enhanced ability to deploy and operate military forces both 
within and outside NATO territory" (Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003: 4-5, this 
author’s translation). 
 
In the defence industry the preferred strategy has been to outsource or contract out former 
government functions, measures that imply public officials to act as service arrangers, 
deciding on what needs to be done and soliciting bids from private firms that are willing and 
able to perform the specified task (Feigenbaum, Henig, Hamnett 1998: 7-8). A 1995 report of 
the Defence Science Board, a standing committee that advises the Pentagon on technical, 
scientific, and other issues, suggested that the Pentagon could save up to $6 billion annually 
by 2002 if it contracted out all of its support functions to private vendors, except those that 
deal directly with war fighting. Deploying this political strategy Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld in a 2002 state-of-the-military review emphasized the success of the department's 
outsourcing of non-core responsibilities, stating that he would "pursue additional 
opportunities to outsource and privatize."  (Peterson 2002: 2-3). According to a study of the 
US Defence Department's contracting patterns performed by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists, by September 2004, half of the Defence Department's budget was 
spent on private contractors, a percentage which reportedly has stayed virtually constant over 
the past six years.  
 
Unlike outsourcing which includes retaining the basic responsibility for services, privatizing 
involves transferring responsibility for planning, organization, financing and managing a 
program or activity from the military to private contractors (Mitchell 2002: 1). According to 
National Center for Policy Analysis, the British Army saved $410 million by leasing 92 tank-
transporter trucks from the US company Brown and Root, and an additional $140 million by 
privatizing the training facilities and services for its tank crews (ibid: 2). The same study also 
estimates that within few years, about half of the British defence establishment will have been 
privatized (ibid: 2).   
 
In other countries somewhat less abide to comprehensive load-shedding so-called public-
private partnerships (PPPs), in which governments work directly with private firms in formal 
or informal relationships to jointly pursue common goals, have emerged as the preferred 
strategy (Feigenbaum, Henig, Hamnett 1998: 7-8). According to the home page of the 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the privatization and outsourcing process that is taking place 
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in public sector in general affects the defence to a high degree. PPPs strategies relevant to the 
armed forces include outsourcing, contracting out and private investments. The goal is to 
accomplish enhanced attention to strategic areas, improvement of the quality of core 
functions, and a general reduction of costs. PPPs are further considered a substantial 
contribution to the modernizing process (The Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2004). 
 
In sum, privatization has emerged as a dominant economic strategy as it assumes lower costs, 
less state responsibility or accountability, and greater efficiency (Howe 2001: 18). Privatizing 
state defence is only another aspect of the general trend and the military the latest area to be 
affected by it.  
 
2.2.2 A credible private military industry 
The evolution of a credible private security and military industry has been dependent on the 
ability of the industry to align itself to ‘any other legitimate business’ both in normative and 
in practical terms.  
 
Sanitizing the industry image   
 “We would love to be accredited by the Organization of African Unity and the 
United Nations, but we cannot be (…) without support from our government and 
because of the poor conception about our company and what we do, mainly due to 
bad press”  
- Nick van den Bergh, head of Executive Outcomes (Isenberg 1997: 18)  
 
There is little doubt that the privatized military industry initially faced obstacles due to 
decades of controversial intervention in the developing world and hence, to their close 
association with traditional mercenary activity. The general perception during most of the 
1990s was that PMCs were merely mercenaries in a corporate skin, performing their usual 
services under better organization (Leander 2003, Godoy 2003, etc.). Both individual 
companies, as well as the industry in general, later seem to have discovered the value of 
corporate reputation and image and its direct connection to competitive success.27 
                                                 
27
 The difference between a corporate image and corporate reputation is that while a corporate image is the 
immediate picture that audiences have of an organization, the reputation is based on long-term value judgement 
about the company’s attributes (Gray and Balmer 1998: 697). 
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Governments have also been recognized as an important factor to consider since the 
reputation of an entire industry can be critical in determining the degree of friendliness of the 
industry legislation passed (Gray and Balmer 1998: 698).  
 
Efforts to emerge as a trustworthy industry can thus be traced both from general 
developments in the industry, as well as by looking into how specific companies have strived 
to accommodate and transform themselves in order to keep up with the evolving market 
opportunities. On the individual company level there are examples of companies having 
struggled to construct a corporate image that would make up for a damaged corporate 
reputation. Tim Spicer, ex-British army officer and a prominent figure within the private 
military industry, describes in his autobiography how Executive Outcomes, a company that 
had attracted a heavy load of negative publicity due to its combat operations in Africa, was 
planned rebranded, restyled, sanitized and relaunched as a "private military company" and 
gradually merge into Sandline International (Campbell 2003: 7), as well as into a range of 
other new affiliated companies, such as Saracen International and others (Pech 1999: 91). 28 
Sandline’s reputation did however also take a serious blow as Spicer was charged of illegally 
importing arms to Papua New Guinea in 1997 (Pech 1999: 93). The so-called “arms to Africa 
affair“, in Sierra Leone in 1998, where Sandline ignored the UN arms embargo on the country 
and shipped 35 tons of AK-47s, ammunition, mortars and a helicopter and provided logistical 
advice to help restore the Kabbah government that had been overthrown in a violent coup the 
year before also seriously stained the company (Campbell 2003: 9, Musah 2002: 925). 
According to the company's home page, by April 2004 Sandline International had closed 
down its business  allegedly due to "the general lack of governmental support for Private 
Military Companies willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa in the absence of 
effective international intervention" (Sandline 2004).29  
 
                                                 
28
 According to an exhaustive search of English language publications carried out by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalist, “PMC” was never used in the context of private military operations (and 
hardly used at all) until after the relaunch of Executive Outcomes, suggesting it being a part of a deliberate plan 
to sanitize the image of the business (Campbell, ICIJ 2003d: 7-9). In an effort to distance itself from the 
controversial EO, some companies refuse the PMC label. ArmourGroup for instance does not want the label 
PMC. In stead they term themselves a “risk management company” (SCFA Appendix 6:§83). 
29Tim Spicer, former head of Sandline, and the protagonist in "the Sandline scandal" is now Chairman and Chief 
Executive of Aegis, a new company that in May 2004 surprisingly was awarded a $293 million contract by the 
Pentagon to act as "a coordination and management hub" for the about fifty PMCs operating in Iraq, plus to 
protect the U.S. Project Management Office (Aegis webpage 2005). 
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Efforts made on the industry level include the formation of the International Peace Operations 
Association, an industry trade organization. The association represents an effort by a group of 
companies to synchronize the reputation and lobby effort. The Washington-based association 
of PMCs and PSCs is open to "any organization offering services to military, governmental, 
and non-governmental organizations" (IPOA 2004: 3).  Apparently efforts to refine the image 
of the private military industry have paid off. They have largely managed to constitute 
themselves as credible alternatives to the insufficient or inexistent public means of regulating 
violence. (Leander 2003: 3). As late as in 1999 Greg Mills and John Stremlau wrote: 
 
“International security services are a peculiar industry. The product is deadly force, the labour 
required is highly specialised but highly mobile and unorganised. (…).Contracts are typically 
extra-legal, and difficult to secure and enforce.” (1999: 12)   
 
This paragraph shows that commentators only six years considered the industry an extra-legal 
and illegitimate industry. A quick glance at the American coalition’s operation Restore Hope 
in Iraq reveals that the outsourcing of certain military capabilities to PMCs by big western 
powers has become a discernible trend. Singer (2003c) asserts that during the first part of the 
war in Iraq the ratio of private contractors to US military personnel was roughly 1 to 10. This 
is a clear indication that there has been a major change in the attitudes concerning buying 
these types of services. According to Sir John Stanley, a member of the Select Committee of 
Foreign Affairs there has been "a striking change of tenor in terms of their [Ministers in the 
British Government] approach to private military companies" (Examination of Witness” for 
the Minutes of Evidence Report by the SCFA, 2002: §130). 
 
Corporate responsiveness 
The dilemma whether to modify products to particular markets, or to promote a more 
standardized universal product is well known in international marketing theory. According to 
Head, a modification strategy may be limited to the way the product is promoted, i.e. the 
‘”message” sent out to customers in an attempt to influence their perceptions of the product. 
In most cases the firm or the industry will also need to consider modifying the objective 
attributes of the product. In some cases, the nature of the product attributes change so much 
that it effectively introduces a new product (Head 2004: 91). Such adaptation does however 
come at a price, and there will naturally be a greater incentive to adapt for a larger market. 
The gains from adaptation will be larger if the demand differences are a) widespread b) 
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permanent (Head 2004: 102). According to Harding, what the PMCs and their mining 
partners did so well in the 1990s was to interpret political instability in Africa as a market 
issue, and position themselves perfectly in that market (Harding cited in Musah 2002: 921). 
Lately the business has proven to sustain its remarkable corporate responsiveness, its role in 
the war in Iraq being testimony of this ability. While initially being made up of a limited 
number of firms offering limited military specialties, the industry is expanding to offer a wide 
range of sophisticated services (Singer 2003a: 83). The requirements of high-technology 
warfare have dramatically increased the need for such specialized expertise, which often is 
sought in the private sphere. PSC personnel not only support sophisticated weapons systems 
but in some cases also operate them; the unmanned aircraft, Predator, is in fact flown into 
missile launch position by PSC personnel (Avant 2004: 154). In order to compete on the 
global scene many companies seek to partner up with equals or acquiring smaller market 
participants with niche market and technology specializations. Broader based firms can more 
easily offer the wider range of services that are necessary for complex conflict environments 
(Singer 2003a: 83). The merger of the British based firm Defence Systems Limited (DSL) 
with the US based Armor Holding exemplifies this trend; DSL originally offered security 
training and consultation to governments and multinational companies using mainly former 
SAS- personnel. Armor Holdings acquired DSL in 1996 and created the new ArmorGroup 
with DSL at its core. Over the past four years, ArmorGroup has acquired over 20 companies, 
among them the Alpha firm, which is essentially the privatized unit of the elite special forces 
of the same name, bringing under its control an array of military-related services, ranging 
from mine clearance to intelligence (Singer 2003a: 84). The diversification of the service 
offer within each company not only leads to a simplified contracting process, but also to 
greater flexibility, as the same company can take on tasks that might not have been 
anticipated when signing the contract. In return, the companies increase their market share 
correspondingly. As the need for alternative military personnel persists, there is now an 
anticipating and responsive industry willing to adjust to each new market/demand fluctuation, 
which holds true not only for service selection, but also for moral standards and human rights 
concerns as seen in the sanitizing section above. 
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Analysis part I 
 
The analysis of how the UN’s use of private security and military companies can be explained 
is organized into two main parts. This first part focuses on the UN and to what degree external 
and internal need enhancing factors have led the organization to deploy PSCs and PMCs. The 
validity of the propositions P1-P3 will be examined separately in the three chapters belonging 
to Analysis I. The part of the research question aimed at looking at the characteristics and 
patterns of the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs is integrated into primarily this first part of the 
analysis. At the offset, a brief presentation of the compilation of the 32 contracts between UN 
organizations and different private security and military companies is due. 
The United Nations’ use of private security companies and private military 
companies 
 
The extensive list of approved suppliers by the United Nations Office of Central support 
services (United Nations Office of Central support services, 2005) reveals that at least 11 
private security or military companies are formally approved for service procurement to the 
UN.  Some of these supply peace and humanitarian operations with a range of services on a 
regular basis. According to Avant hardly any multilateral PKO conducted by the UN during 
the 1990s was accomplished without the contributions of private security and private military 
companies (2005: 7).  
 
Most analysts testify to the UN’s use of PSCs and PMCs but largely fail to provide extensive 
information thereof. For this thesis 32 reports of the UN deploying a PSC or a PMC were 
recorded. After an examination of which type of services was supplied, a categorization 
including three main categories was made. Services contracted for by the UN could thus be 
grouped in the following rather broad categories: ‘security functions’, ‘logistics and support 
functions’, and ‘expert functions’. The security category includes services such as direct 
security provision (armed or unarmed), security assessments and audits, security training, 
close protection, and all kinds of security consulting services. Logistics and support services 
would entail communication, transport, running of airports, and other military support 
services, while the third category, ‘expert functions’, includes services which require 
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specialized skills such as demining, intelligence, civilian policing, etc. All three categories 
exclude any trade in goods, and are hence limited to trade in services.  
 
An overview of the compiled contracts, their location and the categories of services provided 
is presented in table AI.1.  A short presentation of each contract is presented in Appendix Ia; 
while an alphabetical short list of company profiles are provided in Appendix II. 30  
 
Table AI.1 UN contracts with PSCs and PMCs 
Company contracts in country by year* Support 
functions 
Security 
provision 
Expert 
services 
1. DSL in the Balkans 1992*  X X  
2. DSL in Somalia   X  
3. DSL in Angola  X  
4. DSL in Sudan  X  
5. DSL in Mozambique probl. 1995 X   
6. EO in Sierra Leone 1996-97  X  
7. DSL in Angola X X  
8. DSL in Afghanistan  X  
9. ICI of Oregon in Liberia mid 1990s X   
10. ICI of Oregon in Haiti 1996 X X X 
11. ArmourGroup in Bosnia 1996 and on   X 
12. Lifeguard in Sierra Leone 1998 X   
13. DynCorp in Angola 1998 X   
14. DynCorp in Bosnia early 1990s   X 
15. DSL in Sierra Leone 1998  X  
16. DynCorp in East Timor 1999 X   
17. DynCorp in Sierra Leone 2000 X   
18. PAE in Sierra Leone 2000 X   
19. DSL in Kosovo 2001 X  X 
20. PAE in DRC 2001   X 
21. PAE in East Timor 2001 X   
22. GD4 in Kosovo X   
23. Kroll Ass. In Angola 2001   X 
24. ArmorGroup in DCR  X X  
25. KZN Security in East Timor 2001   X 
26. Empowerment Loss Control East Timor 
2001 
  X 
27. PAE in DCR 2004 X   
28. PAE in Ivory Coast 2004 X   
29. Global Strategies Group in Iraq 2004  X  
30. Global Strategies Group in Afghanistan 
2004 
X X X 
31. ArmorGroup in Cyprus 2004 and on   X 
32. ArmorGroup in Iraq 2005  X  
 
                                                 
30
 Appendix II is not limited to the companies registered in table 3.1, but presents a short introduction of 
companies discussed whatsoever.  
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The distribution of services along contracts as found in the 32 contracts obtained for this 
thesis is displayed in figure AI.1:  
 
Fig. AI.1: The distribution of service types along contracts 
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Source: Appendix I 
 
As evident from figure AI.1, logistic and support functions constitute the PSC/PMC service 
category most often procured by the UN according to the data obtained for this thesis. 
Security services range as the second most demanded category, while expert services were 
included in the lowest number of contracts. Due to the controversy associated with procuring 
security services, especially strategic ones, it is likely that security contracts are somewhat 
less publicized than e.g. logistic contracts. The distribution of each service as displayed in 
figure AI.1 should thus be read with a degree of caution. Additionally, the small number of 
contracts obtained implies that reservations are due concerning the further elaboration of these 
numbers. The very restricted access to information must account for the small sample of 
contracts (32), and thus for the eventuality of the sample not being completely random. 
3. Enhanced expectations to the UN – a catalyst for PSC/PMC 
deployment?  
 
After decades of paralysis during the Cold War the 1990s saw an unprecedented activism on 
behalf of the Security Council. The UN responded to enhanced expectations on its behalf by 
expanding its operations not only quantitatively, but it also qualitatively. From having the 
traditional intermediary role in interstate wars, the UN now assumed responsibility in nearly 
all dimensions of peace advancement: From conflict prevention, via peacemaking and 
peacekeeping, to post-conflict reconstruction. It is the argument of this chapter that the 
dramatic expansion of the organization’s workload during the 1990s contributed to the 
organization hiring private security and private military companies to perform tasks integral 
to these operations. As displayed in the introduction to this section, the services procured by 
the organization can be grouped into three categories; security services, logistics and support 
services, and expert services. This chapter will thus discuss the validity of P1, that is, whether 
enhanced expectations to the UN have triggered the UN to deploy PSCs and PMCs for each 
of these service categories.  
 
3.1 Enhanced expectations contributing to UN procurement of security 
services 
UN peace operations have expanded both in numbers and in scope. Whereas the UN used to 
take on monitoring and interpositioning tasks in interstate wars, the organization has 
increasingly assumed responsibility also in intrastate wars. As apparent from figure 3.1, since 
the end of the 1980s the UN has proportionally launched peace operations for a growing share 
of the civil wars in the world, and has thus increasingly assumed responsibility for ending 
wars.  
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Fig. 3.1 Ratio of civil wars versus UN peace operations in civil wars 
 
Source:  UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004: 33. 
 
The most dramatic qualitative change in UN peace operations has been the introduction of 
enforcement components in peacekeeping mandates. The idea was first introduced under 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda For Peace, and later confirmed 
as a viable strategy in the 2000 ‘Brahimi Report’ (Report of the Panel on UN Peace 
operations 2000: §49). The UN’s engagement in peace enforcement has had implications for 
the sustainability of core peacekeeping principles. The triad of principles of peacekeeping 
traditionally included: consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, 
and the use of force only in self-defence (Nambiar 2001: 167), and it is those very principles 
that have enabled the UN to operate as a non-party in the midst of conflicts around the 
world.31  
 
It is the argument of this section that enhanced expectations to the UN for ending ongoing 
civil wars have led the organization to use enforcement measures, which in turn have had 
                                                 
31
 Humanitarian principles also include independence. 
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detrimental effects on the operating principles of the organization.  Whereas the UN flag in 
itself used to imply a substantial degree of security to peacekeepers, observers and 
humanitarians, the corrosion of these principles has had consequences for the security of UN 
personnel. The process of how tainted operation principles have resulted in security costs for 
all segments of UN operations and personnel and hence led to greater demand for PSC/PMC 
services will be outlined beneath.  
3.1.1 The corrosion of core operating principles 
Although the two terms ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ are frequently mentioned in the same 
breath both in academia and in UN parlance, the terms cannot, however, be used 
interchangeably as their semantic meanings do not fully overlap. Given that the terms also 
hold partly different substance whether used in humanitarian contexts or peacekeeping 
contexts, it is perhaps unsurprising that there exists a certain degree of confusion not only 
regarding the practical achievement of the two conditions, but also on a more theoretical level 
regarding the substance of each principle. The constraints on the core operational principles of 
the organization are felt throughout the fieldwork of the organization, and deterioration in one 
operational field tend to inflict negatively on others causing generally felt security costs. 
 
Acting in correspondence with both neutrality and impartiality simultaneously in 
contemporary peacekeeping contexts is at best problematic. According to Donald: 
 
“an impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict, 
based on judgements of the situation, it is fair and just in its treatment of the 
parties while not taking sides. A neutral is much more passive; its limited actions 
are within restriction imposed by the belligerents, while its abstention from the 
conflict is based on an absence of decided views” (Donald 2002: 22). 
 
Traditionally the blue helmets were defenders of the status quo, and operated with light arms 
under the strict instruction to use force only in self-defence. Such operations were termed 
‘Chapter VI and a half’ peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and required, in principle, an 
invitation or consent on the part of the recipient state (Malone and Wermester 2001: 38). 
However, as the UN has moved from first generation peacekeeping of inter-positioning and 
into third generation peacekeeping, potentially involving enforcement, it becomes clear that 
neutrality is no longer feasible. Enforcement in itself is simply not compatible with neutrality. 
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Subsequently, according to Donald, appliance of the neutrality concept in relation to PKOs 
has largely congested in official UN parlance (Donald 2002: 27). After the Safe Havens 
tragedy in Bosnia, for peacekeepers to be “neutral” is now frequently even perceived 
negatively (Donald 2002: 32). In the words of Kofi Annan: “Impartiality does not – and must 
not – mean neutrality in the face of evil” (Annan 1999: 4).32  
 
The principle of impartiality is also subject to some degree of inconsistency (Donald 2002: 
27). The problem, largely, again relates to the use of force. However, peacekeeping missions 
that are launched in areas of ongoing conflict will be mandated to the use of force in self-
defence and to protect civilians under imminent threat. Missions that contain elements of 
enforcement, while claiming impartiality, have often had to render more enforcement in 
disfavour of one party. An illustration of such a situation is to be found in the current UN 
Mission in Eastern Congo (MONUC), where heavy enforcement actions have been carried out 
(including the use of helicopter gun ships and armoured vehicles) against an ethnically Lendu-
based militia group in order to protect the civilian parts of the opposing ethnic group (the 
Hemas) from atrocities (BBC NEWS, 2 March 2005). In this case, the killing of between 50 
and 60 militiamen belonging to the Lendus will hardly be perceived as an act of impartiality 
by any of the numerous warring factions.33  Furthermore, it is unlikely that a warring faction 
which is militarily and politically disadvantaged by the actions of a peace enforcing mission 
will take any comfort in not formally having been designated an enemy (Berdal 2001: 67). 
Consequently, there seems to exist a degree of incoherence in terms of principles as set out in 
mandates and realities on the ground, as a ‘peace enforcement’ operation hardly can apply 
force without simultaneously assuming that such action will influence the political dynamics 
of the conflict. The Congo-case mentioned above illustrates the implausibility that such 
beliefs exist outside high office parlance. UN spokeswoman in Ituri, Eliane Nabaa, stated in 
the aftermath of the UN taking action against the militia: "This group continues to loot, kill 
and rape these people, making life miserable. It's time to put an end to this militia." (BBC 
NEWS, 2 March 2005). 
 
                                                 
32
 The shift is also well demonstrated by the evolving doctrines from former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (1992), Supplement to Agenda for Peace (1995) and to Kofi Annan’s line 
represented by e.g. the Report of the Brahimi panel (2000) and the Reports that followed the Rwandan genocide 
and the massacres in Srebrenica (Donald 2002: 22). 
33
 In this particular case the targeted militia has even claimed that the actions taken by MONUC forces were 
retaliation in order to revenge the slaughtering of nine Bengali peacekeepers, which took place just days before, 
an act which in itself is testimony of perceptions of UN partiality.     
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UN peacekeeping has thus to a certain extent assumed the role of an active participant in 
internal conflicts: neutrality in peace operations is no longer aspired for and impartiality is 
often compromised, especially in operations involving elements of enforcement. The grave 
implications of perceived bias of the organization tend to reach beyond the scope of peace 
operations as actions taken by one division of the organization will often reverberate and 
influence heavily on other parts of the organization’s work in that particular conflict theatre. 
Humanitarian missions are thus often constrained by their relations to peace operations. By 
belonging to an intergovernmental framework, the UN humanitarian agencies do not have 
opportunities for isolationism such as e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to some extent possesses. Being completely neutral would imply independence from 
the rest of the UN system, and thus from their own political and institutional framework. Even 
though some agencies do enjoy a great degree of organizational independence, they are not in 
a position to distance themselves from the political aspects of crisis due to institutional and 
legal obligations (Studer 2001: 385). In the general perception of the public, it is probably 
practically impossible to separate military operations completely from activities in the name 
of humanitarian principles when both are carried out under the UN flag (ibid). Association 
with a peace operation involved in acts of enforcement thus works to compromise the 
humanitarian space, increase insecurity for humanitarians and necessitate additional security 
measures for protection.34 As ‘acceptance’ as a model of security for aid agencies no longer 
work and in order to avoid direct association with military forces, PSCs and PMCs are 
apparently used on an ad hoc basis to secure humanitarian assets, property and personnel.35 
World Food Programme is among the companies reported to use PSCs or PMCs in lawless 
situations  (Vaux 2002: 15). 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Humanitarian space is defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross as “the scope for neutral and 
impartial humanitarian action in the midst of conflict” (Studer: 2001: 372).  
35
 The deployment of PSCs or PMCs is however problematic to aid agencies. There are a number of 
considerations which disfavour the use of PSCS/PMCs. Their association with armed guards is e.g. contentious 
because such associations can work to legitimize the proliferation of weapons, the use of private security 
provides island of security, while insecurity is forced on to the elements of the society who cannot afford to pay 
for security etc. (Vaux 2002: 13).   
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3.2 Enhanced expectations contributing to UN procurement of expert 
services 
Expanding the scope for UN missions has also meant that an expansion in the organization’s 
competence is deemed necessary. Post-conflict reconstruction has especially posed several 
new challenges to the organization. Like many state militaries the UN has encountered the 
need to contract private security or military companies for the supply of certain expert 
services. The services apparently most frequently bought according to table AI.1 include 
demining, civilian police capacities and intelligence. A report of the Joint Inspection Unit on 
reforming the Field Services noted in 2002 that all the UN officials conferred to by the 
inspector concurred that as of 2002 there was a “growing need for more specialized skills, 
proficiency in modern technology, and middle management capacity” among civilian 
specialists in the field (A/57/78 2002: §7). Figure AI.1 indicates that expert functions account 
for roughly one third of the recorded PMC/PSC contracts with the United Nations, that is, 10 
out of 32 contracts included expert services.  
 
 Demining  
With an enhanced focus on rebuilding war-torn societies the removal of mines has emerged as 
a main priority in peacebuilding contexts. While military demining has long been a priority 
for armed forces, it is only recently in the context of post-conflict reconstruction endeavours 
that the clearing of mines for humanitarian reasons is being tackled on a large scale (Faltas 
2001: 430). Landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) do not only pose serious hazard in 
terms of maiming or death, but are also known to affect the delivery of emergency relief, 
discourage investment, alter patterns of production and transportation, delay the return of 
refugees and the demobilization of combatants, fuel malnutrition and the spread of disease, all 
vital parts of post-conflict societal recovery. (Spearin 2001a: 3-4). The removal of mines is 
hence considered prerequisite for further peace building efforts.  
 
While the signing of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction is thought to have 
had a positive effect on the dispersal of landmines, in 2001 there were still some 60 million 
Enhanced expectations to the UN – A catalyst for PSC/PMC deployment? 
 60 
antipersonnel land mines dispersed in about 64 countries (Faltas 2001: 428).36 In Afghanistan 
alone it is estimated that more than 160,000 antipersonnel  mines, 14,000 antitank mines, 
100,000 cluster munitions, and 2.3 million items of (UXO) were removed between 1989 and 
2003 (UNMAS 2004: 18). In addition, as of 1999, sixteen countries had not officially ended 
their landmine production: China, Cuba, Russia, Turkey, the United States, Yugoslavia, and 
ten states in the Middle East and Asia (Faltas 2001: 429). As the expectations to the UN for 
post-conflict reconstruction have augmented, a considerable capacity building effort is needed 
in order to diminish the demand for demining capabilities in the near future. Four out of the 
32 contracts recorded in table AI.1 included demining services.  
 
Civilian Police (CIVPOL) 
According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations police duties have had an 
increasingly important function in PKOs over the years as the organization has invoked on 
more comprehensive measures to reconstruct civil societies in the wake of wars (UN DPKO 
2005). The strengthening of criminal justice systems has been acknowledged as crucial in this 
connection, and although the criminal justice systems would also refer to institutions like the 
judiciary and penal system, most resources have been allocated to the process through 
reforming and re-establishing the police component (Training for Peace homepage).  
 
Intelligence 
Intelligence gathering in relation to UN peacekeeping has been, and to some extent still is, 
politically sensitive. Indeed the UN continues to avoid official use of the term military 
intelligence because of its association with illegal or undercover activities and chooses to use 
the term “military information” (Cline 2002: 179). In the 1960s it was even proposed that the 
UN should ban the word “intelligence” from its parlance (Dorn 1999: 414). However, there 
has been a growing acknowledgement of the importance of intelligence especially in modern 
multidimensional PKOs with their vast range of responsibilities frequently including elections 
monitoring, arms control verification (often including potential surprise inspections), law 
enforcement agency supervision, mediation (where confidential bargaining positions should 
not be revealed to the opposing side), sanctions and border monitoring (where clandestine 
activities must be uncovered or intercepted before perpetrators are able to take evasive 
                                                 
36
 The Convention was signed by 120 states and entered into force as part of international law in March 1999 
(Spearin 2001a: 1), however, some of the world’s leading manufacturers and owners of land mines, including the 
United States, Russia and China abstained from signing (Faltas 2001: 428).  
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action), and protection of so-called ‘safe areas’ (Dorn 1999: 416). In order to protect 
peacekeepers, humanitarian personnel, staff as well as assets, intelligence is an inherent part 
of any security precautions. 
 
The effort to coordinate the political, diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to 
resolve an internal crisis demands more integrated deployment of information. According to 
A. Walter Dorn, information-gathering can be allocated on a continuum from the permitted 
(white) overt information-gathering characterised by visible sensors, clearly identified UN 
personnel, unpaid informants and public documents, both regarding gathering and 
distribution, via questionable (grey) information gathering including less overt sensors, 
observers and human communications and more active gathering efforts, to prohibited (black) 
spying activities including paid agents and undercover agents, stolen documents, covert 
observation and active means of achieving information (Dorn 1999: 420). While the black 
areas are normally dismissed as part of UN operations, grey area information gathering is 
becoming more needed as several tragic lessons have been learned regarding the 
consequences of overt information gathering in the midst of conflict (Dorn 1999: 417).37 As 
the organization has invoked on more complex tasks in more dangerous environments there 
has been a considerable change in attitudes regarding intelligence gathering. While concern 
for issues of sovereignty and the fears of jeopardizing perceptions of impartiality traditionally 
have constituted major constraints to more active information gathering, intelligence 
personnel was increasingly sent to the most dangerous operating arenas during the 1990s 
(Dorn 1999: 428). Towards the end of the decade these military information/intelligence units 
were even labelled G2 units in conformity with military parlance (ibid). Illustrative of the 
change in attitude was the vast intelligence effort put into work in the second Somalia 
operation (UNOSOM II) where the UN in fact crossed the line into the ‘black zone’ of 
information gathering by paying informants and agents for provision of information (Dorn 
1999: 430). Intelligence is thus becoming a more required service resulting from the widening 
of the UN operational scope and PSCs and PMCs were hired for intelligence assignments in 
both Angola and in East Timor (see Table AI.1).  
                                                 
37
 Dorn lists as an example the UN monitoring mission in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and the way radio 
communication from UNPROFOR soldiers were monitored by Serb forces and used to rearrange their attacks 
(Dorn 1999: 416).  
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3.3 Enhanced expectations contributing to UN procurement of logistics and 
support services 
Good mission support has always been critical to mission success and as the size and scope of 
missions expand so must the mission support. While infantry and military observers to UN 
missions were once easily accessible due to the prevailing optimism towards the potentials of 
UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s, the situation was never as prosperous what regards 
logistic units. According to then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the shortage of 
logistic contributions was already a problem to the DPKO in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §51). 
Figure 3.2 shows the development in deployment of UN Peacekeeping forces from 1947 to 
2004. It follows from the five-fold increase in deployed peacekeeping personnel from 1990 to 
1995 that the logistical requirements for that period increased correspondingly.  
 
Fig. 3.2: Size of UN peacekeeping forces 1947- 2004 
 
Source: Global Policy Forum web page 06.09.2004 
 
In 2004 UN peace operations rotated 120,000 military and civilian police personnel around 15 
missions (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2005), an amount which obviously 
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will place strains on all aspects of the organization’s existing support and logistic apparatus. 
Furthermore, qualitative changes of peace operations have added to the burden. As PKOs 
have been launched in environments where there is no peace to keep, but rather where peace 
making is part of the mandate, greater demands are placed upon planning and logistic capacity 
in order to avoid exposing personnel to unnecessary risks. The dramatic augmentation in PKO 
deployment during the 1990s and its coincidence with aspirations for unprecedented levels of 
mission complexity, has served to put further strains on the organization’s ability to muster 
the support services demanded by any given mission. According to table AI.1, half the 
contracts between the UN and PSCs/PMCs included support service provision. 
 
The contract signed in 1992 between the British company Defence Systems Limited and the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for assistance to the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) illustrates how enhanced expectations to the scope of a UN 
mission led the Department to seek assistance from private security/military companies. 
Although the accounts of the organization’s use of PSCs and PMCs presented in table AI.1 
frequently involves more than one service, few of the contracts recorded have reached the 
comprehensiveness of the contract between Defence Systems Limited (DSL) and 
UNPROFOR which covered Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UN 
Department of Public Information 1996). In this case DPKO hired at least four PSCs/PMCs, 
or approximately 2,000 civilians, in order to mount the personnel necessary for the intended 
operation. (SCFAb 2002, Annex 6: §74). DSL contributed with 425 international staff from 
24 nations. Among the tasks carried out were crime prevention, crime detection, close 
protection and border security duties. The contract lasted four years until NATO forces 
assumed primary responsibility from the UN (ibid: §75). As the mission grew so did DSL 
responsibilities, and as peacekeepers from Asia and Africa in many cases lacked armour, DSL 
was requested to acquire surplus armoured vehicles (so-called APCs) from the Czech 
Republic. As these battalions also lacked the expertise to maintain and operate the APCs, 
UNPROFOR requested DSL to supply APC drivers and mechanics. DSL in this way became 
involved in operational peacekeeping duties with its drivers in armoured vehicles, maintained 
and fuelled by DSL personnel, out of bases constructed and maintained by DSL, and co-
ordinated by DSL planners in Zagreb (ibid: §76). While initially hired for a diversity of 
security purposes, DSL ended up performing tasks pertaining to all three service categories. 
According to former DSL’s Director of International Affairs, General Sir David Ramsbotham, 
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it was a case of employing fully qualified and experienced personnel to fill gaps created by 
the lack of regular UN civil and military personnel (ibid: §76). DSL employees wore civilian 
pattern UN uniforms with UN badges and identification papers and were fully integrated into 
the UNPROFOR organization. Where regular soldiers normally would serve for six months, 
DSL personnel would typically serve for the entire contracted period of four years (ibid: §77). 
DSL contractors were also given access to classified information (ibid: §78).  
 
According to Thakur and Schnabel, UNPROFOR represents the fourth generation of UN 
peacekeeping operations characterized by the inclusion of enforcement efforts into an 
otherwise complex mandate (Thakur and Schnabel 2001: 12-13). UNPROFOR was by 2001 
the largest PKO ever conducted and was eventually replaced by three separate but interlinked 
operations (UN Dept. of Public Information 1996). This mission illustrates how expanded 
mandates tend to infer a multitude of activities, including security functions, expert functions 
and support functions, which in complex missions frequently are partly fulfilled by PSCs and 
PMCs. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Enhanced expectations to the UN imply both a quantitative and a qualitative expansion of the 
UN’s responsibility, which means that UN peacekeeping operations have thus become more 
expensive, more complex, and more dangerous. In assessing the validity of P1 then it appears 
that greater demand for a wider spectre of activities, which often coincide in time, has fuelled 
a demand for external provision of these services. The more comprehensive role assigned by 
the organization has had serious consequences for the demands for security functions and 
logistic capabilities, but it has also introduced new tasks to the organization, and thus created 
a need for further specializations. P1 is hence supported as PSCs and PMCs are in fact often 
hired to take off load from overburdened UN operations, and additionally to perform 
specialized tasks that only recently have fallen within the domain of the United Nations. 
4. Radicalized operating environments and UN PSC/PMC          
dependence 
 
The operations embarked upon by the UN in the 1990s increasingly took place in 
environments characterized by complex conflict structures and involved multifaceted 
emergencies. These environments have often been characterized by brutal civil wars and 
consequently of inadequate state structures to deal with these problems. In these “orphans of 
the Cold War”  (Dame Margareth Anstee, quoted in Thakur and Schnabel 2001: 14) the UN 
has faced severely aggravated operating conditions which have put stress on the existing 
arrangements for logistics and support function, expert functions, and especially on the 
security apparatus of the organization. This chapter thus aims at discussing to which degree 
aggravated operating environments as represented by failed states and new wars have 
contributed to the organization procuring services from the private security and military 
industry.  
 
4.1 Radicalization of the UN’s operating environment contributing to 
procurement of security services 
 
At present, most of the world’s armed conflicts take place in fragile states. Such conflicts tend 
to create millions of victims and deaths, social and economic destruction and in some cases 
environmental stress, generating refugees and internally displaced people (The African 
Studies Center 2003:16). The complexity of the problems met in these states mean that there 
are multiple dimensions that need to be addressed and a correspondingly increased demand 
for specialized personnel. It does also imply that the conditions under which UN personnel 
work are severely aggravated. According to judgements made by the United Nations Office of 
the Security Coordinator, UN personnel are increasingly exposed to aggravated operating 
environments. Table 4.1 shows a sensational increase in the number of hazardous operating 
environments since the beginning of the 1990s.38 While apparently no UN staff was deployed 
in dangerous operations in 1990, 40,062 were exposed to hazardous environments by 2003.   
                                                 
38
 The UN Security Coordinator declares a mission hazardous when prevailing security conditions require the 
application of security measures under UN security phases (Report of the Independent Panel 2003: 19). The five 
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Table 4.1: Number of UN staff deployed in hazardous missions 
 
Source: Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq 2003: 19. 
 
According to the table, these numbers have risen steadily in pace with the amount of missions 
launched in dangerous operating environments.  
 
The primary responsibility for the safety and security of UN personnel in field operations rest 
with host governments and hardly any security measures can be effective without their full 
commitment and efficiency (UN SG 2000: 1). It is therefore obvious that operating in 
environments where there no longer exist anything close to a state monopoly of violence 
represent the riskiest situations for humanitarian personnel. Factors resulting from weak state 
structures, and which represent a risk to international relief or peacekeeping personnel, would 
include e.g. the wide proliferation of arms in the hands of unskilled or undisciplined soldiers 
(such as child soldiers and soldiers under the influence of narcotics), as well as criminality 
(Currier 2003: 7).  
 
The problem of lacking host state security is accentuated by the character of new wars, or 
‘low intensity conflicts’ which they used to be termed. These conflicts not only complicate 
and multiply the tasks of UN personnel, they also implicate an undermined respect for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
security phases are: (a) Phase One- Precautionary (b) Phase Two – Restricted Movement (c) Phase three – 
Relocation (d) Phase Four – Programme Suspension (e) Phase Five – Evacuation (ibid 34:35).                                                                                                                                                                            
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legal status of relief workers (traditionally considered a war crime) and might even make 
them valuable targets in order to sabotage the war effort of an adversary (Currier 2003:7). As 
discussed in chapter 3, flawed perceptions of UN personnel impartiality has to a greater extent 
made them targets of new wars. Figure 4.1 shows the fatalities of UN peacekeeping personnel 
in percentage of total UN forces deployed every year in the period 1948- 2005.39 The graph 
shows a general positive trend, however, in spite of technological advances, as well more than 
50 years of peacekeeping experience; from around 1990 and onwards there is a slightly 
negative trend with a higher fatality rate among UN peacekeeping personnel.  
Fig: 4.1 Developments in UN peacekeeper fatalities in percentage of total UN force 
 
Source: Numbers obtained from UNDP “Fatalities by year” webpage 21.09.05. 
 
The situation is no better, and perhaps even worse, for UN aid personnel. According to the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) there has been a 
recent increase in violent attacks on humanitarian personnel in the field. Between January 
1992 and 31 August 1998, 153 staff members lost their lives and 43 were taken hostage or 
                                                 
39
 Numbers include military, civilian police, and civilian international and local personnel in UN peace 
operations only. Personnel representing other agencies are not included. The figure for 2005 was estimated by 
doubling the fatalities as of June 30th 2005. 
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kidnapped; by September 2000, the numbers had risen to 198 and 240, respectively. Hundreds 
more have been taken hostage, or have become victims to violent security incidents (OCHA 
webpage). These tendencies have been reinforced by the increased use of terrorist strategies in 
new wars. Attacks on UN personnel, assets or property carry a lot of symbolic value in some 
theatres. In addition to spreading fear and confusion, such attacks will carry messages, which 
are effectively delivered through a globalized media. Terrorism as a way to fight new wars 
thus presents another factor that seriously deteriorates the conditions under which UN 
humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers work. 
 
In Appendix Ib information on the operating contexts of the 32 contracts between UN and 
PSCs/PMCs compiled for this thesis is systematized along with information on which services 
were procured in each contract.40 Table 4.2 presents the covariation of aggravated operating 
environments (Ao) (where both the ‘intrastate wars’ and ‘disrupted states’ variables are 
present) and the procurement of security services (Sp).41 
 
Table 4.2: Aggravated operating environments (Ao) and security provision (Sp) 
 
Source: Appendix 1 
13 contracts included security service provision. These services were bought in 31 per cent of 
the cases where the operating environment qualified as ‘aggravated’ or ‘radicalized’. In these 
cases, the combination of a hostile operating environment and a host state unable to fully 
provide security for the UN mission, appear to contribute to UN entities buying security off 
the private market in the absence of member state forces.42 Although security was not bought 
in the majority of cases where there was aggravated operating environments (34, 5 per cent), 
the percentage of cases where security was in fact procured is still considerable, especially 
seen in the light of the limited numbers of failed states and the high levels of controversy 
                                                 
40
 See Appendix Ic regarding the criterions for plotting of the table. 
41
 ’Aggravated operating environment’ is used synonymously with ’radicalized operating environment’. 
42
 A discussion of the limitations of relying of member state forces for security will be undertaken in chapter 5.  
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associated with such contracting. Not only is the connection between the organization and the 
private security and military controversial, but the contracting out of security functions is 
particularly so as it represents a transferral of the authority of violence already delegated from 
the member states on to private actors. In addition, the mere fact that 31 per cent of the 
contracts in aggravated environments comprised private security procurement is also 
somewhat noteworthy since it officially is not an established practice. The use of armed 
guards in UN contexts in general should only be used “in exceptional circumstances” and 
when “the level of humanitarian need is such that the lack of humanitarian assistance would 
lead to unacceptable human suffering” (OCHA 2001: 7-10). In accordance with P2, security 
services were only bough in 9,5 per cent of the operating theatres, which according to the 
plotting of Appendix Ib do not constitute aggravated environments. It follows, however, from 
the categorizing of the data in Appendix Ib that some of these environments can be disrupted 
states, and hence lack a state monopoly of violence, while not being registered as an 
aggravated environment.43 Contexts not registered as ‘aggravated’ can thus very well require 
additional security measures on a short notice. The final combination of absence of 
aggravated operating environment and absence of security procurement reveals that in one-
fourth of the contracts compiled, other services but security was procured and possibly for 
other reasons than for hostile operating environments.   
 
4.2 Aggravated operating environments contributing to the procurement of 
PSC/PMC expert services 
 
The problem posed by fragile or even collapsed states that confront the international 
community, and in particular the United Nations, is a relatively new one, not so much because 
the component parts are unprecedented, but because they now occur simultaneously. Failed or 
collapsed states thus represent the most complex operating environment for both UN 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The multitude of problems that needs to be 
addressed result in a corresponding increased demand for specialized personnel.  
                                                 
43
 In accordance with the analytical framework, both the ’intrastate war’ and the ’disrupted state’ variable should 
be present in order for the contract to be registered in Appendix Ib as taking place in an radicalized operating 
environment. Arguably, the criterions for formally qualifying as an aggravated operating environment are rather 
strict. It should thus be born in mind that the threshold for qualifying for this category is high, meaning that 
environments characterized by insecurity might not always be registered as ‘aggravated’ in this context.  On the 
other hand, the small amount of security contracts taking place in environments categorized as non-aggravated 
seems to support the rather strict categorization.    
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The demand for some of the expert services can be traced to the operating environment in 
terms of the lack of a functioning state apparatus. Others are more intrinsically liked to the 
terms on which new wars are fought, such as the density of landmines in areas of little 
military strategic importance. The targeting of civilians is symptomatic of new wars and 
landmines are an efficient means to that end. Since new wars are also characterized by a 
blurred division of civilians and belligerent forces, the use of landmines serves a twofold 
purpose by also constituting an efficient instrument in the more traditional goals of destroying 
the enemy’s fighting capacity.   
 
Re-establishing civil order in failed or disrupted states often requires an almost completely 
new police force to be trained. This was the task for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 
where efforts were made to establish a police force in ethnographic balance which was not 
associated with human rights violations (Aboagye and Bah 2004: 10-11). As it is also of 
paramount priority that the new police forces have a police culture that reflects the 
democratized regime (McFarlane and Maley 2001: 185), the requirements for training skills 
and level of professionalism cannot always be met by the random selection of police officers 
offered to the DPKO by its member states.  Whereas UN civilian police (CivPol) officers 
were deployed for the first time in the DRC during the 1960s, civilian police involvement in 
PKOs expanded rapidly in the 1990s. The UN CivPol division has thus had a steep learning 
curve. In January 1995 civilian police officers accounted for just below two per cent of the 
total peacekeeping forces deployed, by January 2004 the share had increased to approximately 
10 per cent, dispersed on 17 and 15 PKOs respectively (DPKO webpage 08.06.05). 
 
In particularly dangerous areas, such as in new wars fought in disrupted states, e.g. in former 
Yugoslavia, Haiti, East Timor or Somalia, or in theatres where genocidal activities take place, 
intelligence takes on added importance and calls for specialized skills in order to prevent 
hostile attacks on the local population, attacks on premises or personnel of the peacekeeping 
mission, or on humanitarian actors (Dorn 1999: 416). One of the main conclusions drawn by 
the panel investigating the security effort in the aftermath of the Canal hotel bombing in 
Baghdad was that the organization had failed to “adequately analyze and utilize information 
made available to the system on threats against UN staff and premises” (Report of the 
Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq 2003: 1). 
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There are 10 contracts involving expert services. The findings from Appendix Ib regarding 
the connection between aggravated operating environment and the procurement of these 
services show that the two variables coexist in 12,5 per cent of the contracts compiled. In 
most cases (53 percent) where the environment is characterized as aggravated, expert 
functions such as demining, civilian police, and intelligence are not procured from PSCs and 
PMCs. P2 is thus not supported in relation to expert services. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Aggravated operating environment (Ao) and expert functions (E) 
 
Source: Appendix 1b 
 
What regards demining and civilian police, the tendency can be explained by these services 
being common post-conflict reconstruction measures. It is likely that these services thus are 
sought on a higher scale when the conflict is terminated and when the conflict environment 
allows for rebuilding initiatives to take place. Looking at the number of contract entities 
where there is an absence of aggravated operating environment and a presence of expert 
service procurement is nevertheless not as high as one should expect (18,5 per cent). Only two 
contracts in fact separate the presence and absence of expert services in aggravated operating 
environments. This divergence might be attributed to the fact that intelligence is normally an 
in-conflict measure used to reduce risk levels, and that the need for such services would 
normally be higher the more difficult operating environments. Second, the fact that the total 
number of expert contracts is low (10 contracts) may result in data not being completely 
representative. 
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4.3 Aggravated operating environments contributing to UN procurement of 
PSC/PMC support and logistic services 
 
As a great number of peace and political missions are carried out in states missing a 
functioning state apparatus, there are obvious obstacles in terms of communication and 
transport for these missions. Little developed, or destroyed in the fighting, communications 
tend to be poor, while the density of landmines often is high. According to Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, the new UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) e.g. is likely to face “unprecedented 
logistical obstacles” (IRIN, 25 March). Logistic and communication obstacles also tend to be 
exacerbated by the way in which new wars are fought. Hampering of humanitarian access to 
certain population groups can be an efficient tool used by fighting factions. In response to the 
difficult operating environment in Sudan and because its member states do not possess the 
adequate logistical means, the African Union has e.g. accepted logistic support and planning 
capacities from NATO for its peace-monitoring mission in the strife-torn Darfur province 
(Agence France-Presse 28 April 2005). 17 of the 32 contracts were found to include support 
services. 
 
Table 4.4 provides an insight into the frequency of aggravated operating environment versus 
UN procurement of support services.  
 
Table 4.4: Aggravated operating environment (Ao) and support functions (S) 
 
 
Source: Appendix Ib 
 
At first glance the figures illustrating the connection between the aggravated operating 
environment (Ao) and support functions (S) resemble those found for security services. 
Dangerous operating environments coincided with the presence of support service 
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procurement in 31 per cent of the cases, and with the absence of support procurement in 34,5 
per cent of the contracts. However, while security services was provided in less frequently in 
safer environments, the number of support and logistic contracts remain high in environments 
not categorized as aggravated. Logistic and support services thus are likely to be a much 
demanded service category regardless of environment. However, the fact that there is a 
difference between the support service procurement in aggravated operating environments 
and other environments is in fact supportive of P2. In case of support functions, the separation 
of the category ‘aggravated operating environments’ into its two component parts would most 
likely provide some clarity. Given that enhanced expectations to the organization have led to 
peace operations increasingly being present in ongoing conflicts, the war status might not be 
decisive for whether support functions are bought or not. The capabilities of the host state are 
likely to be all the more decisive to whether PSCs and PMCs are hired for support 
assignments.44  
 
Radicalized operating environments place obstacles to the carrying out of UN tasks. 
Afghanistan represents an example at hand. In the Zabul province, one of the heartlands of the 
Taleban-led insurgency, the UN-staffed Joint Electoral Management Body was represented by 
two employees of Global Risk Strategies due to very high security risks.45 According to the 
BBC’s correspondent in Zabul, Andrew North, “In effect, here in Zabul, these two contractors 
have become the United Nations” (BBC News 29.09.04). The two contractors were 
identifying and assessing potential voter registration sites for Afghanistan’s presidential 
election, as well as providing “other critical operational and logistic support” to the 
registration process (The Asia Foundation webpage).  In cases such as these the need for 
specialist services seems to have developed not out of lack of internal skills, but for security 
reasons. Radicalized operating environments thus directly and indirectly accentuate the need 
for other service types.  
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 Internal organizational incapacities partly due to member state contributions will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. 
45
 More than 30 Afghan election workers from JEMB and two PSC personnel had been killed by October 2004 
according to a 2004 Report of the Secretary-General (SG 2004: §7). It is unknown whether these contractors 
belonged to Global Risk Securities.    
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4.4 Conclusions 
UN missions increasingly take place in operating environments characterized by the 
UNSECOORD as hazardous. These environments are often characterised by disrupted state 
structures and civil wars. UN missions in these settings represent serious challenges to the UN 
as they tend to pose severe constraints on personnel, require high levels of experience and 
competence, and call for high quality material and high levels of resources. In order for UN 
personnel not to solely be engaged in protecting the mission and its assets but also in 
achieving its mandate, missions also frequently require additional security measures to be put 
in place, as well as professional risk analysis (Currier 2003: 6). According to information of 
the 32 contracts compiled for this thesis, P2 “Radicalization of operating environment has 
contributed to the UN deploying private security and private military companies” appear to be 
largely confirmed by the data in Appendix I. Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, there is a 
clear tendency for security services to be procured in dangerous operating environments, 
whereas they are rarely sought in non-aggravated circumstances. It can thus be inferred that 
the difficult conditions represented by these environments have contributed to the UN 
procurement of security services from the private security and military industry.  
 
Expert services, on the other hand, were more frequently bought in environments not 
characterized as radicalized. Only a small number of expert contracting took place in 
dangerous operating environments. P2 is thus not confirmed by the data represented in table 
Appendix I., on the contrary, absence of dangerous operating environment seems to explain a 
greater number of the contracts for expert services.  
 
In terms of support and logistic services P2 appears to be strengthened. However, it is likely 
that the single variable of disrupted state would explain a higher share of the support services 
contracts than the aggregated variable taking intrastate war into account do. In any case, 
radicalized or aggravated operating environments do seem to contribute to the UN hiring 
PSCs and PMCs for support and logistic assignments. 
 
In sum, aggravated operating environment do appear to have the effect of increasing the UN 
demand for PSC/ PMC services.  
5. PSCs and PMCs - substituting inadequate internal UN capacities? 
   
"The orchestration and management of the various inputs and programmes of the 
UN system – the military, political humanitarian and human rights dimensions – 
is extraordinary complicated. It is not for nothing that the label ‘complex 
emergency’ has gained currency."  
                      -  Thomas G. Weiss (1999: 51) 
 
The ability of the United Nations to act upon mandates is limited both by the will of member 
states to supply personnel and equipment and the permanent arrangements to support and 
arrange peace operations. This chapter intends to discuss the validity of proposition P3, to 
what degree inadequate internal capacity has contributed to the organization’s deployment of 
PSCs and PMCs. The proposition will be discussed by looking at how limitations of political 
will on behalf of member states and internal organizational deficiencies provide an 
insufficient response to the enhanced needs faced by the organization. The chapter 
subsequently examines the internal capacities of the UN in each of the three main service 
categories identified as repeatedly procured by the UN. 
  
5.1 Meeting the need for security  
The ability of the United Nations to fulfil its objectives, i.e. protect civilians and help end 
conflicts, is directly linked to UN staff security (High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change 2004: 74). While the UN has come to acknowledge the fact that their personnel is 
increasingly targeted in the field, until recently very little has been done to the institutional 
design in order to meet the need for additional security measures. The bottom line of the UN 
security arrangements is still the principle of it being the responsibility of the host 
government to provide security for the personnel, premises, property, and activities of UN 
humanitarian agencies (Barber 1999: 35).46 As the nature of peacekeeping has changed in 
tandem with a general tendency of aggravated operating climate and degenerating 
perceptions of the organization’s neutrality and impartiality, the UN’s reaction has been a 
continued reliance on legal measures such as the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and 
                                                 
46
 This principle which stems from the Vienna Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Personnel of 
the UN (ibid.) 
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Associated Personnel. The convention did not enter into force until 1999 and it quickly 
became clear that the convention had little de facto influence on the security situation in the 
field (Spearin 2005: 59). It is only over the past couple of years that greater attention has 
been directed towards the improvement of the UN’s capacity to maintain safety and security 
of its personnel. A thorough review of the UN security system was carried out only after a 
series of attacks on UN personnel culminating in the attacks on the UN headquarters in the 
Canal Hotel in Baghdad, which killed 22 staff and visitors, including the Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello (The 
Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq 2003: 1). The 
initiative in turn led to the adoption in December 2004 of Resolution 59/276, which by 
establishing the new Department of Security aims at professionalizing the security system of 
the organization (Press Release DSG/SM/242, Res. 59/276: XI). The new Department was 
formally inaugurated in February 2005 (Press Release DSG/SM/242) and it is thus the 
security system existing prior to this date that will be relevant in terms of explaining past use 
of PSCs and PMCs.47  
 
The UN security arrangements in existence until February 2005 has been managed by four 
separate structures: (1) The DPKO, which manages the security of peacekeeping operations; 
(2) The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), responsible for 
all policy and procedural matters related to security in the organization (UN SG 2000: 5); (3) 
The Safety and Security Services (S&SS), which manages the security of major UN 
headquarters around the world, as well as the close protection of senior UN staff members; 
and (4) parallel security management structures operated within the UN agencies, funds and 
programmes (The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq 
2003: 3).48 
 
5.1.1 The security capacity in peace operations 
As discussed in chapter 3, when humanitarians operate in dangerous conflict environments 
that call for security measures, UN forces engaged in enforcement actions in that conflict 
                                                 
47
 Some comments on the new security arrangements, including the establishment of a new Directorate of 
Security, will be made in the concluding chapter. 
48
 Although highly relevant, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the individual security arrangement of 
each UN agency, programme or fund. 
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theatre will not necessarily work to alleviate the security situation as their association will 
further contribute to perceptions of flawed humanitarian neutrality and impartiality.  In 
theatres where there are polarizations due to the US-led ‘global war on terrorism’ the process 
of reversed security also seems to be exacerbated.49 This has e.g. lead the ICRC to turn down 
US government offers of military protection for its delegates in Iraq, no matter how hazardous 
environment (Hazan and Berger 2004). The emerging ‘security spiral’, where a quest for 
security offered by armed forces have the side effect of increasing humanitarians’ exposure to 
threats, is well illustrated by the situation created by the UN Protection Force in Bosnia 
(UNPROFOR) in 1992-95. Although UNPROFOR did much to improve the security of 
humanitarian personnel, there were times when the result was the opposite. The Bosnian 
Serbs in particular were very hostile to UNPROFOR after it called for punitive NATO air 
strikes against them. UNHCR, which had become the hub of all humanitarian action in 
Bosnia, and cooperated closely with UNPROFOR therefore often had huge difficulties 
presenting itself as impartial (Cutts 1999: 6). On a number of occasions, UNHCR convoy 
teams complained that the presence of UNPROFOR escorts had the effect of drawing fire 
onto them, and that they would be safer with no military escort (ibid). More recently, the 
NGO Forum in Kabul has expressed concern that humanitarian action may be seen as a front 
for intelligence gathering and has urged the intervening forces to concentrate on creating a 
secure environment by helping to rebuild the Afghan security forces (Lilly 2002b: 11). There 
are also situations where a PKO in charge of humanitarian security could be tempted to make 
humanitarian assistance dependent on the warring parties’ compliance with political 
conditions (Studer 2001: 374). Problems concerning perceptions of flawed neutrality 
stemming from associations of humanitarians with the political and military objectives of the 
armed forces that provided the protection, are often exacerbated when, as is usually the case, 
humanitarian actors remain in the conflict zone after the departure of peacekeepers or other 
external military forces (OCHA 2001: 7). 
 
In situations where there is a potential security spiral at work, humanitarians are left with the 
choice of establishing even closer links with armed forces present (which potentially will 
work to further deprive them of perceived impartiality and neutrality); choose isolation from 
the armed forces (which will potentially leave them virtually unprotected); or seek protection 
from other capacities, such as local warlords (which will contribute to legitimize their rule), or 
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 ‘Reversed security’ is used synonymous with what was termed ‘security spiral’ in chapter 3.  
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from private security/military companies.50 According to Martin Barber, former Chief of 
Policy Development and Advocacy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, PSCs/PMCs have been hired by UN humanitarian agencies both in situations where 
law and order has broken down, and where the host state thus is unable to provide security; as 
well as in countries where the government has lost control over parts of its territory (Barber 
1999: 35). In the first scenario, the only criteria for humanitarian agencies using PSCs 
concern the approval of the host state. The company must be registered by the government of 
the country in which they are operating, and authorized for each specific contract (ibid). The 
problem in such cases relates to the value of a government approval where the government is 
not able to sustain law and order. More specifically, the registration procedures are likely to 
be insufficient, at best, in states where “law and order have broken down.” In the second 
scenario, where there is a flawed monopoly of violence, the strategy of humanitarian 
agencies, according to Barber, is to hold armed groups responsible for security (ibid). The 
problems in such cases are multiple.51 However, the alternative of hiring PSCs is in most such 
cases not feasible “because their operations are not endorsed by host governments” (ibid). 
Paradoxically, Barber holds that in cases where armed groups are not interested in political 
legitimacy52, aid agencies are faced with the dilemma of either abandoning civilians or 
seeking arrangements with PSCs to enable the aid to be delivered (ibid). Barbers account thus 
adds little clarity by providing two rather unhelpful criterions and simultaneously admit that 
these criterions are frequently not adhered to. More recent and general UN guidelines 
developed for humanitarian interaction with military elements are based upon the 2004 
OCHA guidelines Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, which again serve as 
a point of reference for humanitarian practitioners drawing up context specific guidelines. 
Interestingly, while emphasizing the importance of maintaining “an active and perceived 
distance from the military” and “that cooperation with the belligerent forces should in 
principle not take place”, the guidelines specifically excludes PMCs and PSCs from its scope 
(Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2004a: 5-7). While the exclusion could 
possibly be interpreted as an official embracement of PSC/PMC deployment, it is more likely 
to be a maneuver to avoid taking a stance on private security dependency by noting that 
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 To which extent PSC/PMC deployment works to compromise the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarians 
is also subject to discussion. It is, however, likely that it will vary depending on context, as guards can be armed 
or unarmed, and their general behaviour and tactics may vary considerably in degree of militancy.  
51
 It can easily be imagined how warlords can take advantage of such power, as well as what problems such 
strategies pose in situations where convoys move between areas controlled by different warlords. 
52
 This would frequently be the case in new wars in mineral rich areas. 
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“although highly relevant in today’s conflict situations” the relationship between 
humanitarian agencies and PMCs and PSCs “are excluded from the analysis of this paper to 
avoid dilution of focus” (OCHA 2004a: 5). Apparently it is left to the individual aid agency in 
each context which attitude to assume in relation to privatized means of security. 
 
Usually, direct security provision in the field is the responsibility of UN peacekeepers. In the 
absence of a PKO, LifeGuard (a South African company with close ties to infamous 
Executive Outcomes) and DSL were both contracted to protect UN relief operations in Sierra 
Leone in 1998, one year prior to the establishment of the peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL). 
Similarly, DSL was approached by the organization in Somalia in 1992, the very year the 
peacekeeping mission (UNOSOM) was established, to deploy no less than 7000 Nepalese 
Ghurkhas to protect NGO relief convoys from threats posed by warlords. DSL, however, did 
not accept the contract (Vines 1999: 134).53 In some difficult missions, the UN peacekeeping 
troops would seem overstretched and therefore unable to fulfil all their duties. In such 
situations they are sometimes supplemented with private security resources. Currently this 
seems to be the case in the highly complex UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC) where Pacific Architects and Engineers are reported to be handling security for 
UN infrastructure and personnel in Kinshasa (Hukill 2004: 1527).  
 
A central part of most peacekeeping mandates is the facilitation of a secure operating 
environment for humanitarian assistance.54 There are at least three problems related to this 
matter: Firstly, as discussed above, the association of humanitarians with armed forces could 
compromise their impartiality and neutrality and produce what here has been termed a 
‘security spiral’, which has counterproductive effects on the actual security of humanitarians. 
Secondly, peacekeeping forces might not always possess the capacity to provide security to 
all agencies on the ground; and thirdly, in modern complex emergencies the humanitarians are 
normally the first to arrive, while the early days are often also the most dangerous (Newland 
and Waller Meyer 1999: 26-27). A peacekeeping operation normally takes three to four 
                                                 
53
 Nepalese Ghurkha soldiers first served as mercenaries for the British East India Company, but became fully 
integrated in the British Army in 1857 and operate in formed units of the brigade of Ghurkhas. Ghurkha soldiers 
also serve in the Indian army. Ghurkhas are generally known for their fighting skills, devotedness and for their 
dependence on the Kukri knives in battle (Nationmaster Encyclopedia). 
54
 Of the current eight peacekeeping missions in Africa six of them are specifically mandated to contribute to 
create the necessary security conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (DPKO homepage 13.09.05).  
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months, at best, from Security Council request to initial deployment (ibid: 26).55 The 
organizational inertia thus implies that the security of humanitarian agencies normally is in 
the hands of UNSECOORD for the first few months irrespective of a PKO mandate.  
 
5.1.2 The security capacity of the Office of the UN Security Coordinator 
(UNSECOORD) 
For any UN operation apart from those administered by the DPKO, the Office of the UN 
Security Coordinator has the overall responsibility for safeguarding a response to security 
threats faced by UN personnel. In environments where the local authority is not able to 
guarantee the security of UN personnel, the UNSECOORD is then responsible for adequate 
security measures to be put in place. UNSECOORD is, however, a policy-making agency 
based in New York, and is therefore dependent on a structure of officials in the field to make 
judgements about risk levels. In order to improve risk assessments, measures were taken in 
2000 for field officers to develop systematic audits of threats and “minimum operational 
safety standards” (MOSS) for each location. UNSECOORD officials also conduct security 
compliance inspection programs as well as develop criteria for the suspension of operations 
(UN SG 2000: §64).  Surprisingly, these basic security routines were only introduced at a 
stage when UN personnel had already been targeted in conflict environments for years, a 
development illustrated by the 198 civilian staff who lost their lives in service of the UN 
between 1992 and 2000 (ibid: §2). 
 
The UN security system managed by the Office of the UN Security Coordinator is thus a 
headquarters based system dependant on liaison with appointed officials in the field. At the 
headquarters level the Executive Head of each organization of the UN system has appointed 
an official who acts as the security focal point for the management of security within his/her 
respective organization, and liaises with the Security Coordinator (UN SG 2000: §34). These 
officials then interact with the designated official in the field. The security system is 
illustrated by figure 5.1. 
 
                                                 
55
 The Brahimi Report proposed timelines for deployment of peacekeeping operations to be set at 30 days from 
the adoption of a Security Council resolution for traditional peacekeeping operations and 90 days in case of 
complex missions (Brahimi 2000: §88), these goals have so far proven hard to meet.  
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Fig. 5.1: The UN security system for operations other than PKOs                                       
 
         Source: UN SG 2000: §34                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
In the field, a designated officer for security is appointed. In many countries this position is 
taken on top of other obligations, such as being the resident coordinator, head of an operation, 
or head of other UN organizations. The position of resident field official for security has then 
clearly not been prioritized within the organization, which is admitted by the words of the 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “Unfortunately, owing to insufficient capacity for training, 
motoring and evaluation, [designated] officials cannot always carry out their functions as 
effectively as would be desirable” (ibid: §44). The workload included in the position of 
designated official is substantial at the offset as he/she is responsible for preparing a security 
plan for the country and on security issues in general. In order to do so, the designated official 
will establish a security management team, often consisting of the heads of the UN agencies, 
programmes, and funds present at the duty station, who will assist and advice on the security 
plan (ibid: §46).  Another serious default of the handling of security in the field is the lack of 
competency of the officials responsible for security. While designated officials receive some 
security training (ibid: §46), these individuals are not professional security advisors, and the 
one security position that actually is meant for a professional, the field security official, is 
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often not made available to UN duty stations.56 Consequently, any duty station lacking a field 
security officer, lacks the means to provide professional security advice to the designated 
official and the security management team, identify and report on potential security hazards; 
maintain and manage the security and contingency plans; and coordinate the activities of other 
agency specific security officers (ibid: §8). In 2004, there were only field security officers in 
64 of the 146 countries where a designated official had been appointed (UN SG 2004a: §18). 
Considering that the number of “hazardous UN missions”57 in 2003 counted 93 (The 
independent Panel 2003: 19)58, it can be implied that there must be a striking shortage of 
professional security advisors present at the duty stations. Indicative of the overburdened 
security system is the fact that UNSECOORD, the unit specializing in staff security, does not 
have the capacity to recruit and administer the field security officers, but has outsourced this 
task to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), while day-to day management 
remains the responsibility of the Office of the Security Coordinator (UN SG 2004a: §20). The 
activities of UNSECOORD is further limited by the fact that the financing of “field-related 
cost” incurred either in the field or at headquarters locations through the provision of 
operational support, has been based on a cost-sharing formula and voluntary contributions 
from member states (SG 2004a: §60-61).   
 
There are also organizational limitations concerning the management of the limited resources 
available. The fact that there is virtually no flexibility as to the assignment of a field security 
officer if the operating environment suddenly should require professional assistance, serves to 
accentuate the shortage of field security officers. The decision to recruit a field security 
officer is made by the security management team in the field in consultation with 
UNSECOORD, a process that can take up to a year due to cost sharing regulations (UN SG 
2000: §49). Ann Paludan, a consultant to the World Food Programme, has noted, “The only 
fast way to deploy security staff is through professional security companies” (Vaux 2002: 15). 
The Secretary-General Kofi Annan has characterized the system as “cumbersome and 
completely inadequate” (ibid: 49), and acknowledge that due to the severe limitations of the 
security arrangements in the field, UN agencies, funds and programmes have been obliged to 
engage their own security officers to provide essential protection for their staff and activities 
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 The field security officer is sometimes referred to as the field security coordination officer in UN parlance. 
57
 The UNSECOORD declared a mission “hazardous” when prevailing security conditions require the 
application of security measures under UN security phases (The independent Panel 2003: 19).  
58
 See Chapter 4. 
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(UN SG 2004a: §19). It is estimated that as of October 2004, there were 164 agency-specific 
security officers working at field duty stations employed by WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, 
WHO and UNHCR (UN SG 2004a: §27). It is unknown how many of these officials are 
recruited from the private security and military industry. On a more general basis, many of the 
tasks belonging to the field security officer such as security training of staff, comprehensive 
threat and risk assessments (normally also including some degree of intelligence gathering 
and analysis), monitoring and management of staff movements are likely to be contracted out, 
e.g. to PSCs/PMCs even in cases where there is a security officer present, due to the daunting 
work load of such officers. According to the Secretary-General, these officers are in many 
instances hard-pressed and entirely overwhelmed in attempting to carry out the wide array of 
tasks of the necessary frequency, depth and geographic range (ibid: §19). In cases such as 
Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia and the Sudan, and Iraq, it has been necessary to deploy up to 
20 officers (ibid). These apparently highly difficult operating environments all represent 
disrupted states that have been affected by ‘new wars’.59 Considering the time lag, in many 
cases, hiring PSC/PMC professionals is likely to avoid placing urgent humanitarian 
operations at significant risk while waiting for additional internal officers to be recruited, 
trained and deployed. Consequently, the British company Defence Systems Limited (DSL) 
has provided the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) with security officers both in 
Somalia and in Sudan in the past (Vaux 2002: 16). The same company also supplied the 
World Food Program with a temporary security officer in Angola (ibid).   
 
Even if UNSECOORD should manage to curb the demand for security officers in the field, 
these officers are strategic specialists and in the absence of a peacekeeping operation lack the 
tactical means to remedy dangerous operating environments. In extreme conflict theatres such 
as those in Iraq and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), PSCs or PMCs appear to be 
deployed on a broader basis. The British company, Global Risk Strategies, is e.g. the main 
supplier of security to the UN Mission in Iraq (UNMI) according to the Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF 2004: 5).  
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 According to the SIPRI yearbooks Iraq was last registered as engaged in civil war in 2001, the warring 
factions being the supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) vs. the Iraqi government 
(Eriksson, Sollenberg and Wallersten 2002: Appendix 1). However, there are also clearly features characterizing 
the current conflict scenario in Iraq that resemble those of new wars such as the struggle for political influence 
over mineral rich areas between different groups of the population, and in addition, antagonisms within these 
groups.  Iraq is clearly a borderline case, which in this context is registered as an ‘aggravated operating 
environment’ (see Appendix Ic). 
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5.1.3 The security capacity of the Safety and Security Services (S&SS) 
The S&SS posit the responsibility of headquarter security and close protection of UN 
officials. With UN headquarters increasingly being seen as valuable symbolic targets for 
insurgents and terrorist groupings, the requirements to the S&SS in each location have 
increased substantially in a relatively short period of time. The bombing of the UN 
headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, is to date the clearest 
evidence of the Safety and Security Services not having kept alertness to match the threat 
level. The Independent Panel appointed to examine “all relevant facts” regarding the attack 
concluded in detail that there were severe flaws concerning the chain of command, 
information management capabilities, division of labour, and coordination of the security 
arrangements by the S&SS (the Independent Panel 2003: 1-2). An S&SS team e.g. carried out 
a security assessment, including a risk analysis, prior to the establishment of the UN 
headquarters in the Canal hotel. The assessment was however limited to the potential threats 
to the SRSG and not to the UN in general. The report wisely concluded that the risk of the 
SRSG being a direct target was low, unless “he would be at the wrong place at the wrong 
time” which would imply high security risks (Report of the Independent Panel 2003: 10). 
 
Defence Systems Limited and ArmorGroup have on a number of occasions covered services 
pertaining to the domain of the Safety and Security Services (S&SS) both regarding 
protection of headquarters, premises, training, the supply of guards, close protection, etc. The 
UN headquarters in New York and Nairobi are the only locations to have their own small 
training units, these are also complemented by regular budget funds to contract specialized 
training services on an “as-needed basis” (UN SG 2004b: §32). Other headquarters thus have 
to rely on the services of S&SS, which is administered from New York. According to John 
Mayo, Director of Public Affairs Triple Canopy Inc, the UN was about to contract out the 
security of its Baghdad compound after the 2003 bombings. Several companies were bidding 
for the contract, including Triple Canopy and ArmorGroup. In the last minute, however, it 
was decided to hand the task over to the Fijian armed forces (Mayo, personal communication 
June 13 2005).60 Furthermore, according to Sir David Ramsbotham, former Director of 
International Affairs of Defence Systems Limited (DSL), DSL was e.g. hired for security 
training of UN staff in Afghanistan in the early- to mid 1990s, and for the close protection of 
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 There are speculations that so happened because the current UN Special Rapporteur on mercenaries, Shaista 
Shameem, happen to be Fijian.   
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the UN Special Representative (Dame Margaret Anstee) in Angola.61 The current mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAME) currently relies on Global Risk Strategies for security training and 
assistance (The Asia Foundation and BBC News 2004).  
 
5.1.4 The independent security capacity of agencies, funds and programmes 
In addition to the shortage of personnel there are also serious qualitative shortcomings in 
terms of the UN security arrangements for agencies, funds and programmes. The protection of 
humanitarian supplies and convoys, as well as the maintenance of security at refugee camps 
are considered “special requirements” and are consequently not met by means of the central 
organization (UN SG 2004: §28). A number of programme headquarters (UNICEF, WFP and 
UNHCR) have thus established their own security sections, which are guided by the policy 
adopted by the UN Security Coordinator (UN SG 2000: §35). The security arrangements of 
agencies, programmes, and funds are dependent on voluntary contributions as field security 
measures are not funded centrally from the regular budget (SG 2004a: §61-64). In the absence 
of protective tactical measures available from within the organization, these services will 
largely be acquired from the private market.  DSL was e.g. hired to perform security duties for 
UN humanitarian relief convoys for the UNDP in Sierra Leone in 1998 (Musah and Fayemi 
2000: 273). More recently, ArmorGroup has been granted a contract to “secure a UN 
organization in Baghdad” (John Millar, personal communication 4 July 2005).  
 
5.2 Meeting the need for expert and specialized functions 
According to a study conducted by the U.S. think-tank the Henry L. Stimson Center, finding 
expertise for peace operations for many years was a matter of hope more than planning and 
programming, and as missions became more complex, the UN recruited a wider variety of 
specialists from outside the system (Durch, Holt, Earle, and Shanahan 2003: 86). Although 
the training programs for staff in missions have been improved, the recruitment, training, and 
retention of mission oriented staff have been less emphasized than management training (ibid 
2003: 87-88).  
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 Ramsbotham has interestingly also worked for the UN prior to his position in DSL, performing a study of the 
general management of UN peacekeeping on behalf of the Security Council (SCFA 2002, appendix 1: §4).   
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5.2.1 Meeting the need for demining 
The humanitarian UN bodies involved in mine action do not carry out mine clearance 
themselves but rely on peacekeeping troops, national civilian agencies, NGOs, or commercial 
actors (UN Electronic Mine Information Network). However, as expert services in general are 
especially resource demanding, the major UN troop contributing countries such as 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc. are unlikely to inhibit large amounts of the technology and 
competence that some of the expert functions demand. Effective demining is a particularly 
technology demanding activity and at the same time a vital part of the peace building effort. 
Mainly due to the technical requirements of effective mine removal many PSCs and PMCs 
have made their way into the demining market e.g. in service of the UN where they provide 
both mine clearance services as well as training for indigenous deminers (Spearin 2001a: 6-8). 
In Bosnia ArmorGroup performed clearance and training work for several UN agencies to the 
extent that the company even established a local entity in Bosnia, named Mine Action 
Services Limited (ArmorGroup 2005). Other examples of DSL/ArmorGroup performing 
demining work for the UN include the contract with the UN mission in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) for disarming of militia and demolition of munitions and mines.62 DSL also ran 
UN courses in the same country, training managers and quality controllers of demining 
programs for a few years (SCFA 2002, app.1: §6-7, app. 6: §80). The same company also 
performed clearance work under the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and the Mine Action Coordination Centre.63 Currently ArmorGroup is responsible 
for the demining of the buffer zone in Cyprus (Millar, personal communication 02.09.2005). 
Although table AI.1 and only shows four records of UN contracting specifically for demining, 
the likeliness of demining being one of the services very often included in other contracts is 
nevertheless substantial. The lack of information available on the contents of each contract is 
likely to account for the low number of demining records in the chart.  
5.2.2 Meeting the need for civilian police 
While the need for highly skilled civil police officers for deployment in UN operations is 
high, the offer of such individuals is very low. Many CivPol candidates offered to the UN are 
still fundamentally unqualified. For the UN deployment to Liberia in 2003, a majority of 
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 DSL was acquired and incorporated into ArmorHolding in April 1997 (Vines 1999: 71), the new security 
division of which was named ArmorGroup.  
63
 The contract in this case was funded by the UK Department of International Development (Office of the UN 
Humanitarian Coordination for Kosovo 2001: Annex A). 
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those interviewed for the CivPol positions failed to meet basic standards such as having 
driving licence and speaking English (the mission’s language) (Durch et al 2003: 80). Other 
impediments to providing better police include the lack of a common set of standards and 
doctrine for training. The UN Secretariat has presented an initiative to draft standardized 
CivPol rules and procedures, which so far has been hampered by lack of member state 
feedback (ibid). Analysts also indicate that the inconsistent national attention to civilian 
policing, and the corresponding inconsistent quality of CivPol contributed to UN operations, 
leave little hope for timely contributions of well-trained and well-qualified police to the 
organization’s operations in the nearest future (Durch et al. 2003: 81). However, the US has 
lately increased its CivPol contributions through the signing of Presidential Decision 
Directive 71 (PDD-71) Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems Support of Peace Operations 
and Other Complex Contingencies (U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs 2003). Civilian Police has thus allegedly become “a vital tool for US 
foreign policy” (ibid). Ironically, or perhaps characteristic of US policies, enhanced US 
CivPol contributions only means more PMC/PSC personnel under the auspices of the UN. As 
the US does not have a national police force, and the federal law enforcement agencies are 
highly specialized and inapt sources for civilian police, the State Department has contracted 
DynCorp to recruit, hire, train, equip, and deploy all state and local police to be employed in 
UN CivPol operations (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
2003). As a result, all US police officers participating in UN CivPol are currently DynCorp 
employees, meaning that approximately 92 per cent of all U.S. Military observers, troops and 
civilian police serving under the UN flag by 31 March 2005 were DynCorp employees.64 
 
Remedying poor contributions from other member states, both police officers and training 
packages have been procured from PSCs and PMCs in the past. On several occasions the UN 
has hired DynCorp to supply missions with qualified police officers; both for direct 
deployment and for training purposes (see Appendix Ia). DSL has reportedly also been hired 
by the UN for police training purposes in Somalia in the early 1990s (SCFA app. 1: §5). 
Although table AI.1 only contains two records involving police services, DynCorp has been 
known to contract with the UN on a regular basis, and it is likely that police training and 
related services are a preliminary ‘commodity’ in these contracts. It is worth noting, however, 
that DynCorp is not listed among the approved suppliers by the United Nations Office of 
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 Numbers obtained from the DPKO homepage 08.06.09. 
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Central Support Services as of January 2005, while the company itself continues to list the 
organization among its core customers (DynCorp homepage May 2005). 
 
5.2.3 Meeting the need for intelligence 
The strongest analytical capacity of the organization exists within the Information & Research 
Unit of the Situation Centre, which is part of the DPKO. The unit was created in 1994 and 
consists of four officers from the intelligence branches of the militaries of four of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council (Dorn 1999: 433). However, while the UN has 
come a long way in acknowledging the need for intelligence to support peace operations as 
well as humanitarian efforts in conflict environments, several constraints nevertheless persist 
as to the proficiency of the organization to obtain such information.  
 
Governments currently share information with the UN on a “need to know basis”, when 
governments think that the UN needs to know (ibid: 436). However, member states have 
traditionally been reluctant to empower the UN to gather and utilize intelligence due to 
concerns of interference in internal affairs (Rice 2004: 2). On a practical basis, many states 
have been under the impression that the UN is inherently insecure and that any intelligence in 
its possession would inevitably leak to their ‘enemies’ (Dorn 1999: 442). Moreover, when 
such intelligence has been shared, as by the US in the case of The United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, its 
quality has frequently been questioned, further tainting the perceptions of poor intelligence in 
the UN context (Rice 2004: 2). As a consequence, the UN weapons inspector team led by 
Hans Blix did little to conceal that the organization was indeed contracting for intelligence in 
addition to the information it received from member states (Lynch 2001: A15). An attempt by 
the Secretary-General to improve the organization’s ability to anticipate crisis by the means of 
intelligence gathering and henceforth create an in-house analysis unit to integrate the UN’s 
various databases and reports was stalled by governments fearing it would evolve into a 
central intelligence agency (ibid). 
  
Thus, lacking both internal means to supply the organizational apparatus with adequate 
amounts of reliable information and the will from member states to remedy such conditions, 
the UN has begun to buy intelligence services e.g. from the private security industry. In the 
2001 a Security Council committee monitoring sanctions violations in Angola hired Kroll 
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Associates for nearly $100,000 to trace the financial assets of União Nacional para 
a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, a measure which was 
met by scepticism by a range of member states (Lynch 2001: A15). Similarly, the UN 
operation in East Timor (UNTAET) sought local intelligence-gathering services from two 
South African PSCs, KZN Security and Empower Loss Control Services (Singer 2003a: 183).  
5.3 Meeting the need for logistics and support functions 
As the shortage in supply of logistic services has been felt for a considerably longer time than 
the shortage of troops, the organization has had to work on alternative measures for quite 
some time already. While most national forces do not have surplus of specialized enabling 
units performing functions such as engineering, communications, logistics, transport, strategic 
lift (often considered the achilles heel of transport), or medical support services, funding 
PSC/PMC support for such services is a way to go around tying up its own resources (Durch 
et al. 2003: 71).  
 
5.3.1 The Logistic capacity 
In line with the recommendations made by the Panel of UN Peace Operations in the Brahimi 
Report (Report of the Independent Panel on UN peace Operations 2000: §169) there have 
been improvements to the pre-deployment arrangements for equipment.  The upgrading of the 
UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, resulted in the base being able to support the rapid 
deployment of a headquarters for one traditional peacekeeping mission by 2002 (Durch et al. 
2003: 93).65 This indicates that in the case of the UN launching more than one traditional 
PKO, the logistic support provided from the Brindisi base will already be deployed, meaning 
that logistic requirements in the field remain to be met either by troop contributing countries, 
by partners such as The Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade for UN 
Operations (SHIRBRIG), or by private companies.66  
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 The goal for the Brindisi capacity was set to the support of one traditional and one complex PKO, a goal that is 
was out of reach as of early 2003 (ibid). 
66
 The Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations is a multinational rapid 
deployment force consisting of non-standing contributions from 16 member states. Members decide on a case-
by-case basis whether they will participate under Chapter VI of the Charter. So far SHIRBRIG has only been 
deployed in the UN Operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), but is currently planning for deployment in the 
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), both of which have a mandate based on Chapter VI. SHIRBRIG forces are 
expected to be self-sufficient for 60 days, and will be deployed for a maximum of 6 months (SHIRBRIG 
homepage 2005).  
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The UN logistic systems relies on member states being self sufficient at unit level for a given 
period, normally between 60 and 120 days awaiting the UN Field Service to organize (US 
Army 1994: 2). Such a system is problematic knowing that the bulk of personnel issued for 
UN peace operations tend to be drawn from developing countries. The top-ten list of 
contributors shows Pakistan contributing the most, with more than 8500 peacekeeping 
personnel, followed by Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana, India, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uruguay, 
Jordan, and Kenya. Western countries are virtually absent. The American contribution e.g. 
amounted to 0.73 per cent of the grand total of peacekeepers deployed in UN operations in 
July 2004.  Skills such as maintenance of helicopters and planes, airlift services, managing 
complicated logistic and communication systems are resource demanding, and poorly 
equipped and trained contingents are therefore not likely to inhibit such skills. This problem 
was illustrated in a study of deaths of humanitarian workers between 1985 and 1998, which 
demonstrated that the death rates due to motor vehicle accidents are especially high among 
UN peacekeepers, a tendency that is ascribed to inadequate driving skills (Sheik, Gutierrez, 
Bolton, Spiegel, Thieren, and Burnham 2000: 168). Other UN organizations, in contrast, are 
more likely to have full-time drivers (ibid). The increasing inclination of member states not to 
keep large amounts of standing personnel on a permanent basis, but rather to lease such skills 
in situations of need, also contributes to there being little indication of a decrease in the 
demand for additional logistic and technical support services provided by PMCs and PSCs 
(Tufts University 2001: 4).67   
 
Lack of commitment to supplying PKOs with the necessary personnel has often only become 
apparent in the aftermath of the shaping of mandates. While member states, especially 
members of the Security Council have demonstrated an apparent will to respond to crisis by 
supporting the erstwhile issuing of peacekeeping mandates, they have often failed to comply 
with the obligations by not contributing sufficiently to the compilation of troops and support 
measures once the PKO mandate is established (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations 2000: §60). As an effect of words rarely being matched by action, understaffed 
and under-resourced missions have tended to be the rule rather than the exception in UN 
contexts. In accordance with recommendations from the Brahimi panel, resolutions now 
remain in draft until the mandate is matched with the human, material, and political support 
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 The US government has for example awarded contracts worth more than $20 million to two companies, the 
PAE Group and DynCorp to provide logistical support for some 3,500 troops from the African Union anticipated 
to Sudan’s troubled western province of Darfur (IPOA homepage 01.12.04).  
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required to enable the full implementation of the mandate (UN SG 2001: 4). Logistics were 
contracted for in many missions where developing countries were the main personnel 
contributors. Both Pacific Architects & Engineers (PAE) and ArmorGroup supply the UN 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) with logistic services (Beno, 
personal communication 17 August 2005, SCFA 2002, app. 6: §80).68 In the case of the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) International Charter Incorporated (ICI) of 
Oregon has been engaged at various times by the UN to ferry personnel, troops and 
humanitarian supplies into and within the country to support the peacekeeping operations (ICI 
homepage). In Angola Defence Systems Limited (DSL) has provided logistic support to the 
UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM I-III) in the past (Lilly 2000a: 55). Even in 
missions where a developed state has taken the lead, PSCs/PMCs are likely to be hired for 
logistic tasks; in the case of the Australia-led mission in East Timor (UNTAET) DynCorp is 
reported to supply the UN with logistics, transport, and communications (Singer 2003a: 183). 
East Timor being a much more accessible country than e.g. the DRC and with less complex 
conflict patterns, however, private companies are likely to be hired in cases such as UNTAET 
because leading states have embarked upon a privatization strategy for its own logistic supply.   
 
Another obstacle to the effective managing of logistics and other support functions has been 
the reimbursement system.69 The arrangements for contingency reimbursements until very 
recently were based on each contingency counting all equipment used in an operation, 
including each spare part down to screws, nails and cutlery, in advance of deployment (Eide 
2005). In the aftermath of the operation all would have to be counted again in order to 
calculate what had been spent and the due amount to be reimbursed. Such a system surely can 
be considered an effective guarantee against the rapid deployment of units to conflict 
emergencies and a weighty factor contributing to external needs for logistic support. 
Additionally, as the process of reimbursement has been known to delay for years, it is very 
likely to have had negative effects on the inspiration for countries to contribute, as it could 
mean that resources in some cases would be tied up in the UN system for up to a decade 
(ibid).    
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 The main troop contributors to MONUC as of May 2005 are Pakistan, India, Uruguay, South Africa, 
Bangladesh and Nepal (MONUC webpage 25.05.05). PAE manages air control in DRC (Beno, personal 
communication, 17 August 2005), while ArmorGroup provides MONUC with logistics in general (SCFA 2002, 
app. 6: §80). 
69
 The reimbursement system has now been revised and the new system called “Contingent Owned Engagement” 
is currently being implemented (Eide 2005). 
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5.3.2 The internal support apparatus’ capacity  
The UN Field Service is the unit created in 1949 to provide support functions such as land 
transport, radio communications maintenance, security of premises, mission personnel etc. to 
peace operations (Durch et al. 2003: 89). Table 5.1 displays the capacity of the Field Service 
as of 2000:  
 
Table 5.2: The distribution of Field Service Officers among occupational groups as of 
mid-2000 
 
Source: Statistics provided by Field Administration and Logistics Division and Personnel Management Support 
Service (A/57/78: §20). 
 
As apparent from the table, the total number of field service officers is very low compared to 
the fact that the UN had 38,500 peacekeepers dispatched around the 17 ongoing missions in 
2000. Moreover, the span of occupations seems narrow and relevant functional categories 
such as those related to information technology are strikingly absent. Additionally, it is 
perhaps suggestive that more than a third of the total capacity, 35,9 per cent, are devoted to 
“general administration” tasks.  
 
The scarcity of support personnel is due to the unit being seriously under-prioritized during 
the years, it has e.g. been subjected to a hiring freeze since 1993, which has prevented the 
rejuvenation of staff and the acquisition of up to date technological and logistic skills 
(Othman 2002: §20). The Brahimi Panel recorded in 2000 that the technical knowledge of the 
unit appeared outdated and that the Field Services’ composition no longer matched the needs 
of the newer generation of peacekeeping (The Panel on UN Peace Opeartions 2000: §140). 
PSCs and PMCs – substituting inadequate internal UN capacities? 
 93 
Consequently, by 2000 the obsolete and inadequate skill base of the unit had led the DPKO to 
base itself mainly on services other than those of the Field Service Unit; eventually the unit’s 
460 personnel constituted just 13 per cent of the international civilian staff employed in UN 
peacekeeping (Othman 2002: §12). Considering that the total size of UN peacekeepers 
deployed in 2000 only counted 38,500, whereas by January 2005 the numbers had increased 
to 65,050 (Global Policy Forum web page 06.09.05), the Field Support Services is currently 
likely to play an even more peripheral role in the day-to-day support of UN peace operations.   
In spite of the flaws of the Field Service, it remains the only UN staff category “exclusively 
oriented to the field and to peace operations” (ibid: §20) and remains the first response team 
for critical elements of peace operations. With regard to humanitarian operations, each agency 
is responsible for its own Field Service category, and although there have been suggestions to 
establishing a joint pool of field specialists common to all the United Nations organizations, 
the initiative has not been endorsed by the humanitarian agencies (ibid 2002:§26). In 
reforming the Field Service it is also suggested that the future teams of field service officers 
include fewer internationally recruited staff (Othman 2002: §30). More cost-efficient 
alternatives present themselves as UN volunteers, as well as locally and internationally 
privately contracted personnel (ibid). Among the companies most often recorded in table AI.1 
is PAE, which reportedly provide a range of support services to the new UN mission in Côte 
d’ Ivoire (Hukill 2004: 1527), while DSL provided the full range of support, expert and 
security services to the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia from 1992 on (SCFA, app. 1 2002: 
§5). Both PAE and DSL are approved as service suppliers as of January 2005 (United Nations 
Office of Central Support Services webpage). 
5.4 Conclusions 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the only structure within the United Nations 
security management system to have a dedicated force generation unit and a capacity, albeit 
limited, for rapid response to security emergencies (SG 2004a: 32). However, peacekeeping 
operations do not always coincide with humanitarian efforts, are frequently overstretched, and 
in general do not always represent the best way to provide security for humanitarians. 
UNSECOORD represents a civilian means to civilian security. However by lacking both the 
capacity, due to resources not being granted by member states, coupled with organizational 
inflexibility, UNSECOORD is only capable of offering a very limited contribution to field 
security. Agencies, programmes and funds are thus dependent on ad hoc arrangements for 
basic security related to convoy and asset protection and for security in refugee camps. As the 
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main reasons for the aggregate security measures of the organization not being fit to meet the 
needs in modern day conflict can be ascribed to lacking member state will to fund 
alternatives, P3 can thus be considered largely confirmed concerning security. Similarly, it can 
thus be inferred that due to the organizational bottlenecks and lack of predictability regarding 
funding, agencies, programmes and funds operating in the field cannot afford not to provide 
for their own security advice through the private market. 
 
Inadequate access to expert services appears to be primarily a result of lacking member state 
dedication. The UN is still confined to a coordinating role what regards demining due to lack 
of internal capacity. UN civilian police is also limited. Key member states have not 
contributed adequate numbers of skilled police neither to serve as police officers nor to 
conduct training. However, it is with regard to intelligence capacities that the problems of 
intergovernmental cooperation are illustrated. While upgrading intelligence capacities does 
not require the financial costs of demining, neither the potential political costs of risking 
civilian police lives, reluctance to support intelligence capacities is based on a fundamental  
lack of political will due to distrust of other member states. In the case of expert functions P3 
thus seems relevant mostly in terms of lack of political will, and is henceforth only partly 
confirmed by the analytical framework.     
 
While the UN has made some progress what regards its logistic capability, it remains one of 
the greatest challenges to the organization when deploying peace operations. Lack of member 
state commitment to supplying logistic capacities has indeed contributed to the UN having to 
seek logistic support elsewhere. Organizational weaknesses, however, must partly account for 
the launching of missions without having assured that the discrepancy of words and action 
would not spoil logistic capabilities. P3 is thus supported in terms of support functions. Lack 
of resources due to member states not prioritizing the UN operations accounts for need not 
being met by internal means, and hence to discrepant need being filled by the private security 
and military market. Similarly, the support system appears outdated and completely 
inadequate to meet the needs of modern complex peace operations. While the organization in 
general is experiencing a shortage of funds, the incapacity to direct the limited funds to the 
benefit of a functioning support apparatus has thus contributed to the organization frequently 
procuring support functions from the private security and military industry. 
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P3 is largely supported in terms of all three service categories. Although some reservations 
apply to the relevance of the proposition in terms of expert functions, it can be confirmed that 
inadequate internal capacity to a greater or lesser extent has contributed to the UN deploying 
private security and military companies in peace and humanitarian operations. 
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Analysis Part II 
 
The following analysis sections focus on the private security and military industry’s ability to 
become a viable alternative source for security, expert, and support personnel. The influence 
of both external and internal offer enhancing factors is thus examined in order to evaluate the 
relevance of the propositions P4 and P5. The two propositions will be dealt with in separate 
chapters.  
6. Availability - an impetus for PSC/PMC deployment?                    
 
The most dramatic change taken place in the private military/security industry concerns its 
volume. While demobilization and restructuring of armed forces in the post-Cold War era 
freed large amounts of military professionals, the industry depended on another impetus to 
institute itself. It is the argument of this section that while demobilization laid the premises for 
the industry, its endurance and growth was dependent upon the coincidence with certain 
normative changes embedded in the general acceptance of privatization and outsourcing as a 
means to enhance state efficiency. Combined, these two factors will be used to discuss the 
validity of P4, whether pools of available personnel have contributed to the UN’s deployment 
of private security and military companies.  
6.1 Push versus pull factors 
In explaining the background for the dramatic quantitative changes that have taken place 
within the private security/military industry, both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors should be 
considered. Force availability resulting from demobilization in the aftermath of the Gulf War 
was a forced change, or what can be termed as a ‘push’ factor for ex-military personnel to join 
the private marketplace. Quite a few companies established during the 1990s have been 
products of the post-Cold War defence downsizing70. More recently established companies on 
the other hand, tend to be products of downsizing, reorganizing, and privatization efforts in 
combination with the extreme market emerging in connection with the present efforts in Iraq 
and the Afghanistan invasion. The impetus for these companies appears to be profit potentials 
(‘pull factors’) rather than the forced ‘push factors’ described above. The pull factors are 
however also dependent upon the privatization scheme becoming a sufficiently dominant 
paradigm. Relaxed attitudes towards privatization among politicians have thus enabled the 
industry to respond to the high demand for security services that e.g. the coalition forces have 
been faced with in Iraq. Facilitated both by the fact that the industry was already an 
incorporated part of army support, and by the lax attitudes towards privatization of former 
military functions, the sudden and very high need for security providers, especially in relation 
to the US led ‘War on Terrorism’, led to a rapid and largely uncontrolled growth in the 
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 MPRI was established in 1990 (Cilliers and Douglas 1999: 112), while DSL came about already in 1981 
(O’Brien 2000: 47). 
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security providing industry. In industrialized countries the pull factor now clearly dominates 
the push factor. The industry not only attracts senior or retired military personnel, however, 
enlisted military personnel at any level is also drawn to the industry on an individual basis. 
Younger personnel, who under different circumstances would have a long military career 
ahead of them, are attracted by the ‘easy money’ in the private sector. Consequently, as 
demand for contractors has augmented sharply during the Iraq war, the private military 
business has not only absorbed demobilized or retired personnel, but also it has also become a 
drain on the regular armed services. This tendency is especially demanding in the U.S. where 
the salary system has coincided more with rank and time-in-grade than with performance, 
hazard and hardship (Isenberg 2004: 28). With daily salaries anywhere between $400 and 
$1200, sometimes even as high as $2000 (ibid: 25), depending on the contract and the client, 
the private industry does represent a challenge to state forces. It is thus becoming a problem to 
some army divisions to maintain its troops in rank.71  By February 2005 The British special 
forces reportedly had lost 120 troops, more than a fifth of their total number to the private 
sector, while the paratroopers had lost almost 200 soldiers, 11 per cent of their manpower (the 
Herald Feb. 15, 2005: 9). In response to a similar tendency in its ranks, the US Defence 
Department has approved a series of incentives for members of elite Special Operations 
Forces who remain in the military, including a $150,000 bonus for the most experienced and 
highly trained combat personnel to prolong their contracts (New York Times, Feb. 6, 2005). 
South African forces have similarly experienced a serious drain on the Police Services' elite 
task force. As many as half of their employees are reportedly asking for early retirement in 
order to go to Iraq, their $5,000 monthly salary in Iraq being equivalent to about six months 
pay at home (Glantz 2004).  
 
6.1.1 Ephemeras 
Quite a few companies appear to be products of the unprecedented pull factor prevailing in 
the private security market. According to US Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes (Ret.), who 
served in Iraq in 2004, shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 “anybody who could start a 
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 Few companies are willing to inform on exact payments, and reports on the levels of one days pay in Iraq 
especially varies considerably. For Western security escorts numbers are often suggested between $400 and 
$1,200 a day, however, considering that journalism often tend to be tainted with some degree of sensationalism, 
it is reasonable to infer that numbers are most often more likely to lie closer to the lower estimate while certain 
VIP close protection assignments are likely to pay more.  Non-Western employees reportedly earn a fraction of 
these amounts. According to CorpWatch, a South African ex-commando will earn about $1,000 a month 
(CorpWatch 14.09.05).  
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company started piling into the country, threw something together, had no training program, 
no vetting program…” (PBS, Hammes interview transcript 2005). Resulting from this ‘gold 
rush’, scores of new companies were created to meet the urgent demand of commercial 
clients, as well as government agencies, NGOs or other actors present. Some of these 
companies appear to be small and almost created ad hoc to meet short time demand, they are 
hence expected to close down whenever business slows down. Others tend to get to establish 
a client base among government agencies, NGOs and UN agencies, which probably will keep 
them in business longer. Custer Battles is one of the companies reportedly founded nine 
months ahead of receiving its first Iraq contract (Isenberg 2004:32) while Triple Canopy, now 
employing approximately 1,000 men in Iraq, reportedly was awarded CPA contracts worth 
about $90 million while still constituting “little but a name” (Bergner 2005). Other companies 
refrain from informing on its foundation, but stand out as products of the Iraq invasion by 
being a company of westerners without having other headquarters but those in Iraq. However, 
the perhaps newest company with the most lucrative contract is Aegis Defence Services. The 
company surprisingly received a three year contract valued up to maximum $293 million from 
the US Department of Defence (DoD) to coordinate the communication and intelligence 
between coalition forces and contractors through the operation of Regional Operations 
Centres in Iraq in addition to provide force protection (Aegis home page, Isenberg 2004: 
29).72 
 
6.1.2 Well established companies 
The Klondike-like climate resulting from the anarchic situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere, has not only spurred new companies to be established, it has also provided the 
established ones with extraordinary growth. ArmorGroup, a company which has been 
working for the UN for many years providing security training, mine action services and 
protective services (Millar, e-mail interview 04.07.05), is apparently one of the companies 
which has expanded the most in the past few years. The company’s revenues almost doubled 
in one year with a 92 per cent increase from 2003 to 2004, leaving the company with revenues 
of $191.1 million in 2004 (ArmorGroup International plc 2005: 1). Quite a few other 
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 This contract was unexpectedly awarded to Aegis, which is Tim Spicer’s (former head of Sandline 
International) latest venture. Aegis was primarily known to supply specialized maritime security services. The 
contract was subsequently contested by competing companies. There have been speculations that the contract 
was reserved for any British company as a way for DoD to reward the British for contributing to the Iraq effort, 
and that Aegis thus had been chosen primarily on the grounds of being British.    
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companies have had their revenues skyrocket, such as British/South African Erinys. 
According to the head of Erinys Iraq, the company was rather small until 2003 when they 
received the largest security contract in Iraq that year; a contract valued $100 million for oil 
pipeline protection, employing some 15,000 people (PBS, Melville 2005).73 Business has also 
boomed in other areas but security; reconstruction companies like PAE, military training 
companies like DynCorp, companies performing explosive disposals etc. are all experiencing 
an expansion unlike any other.74 It is however not only in Iraq and Afghanistan that business 
has been booming for the private security and military industry, some analysts even assert that 
the private security and military industry in general has expanded to a combined level of 100 
billion (Singer 2003c), a number which industry representatives strongly contest (Brooks 
interview 2005).  
 
6.2 Expansion exceeding oversight  
 The gold rush effect has dwarfed most efforts to maintain effective control of which 
companies are doing what where, and what companies and individuals are inflicting on the 
conflict and reconstruction environment at whatever time.75 
6.2.1 Lack of quantitative oversight  
 According to US Department of State’s PSC records, there are 30 private security companies 
doing business in Iraq (US Dept. of State webpage). However, David Isenberg, long time 
analyst of the industry, on an assessment assignment of the British-American Security 
Information Council found 68 companies doing business in Iraq, more than double the 
amount reported by the Dept. of State (Isenberg 2004: 80-99). While Isenberg’s investigation 
was undertaken in 2004, the Dept. of State does not inform of when from their assessment 
was made, or whether it has been updated recently. Isenberg, however, admits to that nobody 
knows for sure how many PMCs are operating in Iraq (ibid: 7). Industry representatives 
                                                 
73
 Some reports file the Erinys International as British (Frontline Documentary) while others (Isenberg 2004) list 
it as South African. The South African newspaper The Sunday Times claim to have evidence the company is 
based in Johannesburg and run by South Africans with local ID numbers (The Sunday Times 7th Dec 2003). 
74
 In the 2005 Peace and Stability Operations Conference in Brussels representatives of several companies 
discussed how the immense growth had to be slowed in order for it not to outgrow the different organizational 
structures (Personal communication).  
75
 PSCs and PMCs most likely do inflict rather heavily not only on the local population’s view of the occupying 
power, but also more directly as they frequently are engaged in fire exchange. Erinys Iraq officials admits the 
company has killed some 70 Iraqis since the invasion started (Melville interview, PBS Frontline documentary 
2005).  
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themselves, such as head of Erinys Iraq, Andy Melville, states that they believe around 40 
known companies are operating in Iraq, and many more that will only “spring out of the 
woodwork whenever they have an incident” (PBS, Melville 2005).76 Lawrence Peter, former 
consultant to the US Department of Defence on outsourced security, now director of the 
Private Security Association in Iraq contributes to the confusion by estimating 60 companies 
to be present in Iraq, but adding that the accurate number might also be 100 (Bergner 2005). 
Obviously, the ‘pull factor’ has led companies to have popped up before and during the war in 
Iraq to the point that analysts, the US administration, as well as the industry itself have lost 
oversight of the general scope of the industry.  Testimony of the unripe state of the industry, 
especially as seen in Iraq at present, is the frequent corporate mergers and acquisitions 
through which the industry apparently is accommodating itself, elements which are also 
contributing to the prevalent lack of oversight.77 Oversight over contracting procedures is 
further obfuscated by the practice of sub-contracting between companies, which means that 
although a contract is given to a company with good records of accomplishment, there are no 
guarantees that this particular company will carry out the actual assignment. Sub-contracting 
thus leads to a further dispersal in authority, and leaves the original client with few means of 
oversight (Holmqvist 2005: 33).   
6.2.2 Lack of qualitative oversight 
When services are bought ‘back’ from the private sector, they do not come with any 
guarantees of track records of the individuals providing the services. Most PSCs and PMCs 
rely on personnel from a wide range of countries and backgrounds. Erinys was founded in 
2002 by two former servicemen, at least one of whom was a former Apartheid official, the 
company still recruits a lot from South Africa. Company representatives of their Iraq division 
state that the South Africans constitute the largest group of non-Iraqis employed by the 
company (PBS, Melville interview transcript 2005). Furthermore, it is stated that their 
employees are “all former military servicemen. They’re all combat veterans, every single one 
of them” (ibid), which implies that a considerable amount of the employees are combat 
veterans of the pro-apartheid wars. The fact that these “former military servicemen” also 
                                                 
76
 One such company is Zapata Engineering, a US company which only appeared after a so-called “blue on white 
incident”, a fire exchange with US marines (The Guardian June 9, 2005). 
77
 The massive and rapid expansion, currently pushed to the extremes in Iraq, has also had implications for the 
operating environment. Companies themselves have a hard time keeping track of the industry. In the words of 
Melville: “There are a lot of guys out there with guns, and it’s very hard sometimes to differentiate between who 
are the Anti-Iraqi Forces and who aren’t” (Melville, Frontline Documentary).  
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include ex-apartheid troops, only caught the attention of the media after an attack that claimed 
the life of one Erinys trainer, and injured another. The two turned out to be members of South 
Africa's secret police in the 1980s, one of whom had recently received an amnesty application 
from the Truth And Reconciliation Commission after admitting to between 40 and 60 petrol 
bombings, a car bombing, and an arson attack of political activists' houses during the 1980s 
(Glantz 2004). Similarly, several companies, among them Blackwater and Triple Canopy, 
have been reported to hire troops from the Gen. Pinochet era (Franklin 2004, Bergner 2005), 
while other companies hire ex-combatants from the Balkans. Clients in these cases will have 
no way of guaranteeing that the company employees do not have records of human rights 
abuse. Demobilization as a push factor is hence not to be ruled out. Demobilization following 
brutal conflicts has thus supplied the market with private security actors, some of which have 
records of human rights breaches, which the client rarely will be informed of. The result is a 
lack of transparency as each company is responsible for its own vetting and training 
procedures. The privatization incentives of Western governments in particular, have in turn 
contributed to including these former soldiers into not only functions in support of 
industrialized armies, or security provision for people involved in reconstruction, human 
rights agencies, aid agencies and the like, but also into rather sensitive information gathering 
and dispersal.  
 
The recent boom in the private security and military industry has not been met with the 
adequate supervision and control measures, which has implications for potential clients like 
the UN. Not only does the large amount of smaller and bigger companies make it harder to 
‘shop’ for services, but it also contributes to preclude the guarantee as to whom one is hiring. 
Doug Brooks, president of the PSC/PMC interest organization International Peace Operations 
Association (IPOA) admits to this uncertainty by adding that the nature of the industry is such 
that if you hire someone to do demining, that individual might be former Executive Outcomes 
and go off to work for PSCs and PMCs in war zones afterwards (Brooks interview 2005).    
 
Not only has demobilization in the aftermath of the Cold War produced large numbers of 
unemployed soldiers and other military personnel available for the private market, but the lure 
of this well-paid industry has also attracted large amounts of personnel still employed by state 
forces. The ‘push’ factor is still viable although the resources are now freed from countries 
frequently emerging from brutal civil wars instead of from the surplus created by the end of 
the Cold War. The ‘pull’ factor can be attributed to the privatization scheme, which frequently 
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results in a competitive advantage what regards salaries compared to corresponding public 
positions. The ‘pull’ factor, although hard to measure, appears more relevant than the ‘pull’ 
factors at the moment, as there is a tendency of personnel already employed in state forces to 
move over to the private sphere. Both the push and the pull factors are thus influencing the 
private security and military industry and its growth. The result is indeed a private security 
industry that attracts experienced military personnel among its employees contributing to a 
quantitative boost in offer both for newcomers and well-established companies. To an 
organization like the UN this means a greater and a more varied offer of alternative personnel. 
While it is likely that greater availability may have indirectly influenced the UN’s use of these 
companies, through increased accessibility, through customization to their conflict zones as 
part of developed countries capability etc., there is however, no direct link between a 
quantitatively greater offer and UN procurement which can be confirmed by the two variables 
at hand in this context. Although ‘pools of qualified personnel’ is not dismissed as irrelevant 
in this connection, there appear to be other explanatory factors present, which are not dealt 
with directly in P4, which apparently carry more weight in explaining UN PSC/PMC 
dependence.    
 
7. Sanitization for market shares: From the private security and 
military industry to the ‘peace and stability industry’  
 
Along with its massive quantitative expansion, the private security and military industry has 
undergone serious qualitative changes. It is the argument of this thesis that these qualitative 
changes have so far, and are in fact still occurring, along two dimensions; there has been a 
tendency towards de facto alterations to the repertoire of core services offered, and there has 
been marked developments regarding the conceptual outward presentation of the business.78 
The two dimensions will be treated in separate parts for practical reasons, although they are 
closely intertwined and in fact occurring simultaneously. This chapter hence attempts to 
assess the relevance of whether a “credible PSC/PMC industry has contributed to the 
organization deploying PSCs/PMCs”. P5 will thus be attempted verified or unproven by 
applying the two explanatory factors ‘sanitization’ and ‘corporate responsiveness’. Both 
arguments should be seen in the context of the radicalization of operating environments as 
discussed in chapter 4. The argumentation subsequently leads to an assertion of an industry 
with aspirations for inclusive legitimacy and which opts for re-branding as peacekeepers and 
conflict resolvers, a strategy pursued to acquire the ultimate goals of any commercial entity; 
market shares.  
 
7.1 Adjusting the menu of core competencies 
In line with the second explanatory chart from chapter two, corporate responsiveness is used 
in this section to explain the marked qualitative adjustments to the service offer of the private 
security and military industry. It is the argument of this section that the service offer has 
changed both because of the actual shift in client base, but also as a result of the potential of 
further market expansion in the realm of government work. The de facto responsiveness of the 
industry is thus occurring both by adjusting not only to their developed state clients, but also 
to additional market potentials. 
 
                                                 
78
 Again, by treating the business as a whole one runs the risk of over-simplifying. There are extreme elements 
within the industry that do not necessarily fit the descriptions in this thesis, however, as this thesis intends to 
explain the interactions of the industry with the UN, it consequently primarily deals with the more legitimate 
segments of the business.      
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It is possible to detect at least five tendencies in terms of service adjustments: 1) Companies 
today most often offer to perform specific tasks within operations as opposed to take on entire 
operations79; 2) services offered are perceivably of a more defensive or non-lethal character 
than during the 1990s, they are hence often presented as being more of a ‘humanitarian or 
peace building character’ as opposed to of a military character; 3) technology demanding 
services are most often included in the service offer; 4) services related to anti-terrorism at 
land and sea have made their marked entry.80  These changes can be detected e.g. by studying 
the service offerings of individual companies over time, by their marketing efforts, or by 
looking into the services most often contracted.81 The changes 1) to 3) are particularly 
relevant to P5. 
 
7.1.1 Mission support as opposed to mission takeover 
The scope of the service offer of the private security and military business has been modified 
since the mid 1990s. The bulk of services advertised today are aimed at supporting missions 
in an indirect manner whereas before EO, Sandline and others were looking to substitute 
missions. Most companies today thus aim at performing specific tasks within missions, or 
preferably categories of tasks. Contemporary companies do not have the capacity to perform 
the extreme variety of services necessary to take on entire missions.  
 
7.1.2 The new service menus 
Alterations have also been made concerning the character of individual service menus. MPRI, 
the largest American PMC, in 1998 reportedly offered “security assistance and special forces, 
fire support, maritime operations, intelligence training and explosive ordnance” (Cilliers and 
Douglas 1999: 113), services which by medio 2005 are no longer advertised. Instead, new 
services have appeared such as e.g. Democracy Transition Assistance Programs (DTAP), 
                                                 
79
 IPOA’s proposals for the association’s member companies to take on several tasks within operations in Sudan 
and in the DRC as discussed under 7.4 might at first seem not to support the tendency, however, the proposals 
deal with individual companies and suggesting roles for these companies within the UN mission not as a 
combined force, but rather as separate entities. Some of these companies might also compete for certain tasks as 
they include similar core competencies within their repertoire.  
80
 Security services related to piracy is a niche that is being exploited by several companies. Strategic Consulting 
International, later renamed Trident Maritime, is a former Tim Spicer company specializing in maritime security 
(Catterjee 2004).  
81
 Although a thorough study of individual companies over time is beyond the scope of this thesis some 
information on individual service changes will be provided.  
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peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, anti- terrorism/force protection etc. (MPRI website 
2005). MPRI has evidently made some obvious changes to its centre of attention in the 
direction of peace building, state building, and anti-terrorism focus. ArmorGroup, a company 
that caters to a slightly different market segment than MPRI, has traditionally listed protective 
security services, security training and demining as its three main service areas.82 When asked 
about current areas of particular attention John Millar, Director of Business Development, 
ArmorGroup, lists post-conflict reconstruction services, DDR programmes and 
reconstruction; as well as state building services such as security sector reform (SSR) and 
police training. Emphasis is placed on the large DDR related contract the company holds in 
Iraq for ordnance and explosives destruction (Millar 2005, e-mail interview). Clearly 
ArmorGroup is directing its services in a post-conflict service direction, instead of towards in-
conflict services. The focal points of ArmorGroup services also fit in quite nicely with a 
greater degree of humanitarianism, as disposing of weapons obviously would carry more 
weight in humanitarian circles than weapon’s instruction, or their actual use, as might be the 
case in direct security provision. 
 
7.1.3 Technology demanding services 
While there currently are many new and small actors in the business (which necessarily must 
limit their service offer) as discussed in the last chapter, some of the preponderant actors have 
made an effort to expand their service menu and hence cover a larger segment of the market. 
Especially in terms of logistics and specialized services, one can detect some degree of 
specialization among smaller firms and a broadening in services among bigger actors. To 
larger firms the broadening of service basis is necessary in order to cater to clients in complex 
conflict environments. Such expansion has taken place through mergers with other companies 
and in particular, by acquisitions of smaller companies holding particular competencies.  The 
broadening of service menus has led to a growing connection between the private military 
industry and related, but more mainstream industrial undertakings such as goods and services 
from the arms production, construction, computer, electronics, and communications 
industries. Mergers and acquisitions can be helpful not only to attract more customers with 
multiple needs, but according to Larry Makinson at the Center for Public Integrity also to 
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 One of the main differences being that MPRI specializes in training while not actually supplying security 
services directly, whereas ArmorGroup does protective security provision as well. 
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acquire contracts on the US market reserved for companies with a so-called “small business 
status” (Makinson 2004).83  In some cases acquisitions and mergers also tend to be 
undertaken in the wake of negative publicity, as was the case when DynCorp was acquired by 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) and Titan by L3 Communications.84 However, it is 
likely that responding to needs in the market and expanding its reach is the most common 
reason for the frequent mergers and acquisitions in the industry. After the takeover of 
DynCorp, CSC managers stated that the takeover was done in order for the company to 
augment their capabilities and adjust to the needs of the new US Homeland Security 
Department (CSC webpage 2005).  
 
7.1.4 Tailor made service menus 
 Counter-terrorism related security measures are especially on domestic markets on great 
demand. PSCs and PMCs are therefore doing their best to position themselves perfectly in the 
market by combining technology intensive capabilities with security offering advanced 
solutions within the intelligence market (Holmqvist 2005: 37-38). The fact that 
counterintelligence measures also must be undertaken in relation to security assignments, also 
works to strengthen the capacity of the private security and military industry in this particular 
area. 
 
A closer look at the needs of the UN as identified in the chapters 3-5 (security, support 
functions and expertise), reveals that there are many new actors in the security field. More 
companies are offering a combination of support functions and expertise, often technology 
demanding solutions as such. These modifications in service offer in progress within the 
private military and security industry must be seen in connection with analysis of market 
potentials. Adapting to the market represented by the UN has meant a specialization that 
somewhat paradoxically entails a broadening of service offers for bigger companies in order 
to be better suited for contracts in complex environments. The industry itself has been quick 
to point to the shortcomings of UN operations and it appears no less than striking at times 
how services are moulded to fit these shortcomings. Most companies emphasize their rapid 
                                                 
83
 Under an informal quota system set by the US Congress, federal agencies are encouraged, though not required, 
to distribute 23 per cent of their procurement dollars to small businesses. 
84
 DynCorp employees were allegedly involved in organizing prostitution rings and human trafficking (The 
Observer, London, 29th July 2001), while Titan employees were involved in the Abu Ghraib prison abuse 
(Washington Post December 13, 2004: E01).  
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deployment abilities, their technological mastery, their unsurpassed training and training 
skills, as well as their logistical abilities. One particularly interesting finding is the tendency 
among well-reputed companies to offer services that normally have been regarded core 
functions of the organization. These would include e.g. the establishment and running of DDR 
programs along with newer areas of attention in which private actors have very little tradition, 
such as Democracy Transition Assistance Programs. These developments are arguably 
testimony of the adapting abilities of the private sector and in this case an intergovernmental 
organization such as the UN might not even detect its own need for assistance until it is 
readily available.  
 
The development in service menus described above indicates a flexible private security and 
military industry, which has adapted to a market represented by organizations such as the UN.  
A service offer tailored to the needs of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations should 
indicate the validity of proposition P4, which states that the industry’s responsiveness to 
market fluctuations have contributed to it being hired by the UN.  
7.2 Re-branding for market shares  
As the private security and military industry has been surrounded by much controversy and 
has attracted a large amount of sensationalist press, it is clear that in order to expand into new 
market segments and attract additional business within organizations such as the UN, some of 
the preponderant perceptions of the industry should be altered. The fundamental scepticism of 
many member states towards contracting out former security and military functions should 
also not be underestimated. The mercenary association, which has lingered with the industry, 
is in particular seen as a hindrance to accomplishment of the potentials of the industry, and the 
disposal of this association is crucial to the entrance onto the vast market that the UN does 
represent.  In this section the sanitizing variable, displayed in the lower part of the second 
analytical chart (Figure 2.2), will be used to explain the qualitative changes that the industry 
has submitted itself to in order to accomplish greater market shares.    
 
7.2.1 The International Peace Operations Association as a re-branding locus 
The conveniently Washington DC located PMC/PSC interest organization, the International 
Peace Operations Association (IPOA), appears a reflection of the efforts made by large parts 
of the industry towards changing public associations with the business. The association itself 
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states on its homepage that among its core purposes is to contribute to “raise the profile and 
acceptance of its members in the world foreign policy community” (IPOA homepage 
01.12.04). Certainly, some of IPOA’s founding members could use their profile to be altered 
somewhat. One of the initial members of the association was Sandline International (Brooks 
interview 2005), which at the time of joining IPOA was having a rather rough time facing the 
accusations of breaking the UN arms embargo to Sierra Leone in 1998. Apart from providing 
its members with a connection to peace operations through its name, the association is, in 
practice, also an advocacy agency for the industry in general, including for non-members. 
According to IPOA president Dough Brooks, while some companies find the member fee a 
threshold of actually joining the association, many company agents express their support and 
appreciation for the work done by the association for the industry in general (Brooks 
interview 2005).85 One of the most visible efforts made by IPOA to reinvent the private 
security and military industry, is the recent renaming of the entire industry. Whereas IPOA 
until very recently used the term “military provider industry”, Brooks and the association now 
insists on the industry to be termed “the peace and stability industry”, a name which does 
little to cover up the ambitions of the industry.86  Whereas the industry has boomed in the 
wake of the offensive operations undertaken outside of the auspices of the UN, such as the 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan’ and ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, commonly 
termed “stability operations”, the peacekeeping market is yet to be fully conquered.87 When 
asked about this sudden ‘metamorphosis’, Brooks holds that the name was created in order to 
better cover the range of services offered by the IPOA member companies, which range from 
medical services, logistics, security provision, military training, construction etc (Brooks 
interview 2005). Recently Security Support Solutions (commonly named 3S), a supplier of 
armoured vehicles and other protective equipment has also joined the association (Mike 
Pearson, Director of 3S, personal communication). Brooks further asserts that the alternative 
name would be “companies that work in conflict/ post-conflict environments” (Brooks 
interview 2005). The target customer of the industry has hence clearly evolved from militaries 
(as reflected in the associations’ earlier preferred term ‘military service providers’) to ‘anyone 
performing peace and stability operations’. The market segment thus has expanded into 
including intergovernmental organizations like NATO, the EU, the AU, and of course the UN. 
                                                 
85
 The member fee is currently $5000 for logistic companies and $ 15,000 for security companies (ibid).  
86
 The term first appeared on the IPOA web pages as well as other material produced by the association in early 
2005.    
87
 See e.g. the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s homepage.  
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that the new name is strikingly similar to the Pentagon think 
tank the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, which acquired its name 
in 2003, association with which would not harm IPOA.88  
 
Other efforts are also being made to promote a more ‘humanitarian’ image of the industry. 
One striking example was put to the fore in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami disaster as 
IPOA launched a ‘Peace and Stability Industry Tsunami Relief Effort’ campaign, detecting 
“an opportunity to show unity and to make a positive statement in a truly meaningful way” 
(IPOA webpage January 2005). In relation to the destructions of the hurricane Katrina in the 
US, the association has also apparently taken initiative: “As an association of companies 
specializing in activities that alleviate human suffering all over the world we have discussed 
with our membership how we can best help” (IPOA home page 25.09.2005). Furthermore, the 
IPOA home page states that their members provide “services related to conflict alleviation 
and avoidance, post-conflict reconstruction, and emergency humanitarian rescue worldwide”. 
Such an outline conveniently misses the additional services related to business segments, such 
as protection for extraction companies as well as services sold to despotic regimes such as 
Equatorial Guinea etc.89 When confronted with the fact that in many cases only a small part of 
the business of member companies actually relates to peace or stability operations, Brooks 
defends the name by arguing that as long as a company does some peace and stability 
operations related work, it can be considered part of the industry. The consequences of such 
an argumentation/logic could however, if stretched far enough be that a range of far-flung 
service and goods providers would have to be included in the ‘peace and stability industry’, a 
logic which Brooks himself is aware of (Brooks interview 2005). It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that such a re-naming primarily is designed to link public associations of the industry 
with concepts such as humanitarianism, benevolence, altruism, and peace versus associations 
of mercenarism, cynicism and profit in order to achieve the desired inclusion into e.g. the UN 
market. The renaming represents a carefully designed disassociation with the mercenary label 
which has haunted the industry and which has caused customers such as the UN to question 
the legitimacy of the industry.   
 
                                                 
88
 The former name was the US Army Peacekeeping institute. 
89
 MPRI in 2001 was engaged in a contract to train the Equatorial Guinean Coast Guard (Silverstein 2001).   
Sanitization for market shares: From the private security and military industry to the ‘peace 
and stability industry’ 
 111 
While the US-led war in Iraq currently is boosting the demand for PMC and PSC services, re-
branding appears a longer-term investment that is meant to secure business prospects in the 
long run. For an organization such as IPOA to maintain focus on the peace and stability 
segments of the market is apparently rewarding. IPOA has had a significant expansion in its 
member base during the past year or so. While in May 2004 IPOA consisted of nine executive 
member companies and one affiliated member, in May 2005, the association counted 14 
executives and one “provisional” company (IPOA website 2004 and 2005). By 2005 the 
association had lost two member companies and acquired eight (the one affiliated company, 
O’Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt was acquired by Armor Holding). The two companies lost were 
Sandline International, which closed down due to lack of corporate confidence after a couple 
of infamous and highly controversial projects. The other was AirScan, a company specializing 
in airborne surveillance and security operations, which according to Brooks left the 
association for its own reasons, but apparently is welcomed back (Brooks, personal 
communication, May 2005).90  The eight new member companies include some high profiled 
PMCs/PSCs like Blackwater USA, Hart, Triple Canopy and SOC-SMG in addition to 
companies such as Security Support Solutions (3S), Evergreen International Aviation, 
Medical Support Solutions and Groupe EHC (a French security company listed as a 
provisional member). 
 
 Considering the effort made by IPOA to “raise the profile and acceptance of association 
members in the world foreign policy community” (IPOA website 01.12.05), the rapid 
expansion of IPOA can be interpreted as a sign of companies realizing the worth of a 
‘healthy’ image. Some of the recent members of the association could use some profile work 
and image polishing while others appear to be opting for more international attention and 
market shares. Blackwater has received some negative publicity on a few occasions relating to 
e.g. Blackwater president Gary Jackson in an electronic newsletter stating that “actually it is 
‘fun’ to shoot some people” (Townsend 2005). Triple Canopy on its part, is a new company 
which had much of it’s site security contracts reduced in Iraq (Isenberg 2004: 98), while 
Groupe EHC is a French company likely to be opting for market shares in the wake of the 
booming business originating from the war in Iraq and the Afghanistan reconstruction efforts. 
                                                 
90
 There are indications that the status of AirScan is somewhat undetermined; their webpage does no longer 
provide any information whatsoever. PMCs and PSCs sometimes appear to disappear from the arena for shorter 
periods, sometimes due to lack of business, rearrangements, rebranding efforts, or due to being in a process of 
merging with other companies.  
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Brooks himself asserts that the association has attracted new members due to the Code of 
Conduct having “caught on” among potential clients, an effect he expects to bring in further 
member companies (Brooks, personal communication, May 2005).  
 
7.3 Regulation – a tool for legitimization? 
“To put it bluntly, the cheese industry is better regulated than the private military 
industry" 
-  Peter W. Singer (2004: 14). 
 
The private security and military industry is currently evaded from any international 
regulatory regime or international legislation. According to Holmqvist there is little hope of 
any such measures to be established sometime soon (Holmqvist 2005: 45).  
 
7.3.1 The legal limbo 
On a national level, only the US and South Africa have regulation concerning the export of 
military services, while Great Britain has embarked upon the process through a Green Paper, 
but has so far failed to produce any legislation (Holmqvist 2005: 50). In the case of Iraq, 
contractors are effectively granted immunity from local prosecution under CPA Order 17 
(issued in June 2003 and renewed on 27 June 2004 to remain in force for the duration of the 
mandate authorizing the Multinational Force) (CPA 2004: section 4). However, contractors 
working for the US Department of Defence can in theory be prosecuted under the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (House of Representatives, Public Law 106-778), 
known as MEJA. To this date, however, there are apparently no reports of PSC/PMC 
personnel having been prosecuted under MEJA. Company employees working for any other 
agency, or companies of other nationalities, are subject to the eventuality of a prosecution by 
the host nation or, possibly in that contractor’s particular home nation. In practice this has 
meant that PSC and PMC employees essentially have been in a ‘legal limbo’ in states such as 
Iraq and many other disrupted states. While lack of formal accountability could at times work 
out to a company’s advantage, it certainly has its price in terms of the industry’s legitimacy.  
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7.3.2 Lack of accountability  
The fact that apparently not one criminal charge has been charged against any of the 
approximately 20,000 security contractors working in Iraq over the past two years, while the 
military justice system has investigated and prosecuted hundreds of soldiers in Iraq, (The 
News and Observer January 9th 2005), lends few signs of any accountability in terms of 
PSC/PMCs operating in Iraq.91 These conditions are confirmed by the Director of the Private 
Security Association of Iraq, Lawrence Peter, who cannot even recall one single reprimand of 
a PSC employee in Iraq during the past year (Frontline Documentary 2005). The sharp 
difference between the status of soldiers and private personnel was illustrated by the handling 
of the Abu Graib scandal. Several soldiers have been prosecuted and sentenced, while none of 
the implicated CACI and TITAN contractors faced prosecution despite the fact that these 
contractors allegedly were involved in an estimated 36 per cent of the proven abuse incidents 
at the interrogation facility (Singer 2004: 13).  Brooks testifies to the fact that improving 
accountability “makes good business sense, because potential clients are much more likely to 
hire firms with records of proper behaviour” (Neff and Price 2005). The lacking regulation 
has thus not served to bestow the industry with a genuine legitimacy. Since some degree of 
legitimacy is a prerequisite for UN contracting, as well as for contracting with most developed 
states, the industry has become much more focused on improving its legitimacy base. The 
opting for regulation on part of individual companies as well as collectively through IPOA 
can indeed be seen as a bid for legitimacy. As an illustration of the attention to the subject, 
Brooks himself is currently working on a PhD relating to the regulation of the industry 
(Brooks interview 2005). Regulation would in fact help keep the legitimate segments of the 
industry from the less serious ones and help potential customers choosing business partners. 
To the serious reputable segments of the industry, regulation would then arguably serve as a 
stamp of approval. 
 
7.3.3 Self-regulation for legitimacy 
 In the absence of international regulation, the industry has embarked upon its own regulation. 
IPOA has drafted a code of conduct compulsive to their member companies stressing e.g. 
                                                 
91
 Iraq is in many respects the ‘laboratory’ of how legal issues concerning security contractors are to be dealt 
with. Therefore, the privatized elements of the Iraq war are likely to stir additional debate in its aftermath and 
most likely provoke some changes in terms of regulatory measures.  
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member companies’ adherence to international human rights protocols and conventions 
(IPOA code of conduct 2005). The code appears however, to be more of an advertisement tool 
to company managers for IPOA membership, than a guide for field staff. Additionally, it is 
likely to be helpful in that IPOA have something to show for in discussion with NGOs and 
other actors that might worry about the residing lack of regulation of the industry. Brooks 
affirms that the Code received no resistance or efforts of amendment by the member 
companies when it was introduced to them, because they would individually already have a 
set of established rules to go by, which were in fact stricter than the IPOA code (Brooks 
interview 2005).92 IPOA is apparently also working on some financial penalty arrangements 
that would be used to reinforce the message of the Code (ibid). Whether IPOA could muster 
the needed authority among its members to make such an initiative assert to more than 
another PR trick, is uncertain, at best. The role of the association seems to be limited to an 
outward advocacy role, rather than as one with much leverage on the day-to-day dealings of 
its member companies. Regulation is thus seen by the segments of the business opting for 
business in the international realm, such as UN engagement, as a very important door opener. 
    
7.3.4 Other impediments to legitimacy 
Disassociation with mercenarism is another crucial aspect in terms of legitimacy. As long as 
PSCs and PMCs are not covered by international regulations and there are ambiguities in 
terms of how they are to be handled in terms of international law, they will not be fully 
excluded from the perceived mercenary realm. One of the problems here is that the legal 
definition of the term ‘mercenary’ is out of date by failing to fully cover contemporary 
versions of mercenarism and therefore does little good to companies seeking to distance 
themselves from that label.  
 
Industry advocates are also eager to remove practical impediments to the alignment of the 
industry to the mainstream business community. Arrangements such as insurance and liability 
issues are currently worked on.93 In particular, the question of liability is described by Lt Col. 
La Brie, Senior Staff Officer Contracts Canadian National Defence, as an especially difficult 
                                                 
92
 Triple Canopy, Hart, DynCorp are among the companies with their own code of conduct (Triple Canopy home 
page, Hart home page, DynCorp home page). 
93
 This is seems to have been brought to interest especially in the aftermath of the killing and lynching of four 
Blackwater employees in Fallujah in March 2004, which led the families of the victims to file lawsuits against 
Blackwater for fraud and wrongful deaths (Neff and Price 2005).   
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arrangement to solve on a general basis (Conference discussion), such arrangements would go 
both ways in serving both the industry as well as their employer.94 However, any 
arrangements that will serve to align the PSC/PMC industry to just any other industry serve 
their legitimizing purpose in that it would decrease mystery and sensationalism that still 
surround the industry, reduce risks, and assure a more even profit base.   
 
The intrinsic relationship between legitimacy and profit is acknowledged by Doug Brooks, as 
he asserts that “the increasing number of public sector contracts will result in legitimization” 
and that “the key to accessing these future international contracts will be to develop rapidly 
stellar reputations for efficiency, ethics and humanitarianism” (Brooks 2001: 141). UN 
cooperation is hence beneficial in two ways; not only does it represent a huge market potential 
in itself, but association with the UN agencies, programmes and funds is no doubt a way for 
the companies to enhance their reputation given the political and moral salience of the 
organization. Such association will also provide a door opener to other market segments such 
as to individual state militaries in countries still sceptical of widespread outsourcing. 
 
As set out in P5 it seems the determined focus on the more acceptable normative outlook of 
the industry has been successful. The continuous efforts to sanitize the industry’s image have 
led to improved moral affiliations of the industry, which in turn have contributed to it 
becoming a viable option for remedying the shortcomings of the United Nations identified in 
chapter 5.  
 
7.4 The private security and military industry’s aspirations for UN work 
“The consortium is prepared to offer a greater degree of transparency and 
accountability than any UN peacekeeping operation has EVER provided. The 
consortium members fully expect to be held at a higher standard than typical UN 
operations and are committed to earning the confidence of all concerned parties 
with professionalism and responsiveness” (Brooks 2003: 4) 
 
                                                 
94
 La Brie is responsible for the operational level management of the Canadian Contractor Augmentation 
Program for all Canadian Forces deployed including Iraq and Afghanistan (Conference material, available from 
the author). 
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The UN represents an expanding marketplace for the PSC/PMC industry. The UN 
peacekeeping budget alone is expected to reach close to $5 billion in 2005/2006 (UN 
Information Service 2005), while UN agencies in 2004 procured more than $276 million on 
air transportation services, $21 million on airfield operations and $12 million on security 
equipment and services (UN Procurements Service website). The industry is well aware of the 
market which the organization represents as confirmed by most industry representatives 
spoken to in relation to this thesis (e.g. Mayo of Triple Canopy, Lee of PAE, Pearson of 3S, 
and Brooks of IPOA). ArmorGroup also identifies the UN as a source for profit in its 2005 
Preliminary Results Report: “There are many billions of dollars pledged via the United 
Nations to assist Sudan as soon as the internal situation stabilises sufficiently. ArmorGroup is 
in a prime situation to assist in all these areas” (ArmorGroup 2005: 5).  
 
7.4.1 The UN, the difficult client 
Whereas the mere size of the existing (and potential) UN market most certainly is attractive to 
the industry, the UN is apparently, however, far from an ideal client. According to Brooks, 
head of the International Peace Operations Associations, some companies allegedly have a 
problem engaging with the UN directly, “due to hassles with contracts, bad payment records, 
bias towards US companies, inefficient bureaucracy etc.” and therefore prefer to be hired for 
UN service by member states (Brooks, personal communication, Jan. 2005).95 Mike Pearson 
of 3S, a company that so far has not worked with the UN, confirms that there are rumours in 
the industry of the organization being a challenging client, but that nonetheless, 3S will be 
making an effort to get UN contracts in the future (Pearson, personal conversation 11.07.05). 
Richard Lee of PAE, a company which currently runs six airports in DRC for the UN mission 
in the country affirms that delays in payment sometimes forces companies to take up loans in 
order to keep up while they are awaiting payment. Still, Lee says, companies like his is aware 
of what they are going to with the UN and still pursue UN contracts because “there is a lot of 
business and they like this kind of business” (Lee, personal conversation June 13, 2005). 
Though the organization might be a challenging client to have, the main hindrance appears to 
be to manoeuvre your company in a position to actually be considered for UN contracts in the 
first place. The UN Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) and UNDP have 
developed a 21-pages ‘guide’ to doing business with the UN system, a document that lists 
                                                 
95
 ICI of Oregon allegedly belongs to this category according to Brooks. 
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among its advice: “don’t give up too easily” (IAPSO 2004: 11). The US UN Association 
further has developed a five-step approach of how to do business with the UN in which 
establishing relationships with UN officials and procurement officers is heavily stressed. 
Although potential suppliers should register in supplier roosters to guarantee “equal  
consideration in the selection process”, it is nonetheless stated, “many field officers do not 
rely on supplier rosters, but select bidders based solely on personal relationships” (UNA-USA 
webpage). The apparent lack of coherence and perhaps predictability to procurement 
procedures makes soliciting a contract with the UN a time-consuming and complicated 
process. Mike Pearson Director of 3S, affirms that his company has consulted various UN 
personnel, other suppliers etc. on how to best approach the UN (personal conversation July 
11, 2005).  
 
The UN does keep a list of approved service suppliers, which is updated every year. The 
criteria for becoming listed on this apparently advantageous list, appears however, far less 
streamlined than one should expect. When asked specifically about these criteria IAPSO 
officials refer to a 13- step online registration procedure, which will be evaluated by 
individual agencies. Apparently the agencies evaluate potential business partners from rather 
undefined criteria: “Most agencies will be concerned with the types of goods/services being 
offered by the supplier and whether or not these are relevant, whether the supplier has 
experience in doing business on an international basis, if the company is financially stable and 
can provide trade references etc. (Kerry Kassow, UN Global Marketplace, personal 
communication 17 Aug., 2005).” While there is little controversy invoked in these cited 
criterions, there appears to be equally little systematic coherence or substance. Apparently, 
personal judgements play a rather significant role in this selection process. The lack of 
systematic coherence and procedures thus seems to be a common feature in the UN’s 
procurement procedures, making it increasingly difficult for companies to gain ground 
commercially with the organization solely based on comparative advantages. 
 
7.4.2 Self-invitations for UN work 
In spite of the admission obstacles to the UN market, quite a few companies are willing to 
make the extra effort. Some companies also go beyond ordinary advertisement and lobby 
measures. The first company to suggest a UN operation should be outsourced to them in total 
or in part was Executive Outcomes, which suggested it intervene in Rwanda during the 
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genocide in 1994. According to internal firm plans EO, could have had armed troops on the 
ground in 14 days and fully deployed 1500 personnel, supported by its own air and fire 
support, in six weeks (Singer 2003a: 186). The concept of the operation would have been the 
creation of “security islands” that would have been used to provide safe havens for refugees 
and disaster relief. The estimated costs for a 6-month operation would have been $600,000 
per day ($150 million total), while the UN operation ended up costing approximately $3 
million per day (ibid). While EO had a reputation that (for the most part) was incompatible 
with UN work, other companies have emerged with less stained track records.96 IPOA has on 
behalf of some of its member companies, drafted suggestions for how these companies 
combined could handle parts of the UN operations in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2004 and in DRC 
(MONUC) in 2003.97 The proposal made for supporting the MONUC mandate is a quite 
ambitious one despite the fact that it is described “modest” in the Operational Concept Paper 
(IPOA 2003), while the UNMIS proposal (IPOA 2004a) appears more limited in scale and 
scope.  
 
The proposal for “empowering MONUC” to become “a UN success story” (IPOA 2003: 2-3) 
includes five of IPOA’s member companies: PAE, ICI of Oregon, MPRI, AirScan 
International and Task International (the last two of which are no longer members). These 
companies were envisioned to help establish and maintain a so-called “Security Curtain”, a 
50km-wide demilitarized zone in the Eastern Congo, which would serve as a safe haven for 
internally displaced persons by providing high-tech aerial surveillance, effective rapid 
deployment units, assist in setting up a disarmament program that would implement the 
disarmament and subsequent protection of fighting factions, and run a training program for a 
future Congolese gendarme (IPOA 2003: 4).  
 
Lt. Col. Bjørn Robert Dahl of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment describes the 
‘Details of Operations’ section included in both proposals as indeed very little detailed.98 
However, it is clear that the services the IPOA companies presumably could render MONUC 
cover almost the entire range of services detected as insufficiently taken care of from within 
                                                 
96
 EO was reportedly once deployed by UN personnel for emergency evacuation services in Sierra Leone during 
1996-97 (Pech 1999: 93). 
97
 IPOA has also prepared other proposals for PKO assistance.  
98
 Lt. Col. Dahl was asked by the author to consider the proposals from a professional military angle. He has 
commented on the two papers in part on a general basis, that is, without having extensive knowledge of 
operational details and scale, and in part based on personal empirical experience. 
Sanitization for market shares: From the private security and military industry to the ‘peace 
and stability industry’ 
 119 
the organization in chapter 3-5. In terms of security provision the proposal covers protection 
of civilians under imminent threat; protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment; protection of MONUC personnel; protection for international humanitarian 
operations, and emergency evacuation capabilities for key personnel in crisis situations and a 
24-hour rapid rescue service for MONUC and NGOs (IPOA 2003: 5-6). The proposal 
includes training of Congolese forces for border protection functions; however, there is no 
mention of any security training for UN or UN-related personnel, nor supply of security 
advisors. Otherwise the MONUC proposal comes a long way in covering the full range of 
security duties. It is also noticeable that IPOA takes into account having “forces” on the 
ground as it proposes to protect civilians under imminent threat, and not least, “deter, or if 
necessary, interdict armed factions undermining the UN mandate” (ibid: 5). In an extremely 
violent conflict such as the one in the Ituri province in Eastern Congo, one would have to 
infer that such actions would fall little short of combat, making the proposal increasingly 
controversial. The use of these companies for offensive assignments will necessarily have 
implications what regards international law and the Geneva Convention in particular, as 
private military/security personnel seems to fall in between the established categories, 
conditions which do not seem to be taken into consideration in the proposals.  
 
Furthermore, the MONUC proposal covers contributions to the carrying out of a 
comprehensive demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. The program 
would include complex tasks such as disarmament of the numerous militias and other 
irregular forces present in that conflict, and in particular the Interahamwe and ex-Far, thought 
to be instrumental in the Rwandan genocide (Berdal 2001: 69), “in a peacefully and orderly 
fashion” (IPOA 2003: 5), disarming of civilians, cataloguing, removing and immediately 
destroying all weapons retrieved as well as ensuring that disarmed factions are protected from 
reprisals (ibid). While DDR services is an area where private actors can be expected to 
expand (7.1 above), the proposal with regard to DDR seems to be in line with the rest of the 
proposal as described by Lt Col. Dahl as somewhat superficial and not very well considered 
in that it seems to underestimate the degree of difficulty and the scale of the suggested 
assignments (Dahl, personal correspondence June 22, 2005).  
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When asked why ArmorGroup, an IPOA company which contracts with the UN on a regular 
basis, was not among the companies behind the Congo proposal, John Millar, the company’s 
Director of Business Development answered: 
 
“We do not see our company as an offensive company or company that can 
replace military force other than for purely non-military protective services such 
as say protecting humanitarian resupply in a sufficiently permissive environment. 
There are many services and contracts that we will not consider, and we do not 
advocate that private security companies are a replacement for military 
personnel” (Millar, e-mail interview July 4, 2005). 
 
Evidently, ArmorGroup has rendered the proposal too controversial to go along with based on 
the envisioned use of force included in the proposal. 
 
In terms of support functions the proposal contains the establishment of communication 
networks, medical evacuations, and general logistics for both NGOs and humanitarian 
organizations. The consortium also proposes to carry out demining activities as well as 
ordnance disposal operations and to provide 24-hour medical facilities (IPOA 2003: 6), which 
can be categorized as expert functions. The support and expert functions are less controversial 
services in general, but nonetheless demanding. 
 
The total costs of such a deployment would presumably amount to between $ 100 and 200 
million annually, providing MONUC expanded to its authorized size of 8,700. The estimate 
then totals 10 to 20 per cent of the total cost ($ 1 billion) of the current mission (ibid). IPOA 
further suggests its fee to be provided as a proportion of the United States’ normal 27% 
contribution to the MONUC budget. This last aspect is interesting in light of the industry’s 
concern with the UN as a client, and also since TASK international, a specialized security 
firm utilizing primarily Nepalese Gurkha veterans (ibid: 3), is a British firm (TASK 
international website). The cost estimate can only be described as extremely rough, and 
appears rather unfounded (Dahl, personal correspondence June 22, 2005).  
 
A somewhat less ambitious proposal was launched in 2004 for the UN Mission in Sudan.  No 
offensive support is offered on the offset, even though the UNMIS mandate does in fact 
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contain a Chapter VII component. The likelihood of extensive enforcement being required in 
the Sudan mission is however not impending. The proposal for UNMIS is very brief and 
contains a very limited amount of information as to what exactly the companies are offering. 
Roughly it is stated that the companies (in this case there is no listing of the actual companies 
included in the proposal) would provide “critical aerial intelligence and mobility capabilities 
along with essential logistical support and construction capabilities” (IPOA 2004a: 1). These 
services thus belong to the expert and support categories of services. No security services are 
offered; on the contrary, IPOA in this case bases the proposal on the 3,000 UN peacekeepers 
to provide base security (ibid). The proposal also asserts that “base locations would be made 
available and would not require extensive reconstruction”, an assumption that, according to 
Dahl, very likely would spoil the plan at the offset (Dahl, personal communication) 22.06.05). 
Sudan being geographically the biggest country on the continent, the lack of infrastructure 
and the provision of only 3,000 peacekeepers would thus render these two assumptions rather 
unrealistic, as peacekeepers would be needed for other tasks but base security. Base security, 
on the other hand, would perhaps be a more reasonable task to contract out (ibid). Curiously, 
IPOA presents no offer to perform the “base reconstruction” referred to in the proposal, even 
though IPOA member company PAE has a division specializing in camp construction and 
maintenance (PAE advertisement material).    
  
In general, the two IPOA concept papers appear to be more for commercial purposes than a 
source for extensive information for UN mission planners. The fact that these proposals are 
readily available on the Internet also seems to support this conclusion. According to Dahl, 
some of the formulations in the Congo paper would most likely have negative effects on 
mission officials, as they display a rather arrogant attitude by both blatantly questioning UN 
skills and praising the consortium’s skills (Dahl, personal communication 22.06.05).      
 
Blackwater USA, a rather high profiled PMC, is another company to have launched the idea 
of their company performing peace operations duties. Eric Prince, Blackwater CEO, in 
February 2005 proposed the company could put together a “quick-reaction force” to provide 
security for NGOs and to “deal with” the Janjaweed militia in Sudan’s western region of 
Darfur (Hodge 2005).  Such a force would be put under UN, NATO or US control, but would 
be supplied, managed and lead by Blackwater (ibid).  
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These kinds of suggestions echoes the EO suggestion for Rwanda by in an obvious manner, 
crossing the threshold of offensiveness of which most companies currently working with the 
UN tends to steer clear of. Crossing the threshold would have implications for the already 
porous dividing line between mercenarism and security work, which most companies eagerly 
work to uphold. Initiatives such as the Blackwater proposal will most likely not serve to win 
them many UN contracts, on the contrary, UN contracts are more likely to go to companies 
that stay clear of offering offensive services, such as ArmorGroup and others.  It is interesting 
to note that according to Appendix I, it is the companies with fewest UN contracts, or more 
commonly, none at all, which tend to launch uninvited proposals for how they could make a 
UN operation work.  As evident from figure 7.1, ArmorGroup and its predecessor DSL is the 
company most often awarded UN contracts while PAE is represented in 16 per cent of the 
contracts in table AI.1 and Appendix I  PAE was among the companies willing to take part in 
the MONUC proposal, however, the company specializes in logistics and support services, 
which constitute the uncontroversial elements of the proposal. None of the companies 
envisioned for enforcement actions in the proposal are included in the ‘other’ category.  
 
 Figure 7.1: The distribution of companies in UN contracts as recorded in Appendix I 
 
Company distribution in UN Contracts
40 %
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16 %
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DSL/ ArmorGroup
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DynCorp
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The distribution of UN contracts on IPOA member companies versus non- IPOA member 
companies reveals a striking predominance of IPOA companies in the UN realm. Figure 7.2 
illustrates the balance of the two categories.  
 
Figure 7.2: IPOA member companies vs. non-IPOA companies percentage of UN 
contracts 
Percentage of UN contracts held by IPOA member companies
IPOA member contracts
non- IPOA member
contracts
 
 
Companies which subscribe to the IPOA code of conduct, companies which term regards 
themselves parts of the ‘peace and stability industry’ in stead of the ‘military provider 
industry’ or the ‘private security/ military industry’ thus received 62,5 per cent of the total 
contracts recorded for this thesis.  Even though the numbers of contracts operated with is 
rather low, the tendency cannot however be dismissed. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
Evidently, little precludes the industry’s efforts to renovate its character and that way to 
justify and secure its future client base. Quite a few companies have come a long way in 
accommodating to the normative and de facto requirements of the UN and there seems to be a 
general tendency to make an effort to shed any historical ties to illegitimate business among 
the strata of more well reputed companies. While some companies enjoy more success than 
others with their rebranding processes, most companies appear to join the trend and opt for 
images that inspire confidence, responsibility, and accountability. Although there are few 
guarantees that these marketing efforts pay off in every case, developments in the industry 
suggest the selection of services will not decrease in relevance to organizations like the UN. 
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Looking at the total share of the contracts awarded to PSCs/PMCs by the United Nations, P5 
appears largely supported. The efforts to build a profile fitted to the target market appears to 
have paid off and the result is a group of companies that appears an alternative source of 
security, logistics and specialist personnel needed to answer to some of the internal 
shortcomings of the United Nations.  
8. Concluding remarks 
 
“The United Nations once dealt only with Governments. By now we know that 
peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving 
Governments, international organizations, the business community and civil 
society. In today’s world we depend on each other”  
- Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General (UN webpage 26.09.05).  
 
In the current period of increasing proliferation of transnational threats to peace and security 
the relevance of the UN should be as high as ever. Nevertheless, the organization is at present 
facing a broad range of challenges related to its future role in the world community. The 
difficult negotiations of the World Summit 14-16 September 2005, is only the latest testimony 
of the increasingly difficult climate facing the UN. At the same time, the private sector’s role 
in security has burgeoned. A growing transnational market for force now exists alongside, and 
intertwined with, national and inter-governmental forces. The private security and military 
industry has recently undergone both quantitative and qualitative changes that have enabled 
them to be hired by commercial companies, national governments and international 
organizations like the United Nations on a global scale. This thesis has attempted to shed light 
on the UN’s actual use of private security and military companies by providing systemized 
accounts of such use, as well as a combined explanatory framework for why the UN has come 
to depend on these companies in a range of its missions. In order to do so, 32 reports of UN 
contracts with PSCs/PMCs were collected and categorized. Three main service categories 
were singled out as the ones mostly made use of by the UN: security services, logistic and 
support services, and services requiring expert competencies. To explain the use of these 
services, five propositions were drawn up based on the analytical framework presented in 
chapter 2:  
 
P1:  Enhanced expectations to the comprehensiveness of UN action have contributed to the 
organization’s deployment of private security and private military companies. 
 
P2:  Radicalization of operating environments has contributed to the UN deploying private 
security and private military companies.  
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P3:  Inadequate internal capacity has contributed to the UN deploying private security and 
private military companies. 
 
P4:   Pools of available trained personnel have contributed to the organization’s deployment of 
private security and private military companies. 
 
P5:  A credible private security and military industry has contributed to the organization’s 
deployment of private security and military companies. 
 
In the corresponding five analyzing chapters all five propositions were found to have validity, 
however to different degrees. While enhanced expectations to the UN and radicalization of 
operating environment have worked to deteriorate the preconditions for UN missions, the 
organization has had serious limitations regarding internal capacity to deal with the existing 
workload, and even less so with the challenges placed by new and complicated tasks. Pools of 
available personnel have enabled the industry to become a booming business, but have not 
directly lead the UN to use PSCs and PMCs. The relevance of P4 was then questioned to some 
degree in the analysis. It was subsequently regarded more of an underlying factor than an 
explanatory factor in the UN context. Sanitizing efforts resulting in an altered character of the 
industry, both in terms of de facto service offer as well as normative appearance were 
confirmed to have a considerable effect. The companies that have subscribed to these efforts 
tend to frequent the UN supplier base and the list of contracts in Appendix I, while other 
companies appear used in a more ad hoc manner. Although each of these factors individually 
was to found have contributed to explaining the UN’s use of private security and military 
companies, they need to be seen in aggregate terms in order to fully explain the phenomenon. 
The interaction of these explanatory factors have worked to have mutual reinforcement, and 
although not excluding other factors, appear to largely have provided a clarification of the 
UN’s deployment of PSCs and PMCs during the past decade and a half.  
 
In the current international climate it has become essential for the UN to evolve beyond 
exclusively working through government channels, and to discover new ways of improving 
its missions. A number of private security and military companies have contributed to 
enhancing levels of proficiency and efficiency of UN operations in the past. In some cases 
where they were not deployed their use might have benefited the operation and populations 
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affected by conflict. However, continued or increased UN reliance on PSCs and PMCs entails 
several concerns.  
8.1 A double-edged solution    
Individual member states such as the UK, The US and South Africa have embarked upon the 
examination of legislation and regulation of the private security industry. The ICRC has 
admitted using PSCs and PMCs in “exceptional circumstances” and has consequently worked 
out plans for a more systematic approach to establish dialogues with the industry (ICRC 
2004). The UN however, has taken no initiative to come to terms with the many problematic 
aspects of PSC/PMC presence in conflicts. There is a growing need for the UN to start 
discussing its own use of PSCs and PMCs; only then will it be possible to fully disclose the 
background for their PSC/PMC service demand. The current strategy of concealment only 
works to mystify the practice, and not least to add to present perceptions of a biased and 
opaque business culture within the organization. The UN then needs to develop coherent 
standards and criterions for companies to comply with, in order to qualify for contracts with 
the organization. These would include adherence to international humanitarian law and track 
records of individual adherence to the same standards (Holmqvist 2005: 46). The disclosed 
nature of UN PSC/PMC contracting needs to be altered. Efforts to make the practice more 
transparent would have the effect of increasing accountability and would imply a relaxation of 
the principle of ‘client confidentiality’ in UN contexts, which effectively blocks discussions 
of companies’ roles and conduct in UN operations (ibid).99 Publication of rules of engagement 
and contract scope would in the end only constitute further details of the UN mandates. In this 
connection issues concerning chain of command would also need to be resolved. There is thus 
a need not only for the UN to tackle the issue of its own use, but also to invite to further 
debate on the conditions on which private means of security are used by member states within 
conflict zones in general. The UN should develop specific guidelines for humanitarian use of 
PSCs and PMCs and the corresponding tools to monitor them. Such guidelines would serve 
both humanitarians and the industry by simplifying the contracting in each case and assuring 
adherence to international humanitarian law.      
 
The prospects for international regulation are limited by the UN’s use of PSCs/PMCs. It 
appears that the organization is not willing to deal with their own use until there is 
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international regulation (and thus some degree of legitimacy) on the table, the paradox thus 
resides with the fact that the UN is often pointed out as the vehicle for such regulation either 
through the office of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, or the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  
 
There are other problems related to the privatization of security highly relevant to the UN as 
an agent for international security. While member states prioritize which missions to support 
by its internal interests, increased reliance of privatized security suggests that the problem of 
uneven provision of security be unresolved, or possibly accentuated through UN deployment 
of PSCs and PMCs as it could lead to a more dispersed and differentiated provision of 
security and services. Such problems were evident during the NATO operation in Croatia, 
where MPRI was hired to train the new Croatian army, an exercise financed by a number of 
Muslim countries including Brunei, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates (Mandel 2001: 142). In a UN context differing cleavages between member states in 
such scenarios carry the potential of undermining the broadening of the security community 
of the organization. The eventuality of member states taking advantage of PSC/PMC 
endorsement to a greater degree should also be kept in mind. As pointed out by Avant, rather 
than being a tool for enhancing UN operations, PSCs and PMCs could become a means 
through which individual states or organizations could accomplish goals abroad without the 
involvement of the UN (Avant 2004: 157). 
 
Privatization has its costs. Outsourcing tasks formerly taken care of by the organization 
requires resources in order to administer contracts and contract compliance. The organization 
has, as mentioned above, already certain limitations to its internal procurement arrangements. 
The satisfactory handling of sensitive PSC/PMC contracts is thus likely to pose a considerable 
burden on this system. ”Establishing personal relationships with the procurement officers in 
the field” should hardly be the continued guideline for PSCs and PMCs seeking to do 
business with the UN.100 The shortcomings of UN contracting routines are illustrated by the 
listing of Titan Corp. on its January 2005 List of Approved Suppliers. Titan Corp. employees 
were e.g. central in the abuse scandal related to the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2004.101 The 
UN has also been known to contract so-called ‘double dippers’ on a regular basis. These 
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 See section 7.4 above. 
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 The company also happen to be under investigation by the US Justice Department Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for bribery charges in five countries, according to the US NGO CorpWatch homepage. 
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companies are accused of having profited from previously producing the landmines they are 
now being paid to remove (Sherman 2005).102 The apparent lack of contracting proficiency 
holds few promises for the current transparency and management of PSC/PMC contracts in 
the UN system. 
 
8.2 Prospects and realities 
The private security and military industry is not a temporary phenomenon. The industry’s 
exceptional expansion at the commencement of the 21st century has been in the realm of 
industrialized state endeavours, and is likely to continue along that path.  Although segments 
of the industry will continue to cater primarily to governments and non-state actors in 
developing countries, there are vast market potentials in relation to developed countries, both 
domestically and internationally. Streamlining and restructuring of national defences are 
producing niches in the market for the private market to fill. The demonstrated ability of the 
PSC/PMC industry to adapt to market fluctuations suggests that the service menus are likely 
to be equally streamlined. While the recent uncontrolled boom in relation to the war efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has produced an uneven and unripe industry, the industry in all 
likelihood now faces a stabilization period, which will dry up the industry segments that fail 
to comply with normative and practical standards. In the absence of international regulation 
companies are vulnerable to reputational shifts, and in the process of maturation, the private 
security and military industry scene is likely to face certain replacements.  
 
Illustrated by the US Senate appropriations bill quoted in the Introduction chapter to this 
thesis, admittance to national markets for PSC/PMC services is closely linked to an expanded 
admittance to the UN market. Little also indicates that the organization will face a decreased 
need for PSC/PMC services in the future. The current international climate does not seem to 
favour the UN in terms of contributions of skilled personnel. The fact that the most powerful 
member states appear to regard the organization an instrument always possible to ‘fall back 
on’, does not hold much promise of an immediate improvement in developed member state 
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 The South African company Mechem and the Zimbabwean Mine Tech are companies accused of  ‘double-
dipping’. Mechem has been contracted by the UN agencies on numerous occasions: By the UNDP’s Mine 
Action Capacity Building Programme in Eritrea in 2004 (UNMEE 2004), by the UN Office for Project Services 
in Sudan in 2004, by MONUC in DRC in 2002, by the UN Oil for Food Programme in Northern Iraq in 1997 
(Landmine Monitor Report 2004). Mine Tech has, according to its website, been hired by the UN in places like 
Croatia and Kosovo (Mine Tech web page 26.09.05).  . 
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contributions of support, expert or security personnel. On the other hand, the optimism on part 
of the UN regarding personnel contributions also appears to have its limitations. The new 
security system, which includes the establishment of a UN Directorate of Security103, is 
estimated to cost $97,1 million, including one-time requirements of $29,6 million, which is to 
be funded to a greater extend through the regular budget (UN SG 2004b: §16). Table 8.1 
illustrates the increased focus on organizational security as an alternative of relying on 
donations and extra-budgetary sources. 
 
Table 8.1 UN Security spending as part of the new security system 
 
Source: UN Secretary-General 2004b: Annex II) 
 
The increase in spending on security sector posts amounts to 48 per cent. There will be 778 
new posts emerging from the establishment of the Directorate of Security (ibid: Annex IV), 
the distribution of which will grant 309 positions to the Safety and Security Services (S&SS) 
and 112 to the Field Security Operations (the former UNSECOORD) (UN SG 2004b: Annex 
VIII). It can thus be concluded that a reasonable share of the new post will be directed 
towards fieldwork, or as is often the case, to the administration thereof. The most interesting 
resource growth however, is found in the increase in “contractual services” and in 
“consultants and experts”. The expenses related to security contracts are estimated to increase 
with 110 per cent in the biennium 2004-2005, as a consequence of the new security system. 
$2,7 million additional dollars are expected spent on these services. The resources spent on 
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consultants and experts are planned increased by 400 per cent, or 0,2 million dollars (ibid: 
Annex II). Contracting for security thus appears to be an inherent part of the new security 
system, and although it is uncertain how big a share will be awarded PSCs and PMCs 
specifically, the UN market for private security and military companies clearly is in 
expansion.   
 
There are clear indications to that the scenarios described from Congo and from the former 
Yugoslavia have become more than anecdotes from especially underprivileged missions. The 
future ability of the UN to make a real difference in conflicts is by the end of the day in the 
hands of its member states. So, it appears, are the revenues of the private security and military 
industry. Unless the promises made at formal conventions such as the Millennium Summit, 
are met by member state means, there are certain possibilities that they increasingly will be 
met by private means. 
Appendix I: UN’s use of PMCs and PSCs 
 
Appendix I presents the empirical basis for answering the “how” part of the research question. 
The first part (a) is thus an account of the 32 contracts between UN organizations (normally 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, or one of the humanitarian agencies, 
programmes and funds) and private security and military companies. The different contracts 
records vary in terms of specification, as the access to information is often very limited. The 
sources are listed under each contract. As mentioned in chapter one, in cases where the 
sources appear less secure (such as newspapers etc.), these are supplemented with additional 
sources. However, the presence of multiple sources does not necessarily infer inferiority of 
any of them.    
 
The second part of the Appendix, part b, systemizes the information from the contracts with 
regard to service category and context, that is, the operating environment of the contract. 
Appendix Ic explains the basis and particularities of the plotting of the table in b). 
 
Appendix Ia 
 
1. DSL in the Balkans 1992. 
DSL began providing security and logistical personnel to the UNPROFOR in former 
Yugoslavia, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 
1992, becoming the largest contractor to this mission with at least 430 personnel by February 
1995. 
Ref: Alex Vines 1999: 134 
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5 
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2. DSL in Somalia 
DSL provided the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) with a Security Officer in 
Somalia.  
Ref: Vaux 2002: 16. 
Ref: Appendix I, Musah and Fayemi 
DSL in Somalia 
 
DSL was hired by the UN for police training purposes in Somalia in the early 1990s. 
Ref: Memorandum from General Sir David Ramsbotham, SCFA appendix 1: §5) 
 
3. DSL in Angola 
DSL also provided the WFP with a temporary Security Officer in Angola 
Ref: Vaux 2002: 16. 
 
4. DSL in Sudan.  
Defence Systems Limited provided a temporary Security Officer for UNICEF in Sudan.  
Ref: Vaux 2002: 16. 
 
5. DSL in Mozambique approximately 1995.  
DSL was hired by the UN mission (ONUMOZ) for disarming of militia and demining of  
munitions and mines. For the following four years DSL ran UN courses in the same country, 
training managers and quality controllers of demining programs.  DSL also provided security 
and logistic support to ONUMOZ.   
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §6-7, appendix 6, §80 
John Millar (e-mail interview 04.07.05), however does not specify what the contract was for. 
 
6. EO in Sierra Leone 1996-1997 
EO provided emergency evacuation services to UN staff members in Sierra Leone. 
Ref: Pech 1999: 93. 
 
7. DSL in Angola 
DSL has provided local guards and logistic support to UN peacekeepers in 
UNAVEM in Angola in the past.  
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Ref: Lilly 2000a: 55.  
 
DSL in Angola 
DSL was also hired to protect the UN Special Representative (Dame Margaret Anstey) in 
Angola  
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5 
 
8. DSL in Afghanistan, early-mid 1990s 
DSL was hired to train UN staff in security and other practical requirements. 
Ref: SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5 
 
9. ICI Oregon in Liberia in the mid-1990s 
ICI provided heavy airlift services as well as transported troops into combat zones. 
During the Liberia contract ICI crew was caught by a fighting faction and tortured. 
Ref: Hukill 2004: 1527 
 
10. International Charter Incorporated (ICI) in Haiti 1996  
ICI of Oregon was engaged at various times by the UN (as well as by the US and ECOWAS) 
to ferry by helicopter personnel, troops and humanitarian supplies into and within the country 
to support the peacekeeping operations as well as to provide medical evacuation capability. 
Ref: International Charter Incorporated of Oregon homepage. 
 
11. ArmorGroup in Bosnia from1996 on. 
ArmorGroup’s locally registered entity Mine Action Services Limited performed training and 
clearance works for various UN agencies. 
Ref: John Millar Director of Business Development personal communication 2005 
ArmourGroup Mine Action web page.    
 
12. LifeGuard in Sierra Leone 1998. 
LifeGuard provided security services to UN relief operations in and around Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. (LifeGuard is associated with the EO/ Sandline network and draws its personnel from 
the same pool. 
Ref: Africa Confidential, vol. 39, no 21: 2. 
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13. DynCorp in Angola 1998. 
DynCorp provided logistic support for to the UN mission in Angola (MONUA) in 1998. 
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004  
 
14. DynCorp in Bosnia 
DynCorp was contracted to provide police officers for the 2,100-member UN international 
police task force in Bosnia. DynCorp employees were later found incorporated in criminal 
acts as in child prostitution rings. 
Ref: Singer 2003a: 6. 
Ref: Barnett and Hughes 2001. 
 
15. DSL in Sierra Leone 1998. 
DSL was hired to perform security duties for UN humanitarian relief convoys by the UNDP 
in Sierra Leone. 
Ref: Musah and Fayemi Appendix I 
Ref: Africa Confidential, Vol 39, no21 
 
16. DynCorp in East Timor 1999. 
DynCorp won a $10 million contract to operate and maintain helicopters for the Australia-led 
UN mission in East Timor. The company’s work was extended to June 30 2002 by a $6 
million contract awarded to the firm in November 2001. 
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004 
 
DynCorp in East Timor 
DynCorp is reported to in general supply the UN’s logistics, transport, and communications in 
the East Timor operation 
Ref: Singer 2003a: 183 
 
17. DynCorp in Sierra Leone 2000.  
The company provided logistic support for the UN force in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 
Ref: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002: 8 
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004 
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18. PAE in Sierra Leone 2000. 
The company has provided logistic support for the UN force in Sierra Leone  
(UNAMSIL). 
Ref: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002: 8. 
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004 
Confirmed by Senior Consultant PAE, Gen. (ret’d) Ernest B. Beno (personal    
communication August 2005). 
 
19. DSL in Kosovo 2001. 
DSL worked under the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) and the 
UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Centre removing landmines. DSL was funded by the 
United Kingdom Department of International Development 
Ref: Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordination for Kosovo 2001: Annex A 
 
20. PAE in DRC 2001. 
PAE was contracted by the UN to support the expanded UN peacekeeping mission by 
replacing South African Air Force Specialists. The company’s work was later subject to 
investigation by the UN auditors on grounds of over-billing  
Ref: Chatterjee 2004. 
Contract confirmed by Senior Consultant PAE, Gen. (ret’d) Ernest B. Beno (personal 
communication August 2005). 
 
21. Pacific Architects & Engineers in East Timor 2001. 
PAE won a $4.7 million contract to support the UN mission in the country. The contract 
includes the logistics and maintenance of four airfields on the island nation. 
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004 
Confirmed by Senior Consultant PAE, Gen. (ret’d) Ernest B. Beno (personal    
communication August 2005). 
 
22. Global Development Four in Kosovo 
GD4 supplied and maintained vehicles used by the Kosovo police through the UN mission in 
the region. 
Ref: www.ICIJ.org, accessed 23.02.2004 
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23. Kroll Associates in Angola 2001. 
A Security Council committee monitoring sanctions violations in Angola in 2001 hired Kroll 
Associates for nearly $100,000 to trace the financial assets of UNITA rebel Jonas Savimbi. 
Ref: Lynch 2001: A15. 
 
24. ArmorGroup in DRC. 
ArmorGroup has provided security and logistic support to the UN peacekeeping mission in 
DRC (MONUC). 
Ref: Memorandum from ArmorGroup Services Limited Select Committee of Foreign Affairs 
Minutes of Evidence., appendix 6, §80. 
 
25. KZN Security in East Timor 2001. 
KZN Security was contracted to provide local intelligence to the UN operation in East Timor 
in 2001. 
Ref: Singer 2003a: 183 
 
26. Empower Loss Control Services in East Timor 2001. 
Another South African based companies, which were contracted to provide local intelligence 
to the UN operation. 
Ref: Singer 2003a: 183 
 
27. Pacific Architects & Engineers in Democratic Republic of Congo 2004. 
Manages air traffic control in that country, as well as security for UN infrastructure and 
personnel in Kinshasa. 
Ref: Richard T. Lee, PAE Business Development Manager, personal communication June 
2005 
Ref: Hukill 2004: 1527 
Ref: Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 208 
 
28. PAE in Ivory Coast 
Provide fuel, vehicles, and rations for the new UN mission in Ivory Coast 
Ref: Hukill 2004.  
Confirmed by Senior Consultant PAE, Gen. (ret’d) Ernest B. Beno (personal    
communication August 2005). 
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29. Global Strategies Group 2004. 
Global Strategies Group provides security in general in Iraq. 
Ref: DCAF 2004: 5. 
 
30. Global Strategies Group in Afghanistan 2004. 
Global Risk Strategies provided advice to the UN on security for the presidential elections. 
GRS staff assisted the Joint Electoral Management Body and the UN by identifying and 
assessing potential Voter Registration Sites, and provided other critical operational and 
logistical support to this process. GRS also provided security training and assistance. 
Ref: The Asia Foundation website 
Ref: North 2004. 
Ref: Global Strategies Group webpage. 
 
31. ArmorGroup in Cyprus 2004. 
Armorgroup is currently responsible for the demining of the buffer zone on the island.  
 Ref:  John Millar, Director of Business Development ArmorGroup, personal communication 
02.09.2005    
 
32. ArmorGroup in Iraq 2005. 
ArmorGroup has recently won a contract to secure a UN organization in Baghdad.  
Ref: John Millar, Director of Business Development personal communication 2005 
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Inter 
state war 
Intra state 
war 
Disrupted 
state  
Support 
Functions 
Security 
provision 
Expert 
Functions 
1. DSL in the Balkans 1992  X X X X  
2. DSL in Somalia  X X  X  
3. DSL in Angola  X X  X  
4. DSL in Sudan  X X  X  
5. DSL in Mozambique probl. 1995    X   
6. EO in Sierra Leone 1996-97  X X  X  
7. DSL in Angola  X X X X  
8. DSL in Afghanistan   X  X  
9. ICI of Oregon in Liberia mid 1990s  X X X   
10. ICI of Oregon Haiti 1996        * X X X 
11. ArmorGroup in Bosnia 1996 and on   X   X 
12. LifeGuard in Sierra Leone 1998  X X X   
13. DynCorp in Angola, 1998  X X X   
14. DynCorp in Bosnia    X   X 
15. DLS in Sierra Leone in 1998   X  X  
16. DynCorp in East Timor 1999   X X   
17. DynCorp in Sierra Leone 2000  X X X   
18. PAE in Sierra Leone 2000  X X X   
19. DSL in Kosovo 2001    X X  X 
20. PAE in DRC 2001   X   X 
21. PAE in East Timor 2001   X X   
22. GD4 in Kosovo    X   
23. Kroll Ass. In Angola, 2001  X X   X 
24. ArmorGroup DRC   X X X X  
25. KZN Security in East Timor, 2001  X X   X 
26. Empowerment Loss Control in E.T., 2001  X X   X 
27. PAE in DCR, 2004  X X X   
28. PAE in Ivory Coast 2004  X X X   
29. Global Strategies Group in Iraq 2004 X  X  X  
30. Global Stategies Group in Afghanistan 
2004   X X X X 
31. ArmorGroup in Cyprus 2004 and on      X 
32. ArmorGroup in Iraq 2005 X  X  X  
A
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Appendix Ic 
The war status of each contract context is plotted based on the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute Yearbooks Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, editions 
1993-2004. In the case of Afghanistan (record number 8), by lacking exact information on the 
year of the contract the status of the country has been set to ‘internal war’ as this was the 
status recorded in the SIPRI yearbooks during most of the 1990s. The same principle was 
applied in report number 24 regarding the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was 
reportedly in status of civil war largely from 1999 and until the present.  
 
The operationalization of the ‘disrupted states’ category is based on four main indicators 
derived from the UK Department for International Development (DFID)’s definitions of 
fragile states: Territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources and 
the delivery of basic services (DFID 2005: 7). These indicators are further elaborated in Box 
1. 
Box 1: Indicative features of fragile states 
 Capacity Willingness 
State authority 
for safety and 
security 
• The state lacks clear 
international sovereign status 
• The state cannot control its 
external borders or 
significant parts of its 
internal territory  
• One or more groups are 
systematically subjected to 
violence or deliberately 
not provided security by 
the state 
Effective 
political power 
• The power of the executive is 
not subjected to controls, 
either through informal 
(political party) or formal 
(legislature) channels.  
• There are no effective 
channels for political 
participation. 
• Major groups are 
systematically excluded 
from political processes 
Economic 
Management 
• Weak or partial public 
financial tools, such as a 
budget cycle or planning 
process 
• There is no transparency 
in the management of 
natural resource extraction 
Capacity to 
deliver services 
• The state levies less than 
15% of GDP in tax 
• Access to public services 
for specific regions of the 
country is deliberately 
limited.  
  
Source: DFID 2005: 8 
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For the years 1999-2004 contract theatres are thus classified as disrupted or not, based on the 
DFID’s list of fragile states for that period. For 2005, the four indicators have been read from 
the 2005 Foreign Policy Failed States Index, while the years prior to 1999 have been plotted 
by scaling data from the Europa World Yearbook on the four indicators. The Europa World 
Yearbook editions used includes 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999. In addition, 
in relation the borderline cases, Haiti in 1996 and Mozambique during the mid 1990s, Robert 
Rotberg’s Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators (2003), has 
been used to back up information from the Europa World Yearbooks.  
 
The calculations of probability in chapter 4 were conducted by combining the ‘intra state war’ 
variable and the ‘disrupted state’ variable to form on category named ‘aggravated operating 
environment’ (Ao). Presence and absence of Ao was thus combined with the presence and 
absence of ‘support functions’ (S), ‘security provision’, and ‘expert functions’ in turn. 
In the case of the current war in Iraq, an exception was made in that the combination 
‘interstate war’ and ‘disrupted state’ was treated as Ao. This was done in accordance with the 
prevailing disagreements over the status of the war in that country.  
  142 
Appendix II: Alphabetical short list and description of companies 
discussed 
The companies marked * are recorded with UN contracts in this thesis, all others are not.  
  
Aegis Defence Services (UK) 
http://www.aegisdef.com/default.aspx 
 
Headquarters: 118 Piccadilly, London W1J 7NW, United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 20 7495 7495, Fax: +44 20 7495 3979, E-mail: centre@aegisdef.com 
 
Aegis is a new company that surprisingly received a $293 million contract from the US DoD 
to coordinate information between contractors and coalition forces in Iraq. The company is 
headed by Tim Spicer, who is well known from his former company, Sandline International, 
as well as from the Executive Outcomes realm. According to its website, Aegis has two 
divisions: ‘Research and intelligence’ and ‘Security Operations’. The company lists among its 
services “advanced due diligence investigations on companies, individuals and 
organizations”, crisis management and advice, a range of pre-emptive and reactive security 
services etc. (Aegis web page). 
 
 
ArmorGroup* (UK) 
http://www.armorgroup.com 
 
Headquarters: 25 Buckingham Gate, London SW1E 6LD, United Kingdom 
Tel: 44 (0)20 7808 5800, Fax 44 (0)20 7828 2845, E-Mail: Info@armorgroup.com 
 
ArmorGroup is a London-based company that terms itself a “global risk management services 
business”. ArmourGroup is one of the better-established companies in the industry. The 
company is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and reportedly has over 7600 employees 
(ArmorGroup webpage). ArmorGroup is one of the companies most frequently contracted by 
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the UN and is listed by the UN as an approved supplier.104 ArmorGroup reportedly has a long 
history of working with the UN in mine action services and protective security services in 
countries such as Mozambique, DRC, Kenya, Iraq, Bosnia, Cyprus, NYC, Croatia and other 
places (Millar personal correspondence 2005). 
 
 
Blackwater USA (US) 
http://www.blackwaterusa.com 
 
Headquarters: 850 Pudding Ridge Rd. Moyock, NC 27958, USA  
Tel: 252-435-2488, Fax: 252-435-6388, E-mail: susanm@blackwaterusa.com 
 
Blackwater is a US company that markets itself, as “not simply a private security company 
but a turnkey solution provider for 4th generation warfare” has not worked for the UN as far 
as this author is concerned. The company holds several contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Services include security services for coalition facilities, escorting convoys, and providing 
personal bodyguards (e.g. for Paul Bremer). The company also holds training contracts with 
the US navy. Blackwater has recruited ex-Chilean soldiers, including some who served during 
the dictatorship of Gen. Pinochet (Isenberg 2004: 83). The company’s name frequented the 
media in 2004 when four of its employees were killed and mutilated in an ambush in Fallujah, 
an attack that triggered the occupational forces to alter its strategy in the town and launch a 
ground attack (Frontline Documentary).  The killing of the four men also spurred much debate 
regarding liability because of families suing the company on the grounds that the four were 
unequipped for the assignment they were on.  
 
 
CACI (UK) 
http://www.caci.com 
 
Headquarters: 1100 North Glebe Road, Arlington, VA 22201, USA 
Tel: 703-841-7800, Fax: 703-841-7882 
                                                 
104
 however under the name Defence Systems Limited, a company which became after an acquisition constituted 
the main part of ArmorGroup.   
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CACI is a logistics company most famous for its involvement in the Abu Ghraib prison abuse 
where it provided interrogation services. According to their homepage, CACI International 
Inc provides “the IT and network solutions needed to prevail in today's new era of defence, 
intelligence and e-government”. CACI provides a range of services including logistics to the 
US Navy, with a combined value of $125 million (Isenberg 2004: 84).  
 
 
Control Risk Group* (CRG) (UK)  
http://www.crg.com 
 
Headquarters: 83 Victoria Street, London SW1H OHW, United Kingdom 
Tel: (44) (20) 722 1552, Fax: (44) (20) 722 2296 
 
CRG is a company based in London that offers armed guards to protect V.I.Ps, aid workers 
and business. Directors include Sir Michael Rose, former SAS commander and head of UN 
protection force of Bosnia. Currently deploying approximately 500 mainly ex-British military 
personnel in Iraq, especially former SAS personnel (Isenberg 2004: 86).  
 
 
Custer Battles (US) 
http://www.custerbattles.com 
 
Headquarters: 8210 Greensboro Drive, Suite 214, McLean, VA 22102, USA 
Tel: 703-356-2424, Fax: 703-356-3001, E-mail: info@custerbattles.com 
 
Custer Battles is an American veteran owned company formed in 2002 that offers a range of 
security services, kidnap and ransom support, life support, construction, logistics, 
transportation etc. (Custerbattles webpage). The company was charged in a federal lawsuit of 
having charged $ 15 million for security work not performed at the Baghdad International 
Airport. The Pentagon eventually suspended the company from receiving new contracts 
(Witte 2005: A03). 
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Defence Systems Limited (DSL) (AKA ArmorGroup) (UK) 
One of the first companies of its kind DSL was founded in 1981 by Alastair Morrison, a 
former SAS officer. DSL was by 1999 reported to have 130 contracts for 115 clients in 22 
countries (Vines 1999: 71). DSL was the largest PMC/PSC contributor to the UN mission in 
former Yugoslavia in 1992 (SCFA, appendix 1, Ramsbotham §5). DSL’s core business was 
devising and then implementing solutions to complex security problems. Armor Holding 
bought the company in April 1997 (Vines 1999: 71), the new security division of which was 
named ArmorGroup.  
 
 
DynCorp* (US) 
http://www.dyn-intl.com/ 
 
Headquarters: Commercial Security Solutions, James Menendez, 132 National Business 
Parkway, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701, USA (Isenberg 2004:88).  
E-mail: inquiry@dyn-intl.com 
 
DynCorp has an extensive contracting record with US government agencies especially for 
training purposes (Avant 2005: 121). It is responsible for nationally recruiting police officers 
for international assignments on behalf of the US government. In relation to its contract to 
provide police officers for the 2,100 member UN international police task force in Bosnia 
DynCorp employees were found incorporated in organizing child prostitution rings and other 
criminal acts (Singer 2003b: 6). 
 
 
Empower Loss Control Services * 
Empower Loss Control Services is a South African company reported to have supplied 
intelligence services to the UN mission in East Timor in 2001 (Singer 2003a: 183).  
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Erinys International Limited (UK/ South Africa) 
http://www.erinysinternational.com  
 
Headquarters: Old Bank of Kuwait Building, Debra, Dubai, UAE 
Tel: 971 422 33 646, Fax: 971 422 70 099 
 
British/ South African company which’ main business segment is security escort services. 
Currently holds a contract with the US Army Corps of Engineers. Testifies to only employ 
personnel with combat experience, and reports that their employees frequently have had to 
kill insurgents (Melville 2005 interview). The company has held a contract issued by the CPA 
to train a new Iraqi private security force to defend oil facilities and pipelines.  
 
 
Executive Outcomes (South Africa) 
Defunct 
 
South African company commonly called the “world’s first corporate army” which included a 
range of affiliated companies ranging from a travel agency and an airline to extraction 
companies, logistic and military services. The Company was originally based on former 
members of notorious 32 Battalion as well as members of other SADF Special Forces 
regiments from the Apartheid era (O’Brien 2000: 50). EO took an active part in many African 
civil wars, among them, the company was hired by the Sierra Leonean government to help 
fight off RUF rebels in 1995. EO reportedly deployed at least 300 troops in Sierra Leone and 
helped tilt the power balance in favour of the government (Musah and Fayemi 2000: 88-89). 
The company frequently engaged in direct combat and by doing so stands out in comparison 
to the grand majority of companies active today.   
 
 
Global Risk Strategies Ltd.  (UK)* 
http://www.globalgroup.com/risk/ 
 
Headquarters: 6 Stratton Street, London W1J 8LD, United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7491 7492, Email: info.uk@globalgroup.com 
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GRS is the security division of Global Strategies Group according to their web site 
“specialises in security at all levels”. The company is a significant actor in Iraq where it has 
had various UN contracts. GRS is thought to number 1,500 personnel with over 500 ex-
members of the British Army Gurkha regiment (Isenberg 2004: 89).  
 
 
International Charter Incorporated of Oregon* 
http://www.icioregon.com/ 
 
Headquarters: 1860 Hawthorne Ave., NE., Ste 390 Salem, Oregon 97303 USA 
Tel: 503 589 1437, Fax: 503 371 7285, E-mail: info@icioregon.com 
 
According to the IPOA web page ICI is a “private aviation company specializing in relief 
services, peacekeeping support, project management, heavy lift, industry, and VIP transport, 
as well as training for exposure to high risk environments”. ICI crew was reportedly 
kidnapped and tortured while on an assignment for the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia in 
the mid 1990s (Hukill 2004: 1527).  
  
 
Kroll * (US) 
http://www.krollworldwide.com/ 
 
Headquarters: 900 Third Avenue, New York, NY, 10022 
Tel: 212-593-1000, Fax: 212-593-2631 
 
Terms itself a ”risk consulting company” which according to their web site in addition to 
protective security and training, provides a range of other security services, intelligence 
gathering, forensics etc. through their many associated companies.    
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KZN Security Services (South Africa)* 
KZN Security Services is another South African company reported to have supplied 
intelligence services to the UN mission in East Timor in 2001 (Singer 2003a: 183). A pastor 
of the African Evangelical Church allegedly runs the company. 
 
 
Logo Logistics 
Apparently based in the Virgin Island and run by Simon Mann, one of the founders of 
Executive Outcomes. The company was involved in the aborted coup attempt aimed at 
overthrowing Equatorial Guinea president Obiang (Barnett and Smith 2004). The 15 
suspected mercenaries were arrested loading weapons at the Harare Airport in March 2004. It 
was later revealed that Mark Thatcher, Margareth Thatcher’s son had been involved by 
financing a helicopter to be used in the coup. Logo Logistics do not appear to have a web 
page. 
 
 
Mechem* 
http://www.mechemdemining.com/ 
 
Headquarters: Admin. B. Building, 368 Selbourne Avenue, Lyttelton Centurion 0157, South 
Africa. 
Tel: +27 12 620 3403, Fax:  +27 12 664 3528, E-mail: mechem@liw.denel.co.za 
 
Mechem is not regarded a PSC or PMC, but constitutes a division of the South African arms 
manufacturer Denel pty. Mechem is involved in demining and Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD). The company is known for its Apartheid era links, which include implication in 
schemes to supply weapons and explosive devices to ex-members of the state sanctioned hit 
squads. Mechem is also accused of so-called ‘double-dipping’ by having been instrumental in 
the manufacturing of landmines, which they now are paid to clear (Sherman 2005) 
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Medical Support Solutions Ltd. (MSS)  
http://www.medsupportsolutions.com/home.htm 
 
Headquarters: Pine Grove, Garderners Lane, East Wellow, Hamshire SO 51 6AD, United 
Kingdom 
Tel: + 44 (0) 1794 324 877, Fax: + 44 (0) 1794 324 898 
 
MSS specializes in the provision of medical and emergency risk management and remote site 
medical services around the world (IPOA web page). Among the specific services the 
company lists on its web page are surveys and site risk assessments, contingency and 
emergency planning, establishing medical facilities and air ambulances etc. (MSS web page).   
 
 
Mine Tech* (Zimbabwe) 
http://www.minetech.co.uk/ 
 
Headquarters: 22 York Avenue, Highlands, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Tel: 00 263 477 6216, E-mail: minetech@minetech.co.uk 
 
Mine Tech is a Zimbabwean demining company with a security division. MineTech Security, 
according to their website, has the ability to be deployed and work anywhere in the world 
within seven days. MineTech has been accused of hiring workers who were previously 
involved in laying minefields in Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Sherman 2005). 
 
 
MPRI (US) 
http://www.mpri.com/ 
Headquarters: 1201 East Abingdon Drive, Suite 425, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, USATel: 
703-684-0853, Fax: 703-684-3528, E-mail: Info@mpri.l-3com.com
 
MPRI, a branch of L-3 Communications, was formerly known as Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated, but currently only uses its acronym. MPRI is one of the best-known 
private military companies and it holds a very significant position in the lucrative American 
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defence market, which is illustrated by the fact that the company also apparently wrote the 
book on rules for contractors on the battlefield on an assignment for US Army’s Training and 
Doctrine Command (Werve 2004).105 The company offers a very wide selection of services 
ranging from all levels of force training, war-gaming and anti terrorism/force protection to 
“peacekeeping and humanitarian aid” and Democracy Assistance Programs (MPRI web 
page).  
 
 
Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) (US) 
http://www.paechl.com 
 
Headquarters: 888 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1700, Los Angeles, California 90017-5466 
Tel: 213-593-3200, Fax: 213-593-3300, E-mail:  
 
PAE constitutes 9 affiliated companies based in the US that offer worldwide operations and 
maintenance services as well as many other capabilities for all types of military and 
commercial installations. The PAE Group lists five areas of expertise: Base operations 
support services, logistical support services, peacekeeping support services, airfield/ airport 
support services and personnel placement services (advertisement material). Established in 
1955, PAE has a long history of supplying both governments and the UN.  
 
 
Sandline International 
http://www.sandline.com/ 
 
Sandline was a British Executive Outcomes spin-off headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Timothy 
Spicer. Sandline was shut down in April 2004 after a series of bad press in relation to e.g. 
Spicer’s arrest for illegal weapons possession in Papua New Guinea where the company had 
been hired to quell a nine year long armed independence movement in 1997, as well as 
accused of breaking a UN arms embargo to Sierra Leone (Pech 1999: 93-94).  
 
 
                                                 
105
 Field Manual 100-21, titled Contractors on the Battlefield   
  151 
Security Support Solutions (3S) (UK) 
http://www.sss3.co.uk/ 
 
Headquarters: Prince Consort House, 27 Albert Enbankment, London SE1 7TJ, United 
Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0) 207 735 8197, Fax: +44 (0) 207 793 0533, E-mail: Enquiries@sss3.co.uk 
 
3S is a London-based supplier of armoured vehicles and other protective equipment, such as 
helmets, bullets proof vests etc. The Company also provides independent advice, guidance, 
and products to government and non-government clients seeking to increase security and 
protection globally. Does not offer direct security provision.  
 
 
SOC-SMG (Special Operations Consulting – Security Management Group) 
http://www.soc-smg.com/ 
Headquarters: 2393 Heyborne Road, Minden Nevada 83423.  
Tel: 775-783-9277, Fax: 1-775-783-9366 
 
SOC-SMG is a private security consulting and management company, the company offers 
capable of providing international force protection, personal security detail, convoy security 
operations, security consulting and threat assessment, and training (IPOA web page). The 
company claims being veteran owned and with resources to operate worldwide. The company 
lists the Iraqi Coalitional Provisional Authority, the US Department of Defence and several 
commercial companies among their clients (SOC-SMG web page).   
 
 
Titan Corp. 
http://www.titan.com/ 
3033 Science Park Road, San Diego, California 92121 
Tel: (858) 552-9500, Fax: (858) 552-9645
 
Titan Corporation is one of the companies listed by the UN as approved provider of supplies 
or services on the January 2005 list of approved companies. According to the corporation’s 
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home page (www.titan.com) the company provides a very wide range of communications and 
intelligence including war games, army vehicle trainers, force structure analysis, surveillance, 
advice on the management on military assistance to civil authorities and on weapons of mass 
destruction etc. Titan employees were central in the abuse scandal related to the Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq in 2004 were they supplied translation services. The company has been subject 
to an investigation by the US Justice Department Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
for bribery charges against the company in five countries (CorpWatch homepage). 
 
 
Triple Canopy (US)  
http://www.triplecanopy.com/ 
 
Headquarters: 2250 Corporate Park Drive, Suite 300, Herndon, VA 20171, USA 
Tel: +1 703 673 5000, Fax: +1 703 673 5001  
 
Triple Canopy according to their website “excels in executive protection and site security”. 
The company claims to have employees with an average of more than 20 years in “the most 
elite military Special Operations units” Their services furthermore range from discreet travel 
companions to heavily armoured, high profile convoy escort (TP web site). The company is a 
relatively new one, formed in 2003, but quickly received lucrative contracts with the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq (Isenberg 2004: 98). 
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Appendix III: Organizational structure of the new UN security system 
 
      
 
Source: UN Secretary-General 2004b: §17 
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